
INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY ON SANSKRIT POETICS

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DEDICATED
TO

My Parents

Shri Chandubhai Prajapati
and
Smt. Induben Prajapati

With

Love and Respect

युक्तोऽयमात्मसदृशान् प्रति मे प्रयत्नो
नास्त्येव तज्जगति सर्वमनोहरं यत्।
केचिज्ज्वलन्ति विकसन्त्यपरे निमील-
न्त्यन्ये यदभ्युदयभाजि जगत्प्रदीपे।।

(Mahimabhaṭṭa, Vyaktiviveka, I.2)

I. FOREWORD

Dr. Sweta Prajapati's Ph.D. thesis *Influence of Nyāya Philosophy on Sanskrit Poetics* prepared under the guidance of Prof. Dr. R.I. Nanavati, is truly a genuine piece of research in regard to the interdisciplinary influence in the field of Sanskrit śāstras. On the basis of references from the original works of Nyāya as well as Sanskrit Poetics, she has brought out very distinctly the influence of Nyāya Philosophy on Sanskrit Poetics. She has utilised almost all the available works on the topic. In the beginning of the thesis, a brief survey of Sanskrit Poetics, philosophical systems, Nyāya system and Buddhist Logic has been given. Then she has elucidated the Nyāya influence on *Śabdavṛttis*, Poetic blemishes, figures of speech etc., quoting from the *Nyāyasūtras*, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras*, the *Nyāyamañjarī* etc. Then the theory of *Anumāna* has been fully elaborated in the context of Sanskrit Poetics. In this thesis she has also discussed very scholarly topics like Nyāya-methodology, Navya-Nyāya terminology, Buddhist logic etc., with reference to the Sanskrit Poetics.

Though the research has been already made on the topic of influence of Mīmāṁsā, Vyākaraṇa etc. on Sanskrit Poetics, particularly on Alaṅkāraśāstra, this thesis has

exclusively established the Nyāya influence on Sanskrit Poetics. I am confident that this thesis will prove useful to any scholar who wants to study the interdisciplinary influence in the field of Sanskrit śāstras. I wish her all success.

April 16, 1998

Prof. L.V. Joshi,
Retd. Head, Department of
Sanskrit, School of Languages,
Gujarat University,
AHMEDABAD

II. FOREWORD

Amongst various systems of Indian Philosophy, the Nyāya Darśana is known for its all pervading impact with reference to the techniques of analysis and linguistic expression. No discipline under Indian Śāstric learning remained untouched by the impact of Nyāya thought or Nyāya-techniques. Alaṅkāraśastra is no exception. The learned author of this book has examined the co-relation between Nyāya and Alaṅkāraśāstra. She is very well aware of the problems and perspectives of the theme she has undertaken for the investigation. She has also presented an analysis of the development of Nyāya System as well the Buddhist logic. The influence of Nyāya on Alaṅkāraśāstra has been brought out with references to the treatment of *śabdavṛttis*, Poetic Blemishes, *Alaṅkāras* and theory of *Anumāna*. The adoption of Nyāya Methodology in the texts of Alaṅkāraśāstra has also been discussed aptly and the influence of Bauddhanyāya on Sanskrit Poetics has rightly been brought within the perview of this study.

This work is of extra-ordinary merit and brings out both the erudition and insight of Dr. Prajapati into Alaṅkāraśāstra as well as Nyāya. The exposition is exceptionally brilliant and balanced.

Dr. Prajapati deserves special commendation for bringing out new facts or correcting the existing conceptions. For example, she has established that the *tātparya* theory referred to by Mammaṭa in his *Sūtra* : *tātparyārtho'pi keṣucit* in fact

comes from the Nyāya system, and not from the system of Kumārilabhaṭṭa as is generally believed. The correlation between various *Alaṅkāras* and *Doṣas* on one hand and the concepts of Nyāya on the other has been rightly established. The chapter on the influence of Buddhist Logic on Alaṅkāraśāstra is particularly significant, as it provides valuable links for understanding the development of Sanskrit Poetics in a historical perspective.

Indian traditions of Śāstric learning have always developed in interaction and interdependence with each other. This interrelationship has been enriching and strengthening various disciplines. Alaṅkāraśāstra in fact derived motifs, concepts and techniques of analysis from Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā, Nyāya and other Śāstras. To understand Alaṅkāraśāstra, a researcher must be equipped with first-hand knowledge of all these Śāstras. The present work is a right attempt to understand Alaṅkāraśāstra from this point of view. I am confident that it will be equally useful for the students and researchers of Sāhityaśāstra.

Radhavallabh Tripathi
Professor & Head,
Department of Sanskrit,
Dr. Harisingh Gour University,
Sagar (M.P.)

PREFACE

Though Sanskrit Poetics has a long history stretching from unknown beginning, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata is considered as the first work dealing incidentally with some topics of Poetics. From the 6th century A.D. onwards Sanskrit Poetics developed as a separate and systematic Śāstra in the hands of pioneer rhetoricians like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and their successors. During the time of its development various systems of Indian philosophical thought were in vogue. The poeticians in India have taken help of them to make their system scientific and strong. To create an aesthetic beauty of highest kind, knowledge of the three systems, Pada, Vākya and Pramāṇa (Grammar, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya) is necessary. Therefore, the tradition of Sanskrit Poetics has been inspired and influenced by them to a great extent. Among them the Nyāyaśāstra propounded by Akṣ-apāda Gautama and his successors, Buddhists and Jainas, because of its logical nature, scientific method of argumentation, principles of logical analysis and a scientific language exerted considerable influence on almost all the branches of knowledge and Sanskrit Poetics could not be an exception.

Both Prācīna and Navya branches of Nyāya as well as Buddhist logic helped significantly the rhetoricians in building their theories of *Alaṅkāra, Rasa, Dhvani, Doṣa, Śabdavṛttis* etc., and in strengthening them by the method of logical argumentation and thereby making the system sound and scientific. They have not only taken quotations from the works of the great Naiyāyikas but also followed their style, language, technical terms and ideas or concepts. Consequently, a large portion of the expositions of Sanskrit Poetics is quite

difficult to comprehend without a thorough study of Nyāya logic (specially Navya-Nyāya logic). It is also not possible to make an accurate and logical evaluation of great classics like *Vyaktiviveka, Alaṅkārasarvasva, Rasagaṅgādhara, Alaṅkāraratnākara, Alaṅkāramañjuṣā* etc., and the important theories of *Rasa* etc., without a thorough knowledge of Nyāya philosophy.

In spite of such influence and contribution of Nyāyaśāstra on Sanskrit Poetics there was a desideratum of a detailed comprehensive and critical study of the poetic works from the perspective of Nyāya. There was a need of making a comprehensive and critical study of the influence of Nyāya on Sanskrit Poetics. With this in view an attempt is made in this book to bring out a systematic account of some of the notable features of Sanskrit Poetics on which Nyāyaśāstra has exerted influence and an indepth analysis of the factors contributing to it. To the best knowledge of this author, such a study has been attempted here for the first time which naturally leads to a better understanding of the relation of Nyāya and Kāvyaśāstra and thus contributing to the general advancement of knowledge.

The theme of the book is a very wide one and the material for its study is also vast. Hence the inquiry has been restricted to the salient features of the influence of Nyāyaśāstra on diverse aspects of Sanskrit Poetics. While investigation was going on, it was realised that many of the important works of unknown and little-known poeticians (as well as the commentaries especially written by the Naiyāyikas) of Navya-Nyāya period have not been published and some, although published are not available at present. The scope of the study therefore, is restricted only upto the published works of Sanskrit Poetics. On the basis of relevant data from both the systems an indepth analysis of the different aspects of influence is attempted.

The method adopted for the present study is both analytical and critical.

I feel, it is my first and foremost duty to express a deep and heart-felt sense of gratitude, reverence and indebtedness to my revered guide Prof. R.I.Nanavati, Ex-Head, Department of Sanskrit, Pali & Prakrit, presently Director, Oriental Institute, M.S. University of Baroda, who has ably guided me through the thick and thin of this venture. Without his consistent encouragement, guidance and advice, this work could never have reached its completion. In spite of heavy pressure of work, he spent his precious time in discussing various debatable points and took keen interest in going through every detail. It is certainly a pleasure to work with him, in an atmosphere most democratic. I owe him more than what I can express by words.

It gives me immense satisfaction that my work could get the commendation of a great stalwart Prof. L.V. Joshi, Retd. Head, Dept. of Sanskrit, Gujarat University, Ahmedabad as an examiner. I am extremely grateful to him for writing a foreword.

I am very much grateful to Prof. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Head, Dept. of Sanskrit, Shri Harisingh Gaur University, Sagar, for the valuable foreword which he was kind enough to write at my request.

Thanks are also due to Prof. Mrs. Lataben Nanavati and Chi. Esha, who, not only allowed me to use up their time over which they had a claim but even welcomed me to do so and entertained me.

I am highly grateful to my teachers Dr. Mrs. Uma S. Deshpande, Head, Dr. Jaydev Jani, Shri. B.P. Pandya, Dr. L.M. Joshi and Dr. Mrs. K.P. Merh of the Department of Sanskrit, Pali & Prakrit, M.S. University of Baroda for their encouragement.

In spite of the fact that Dr. R.K. Panda is my husband I must thank him for all the help and encouragement that he has given me from the inception of the idea of the thesis to the completion of it.

I take this opportunity to thank my colleagues at Oriental Institute in helping me in different ways in the preparation of the present thesis.

I thank to the authorities of the M.S. University for awarding me the University Research Scholarship which enabled me to persue the present investigation and to give me permission for publishing the present work.

My sincere thanks are due to the authorities of the H.M. Library and Oriental Institute for allowing me to make use of the rich library without which it would not have been possible to complete the work.

I am highly grateful to my meternal uncle Rasikbhai Gurjar and aunt Mrs. Jasudben Gurjar for their help, constant inspiration, love and blessings.

The Publisher, Paramamitra Prakashan, Delhi, deserves my sincere and heart -felt thanks for his kind co-operation in the publication of the book.

Lastly I should never forget to thank my near and dear ones : my parents, my brother and sister, Chi. Urvee, Gulia, Chhaya, Kuna, Tapan, Nilesh, Sunil, Preeti and Shailendra, who have helped me in various ways for bringing my work to publication.

BARODA **Sweta Prajapati**

18.9.98

BLESSINGS

Sweta was one of my better students. Her Ph.D. thesis is also one of the better theses among the lot that is being produced today. Just as a parent sees the child imbibing un-familial influences and developing independent faculties, I saw her developing extra-ālaṁkārika interests and developing Nyāya-discipline also under the influence of her husband Dr. Rabindra Panda (who is one of the better Nyāya-Students). The result is this thesis. I am happy that it has been praised and welcomed by such Scholars as Prof. Radhavallabhji and Prof. Laxmeshji. I am almost sure that, in its published form, it will win approbations of other scholars also.

May Sweta bear her first feather in humility (because that is the prime condition of correct development), multiply her researches and scale further heights.

My blessings.

Saradpurnima,
5th Oct, 1998

R.I. NANAVATI

ABBREVIATIONS

ABh.	Abhinavabhāratī.
AM.	Alaṅkāramañjuṣā.
AP.	Agnipurāṇa.
AR.	Alaṅkārarāghava
AS.	Alaṅkārasarvasva.
ASaṁ.	Alaṅkārasaṁgraha.
BŚP.	Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa (by V. Raghavan).
Ch.	Chapter.
Dh.A.	Dhvanyāloka.
Ed.	Edition.
GOS.	Gaekwad's Oriental Series.
HSP.	History of Sanskrit Poetics (by P.V. Kane)
Intro.	Introduction.
KA.	Kāvyālaṅkāra.
KASV.	Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti.
KASS.	Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha.
ḲD.	Kāvyādarśa.
KP.	Kāvyaprakāśa.
NBh.	Nyāyabhāṣya.
NM.	Nyāyamañjarī.
NS.	Nāṭyaśāstra.
NyS.	Nyāyasūtra.
NSM.	Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali.
PV.	Pramāṇavārttika.

RG.	Rasagaṅgādhara.
SD.	Sāhityadarpaṇa.
Śṛ.P.	Śṛṅgāraprakāśa.
SSS.	Sāhityasudhāsindhu.
TB.	Tarkabhāṣā.
TC.	Tattvacintāmaṇi.
TS.	Tarkasaṁgraha.
VV.	Vyaktiviveka.
YS.	Yogasūtra.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.1. A Survey of Sanskrit Poetics

Poetics, the science of poetry *(kāvya)* known by numerous names such as Kāvyaśāstra, Alaṅkāraśāstra, Sāhityaśāstra[1] in Sanskrit literature is a fully developed discipline which deals with the nature of *kāvya* and its important aspects, viz., *Rasa, Alaṅkāra, Guṇa, Doṣa* and many others in a comprehensive and critical manner. The continuous literary activities of the Sanskrit poeticians over a period extending from the hoary antiquity upto the eighteenth century A.D. resulting in the form of original works, commentaries and sub-commentaries have made this important Śāstra detailed in its nature and varied in its scope. But the exact time of the origin of this science is not known. Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* (NS) is considered as the earliest available work dealing with the poetic theories in the field of Sanskrit literary criticism. But the origin of the Sanskrit Poetics is definitely prior to the NS of Bharata. For, in various works we find references to some authors[2] like Nāndikeśvara, Kāśyapa etc., who have probably preceded Bharata and whose works are not available to us. They seem to have significantly

contributed to this science. Bhāmaha tells us that he had predecessors whose works apparently he had utilised. While referring to these predecessors generally as *anye,*[3] *apare*[4] and *kecit,*[5] Bhāmaha cites twice by name one Medhāvin,[6] probably a Buddhist Poetician.[7]

Rājaśekhara, in his *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* gives a mythical account of the genesis of *Kāvyapuruṣa,* a personification of poetry. He describes *Kāvyapuruṣa* as born of Goddess Sarasvatī and as having instructed seventeen students born by his will. These seventeen students themselves are supposed to have written separate treatises.[8] Apart from this mythical account, the seeds of this science are found in the *Rgveda*[9] and earlier Upaniṣads also. The word *Upamā* is found as early as the *Ṛgveda.* The Ṛgvedic poets indulge in various figures of speech such as *Upamā, Atiśayokti*, *Rūpaka*[10] etc. Similarly, Upaniṣads also contain some good examples of *Rūpaka.*[11] Later on these subtle ideas gradually got crystalized in Alaṅkāraśāstra. This becomes evident from the grammatical analysis of the general ideas adumbrated in the *Nighaṇṭu,*[12] *Nirukta,*[13] *Aṣṭādhyāyī*[14] of Pāṇini and *Vārttikas*[15] of Kātyāyana. It is an early but clear approach to some technical elements of poetry. The first available work dealing with Sanskrit literary theories is Bharata's NS (200 B.C. to 200 A.D.)[16] which is an encyclopaedic manual on theatre art but 'poetry' comes within the scope of *vācikābhinaya* of drama and therefore finds a place in Bharata's treatise. Bharata discusses in detail various aspects of poetics like *Rasa, Lakṣaṇa, Guṇa, Doṣa* and *Alaṅkāra.*

The period of about five centuries succeeding Bharata is comparatively a blank one in the history of Sanskrit Poetics as no work of Alaṅkāraśāstra in this

period (except perhaps the *citrasūtra* section of *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*) is available. Hence, Bhāmaha (650 A.D.),[17] the author of *Kāvyālaṁkāra* (KA) is considered to be the first poetician to formulate the doctrines of Sanskrit Poetics in a systematic manner. The major works subsequent to Bhāmaha are *Kāvyādarśa* (KD) of Daṇḍin, *Kāvyālaṁkāra-sūtra-vṛtti (KASV)* of Vāmana, *Kavyālaṁkāra-sāra-saṁgraha* (KASS) of Udbhaṭa (800 A.D.) and *Kāvyālaṁkāra* of Rudraṭa (900 A.D.). The ninth and tenth centuries A.D. constitute an outstanding period in Sanskrit Poetics as it saw the birth of many important theoretical works. Outstanding figures like Ānandavardhana, Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Nāyaka, Tauta, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka and others flourished, propounded many different and independent theories, developed various viewpoints and made valuable contributions to this science.

Sanskrit Poetics has a very long history of uninterrupted development which witnessed various changes in contents and outlook. In the field of poetics we find much by way of growth as a result of dialectical examination and refutation of views which resulted in a gradual rise, formation and development of five schools, viz., 1. *Rasa*-school of Bharata, *Alaṅkāra*-school of Bhāmaha 3. *Rīti*-school of Vāmana 4. *Dhvani*-school of Ānandavardhana and 5. *Vakrokti*-school of Kuntaka. These schools are not in conflict with one another as they all recognise the indispensability of *Rasa* in any literature worth the name. But they attach relatively more importance to some one element of these than to the rest.

Bharata is considered to be the earliest exponent of *Rasa* school. The greatest and most far-reaching

contribution of Bharata to poetics is his formulation of the *Rasasūtra* to explain the genesis of *Rasa*. On this *Rasasūtra* many of the later rhetoricians built their own theories of *Rasaniṣpatti*. (Even those others who did not do so, have, from Bhāmaha onwards, at least incorporated the element of *Rasa* in their scheme of poetics). But the original work of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Nāyaka are yet not found and we have to rely upon the summaries of their views furnished by their critics such as Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa. There are also several other works dealing with *Rasa* like *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, *Daśarūpaka*, *Śṛṅgāratilaka*, *Bhāvaprakāśana*, *Rasataraṅgiṇī* etc.

Some poeticians made outstanding efforts to analyse the nuture of *Alaṅkāra* and the role it plays in beautifying poetry. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa are the main exponents of this theory. The significance of *alaṅkāra* in *kāvya,* particularly in the sense indicated by Vāmana, *saundaryam alaṅkāraḥ* has attained so much importance that the whole Śāstra is named after it, i.e. Alaṅkāraśāstra.

The *Rīti* School got developed under the leadership of Vāmana. He is foremost known representative of this school. The credit for setting forth, for the first time, a fairly systematic theory of poetics goes to Vāmana. He is also the first author to probe into what constituted the soul of poetry. According to him, *Rīti*, the distinctive arrangement of words, is the soul of the poetry, the distinction being the presence of *Guṇas* (poetic qualities). Vāmana mentions three *Rītis*, viz., *Vaidarbhī*, *Gauḍīyā* and *Pāñcālī*, but holds that among them, only the former is preferable because it alone possesses all the *Guṇas*. He makes a clear distinction between *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*. The former are constant

elements which impart beauty to poetry while the latter merely enhance its beauty.[18] *Guṇas* in Vāmana's scheme are actually twenty in number since the ten *Guṇas* appear both as *śabdāguṇas* and *arthaguṇas*. To *Rasa*, which was regarded only as an *alaṅkāra* by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, he gives superior position by including it as the final *arthaguṇa, kānti*.

With the notable *Dhvani*-vādins, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, poetics turned into a subject that can stand logical treatment and resulted in a philosophy of poetry which propound an aesthetic experience and which was compared later on to the spiritual experience of *Brahman*. Later on the *dhvani* theory is controverted by Mahimabhaṭṭa, who in his *Vyaktivi-veka (VV)* saw no reason for recognising *dhvani* as a special mode of thought, since it can be subsumed under inference (*anumāna*).

Kuntaka, the author of the *Vakroktijīviṭa* held that *Vakrokti* (aesthetic expression) is the very life-breath of poetry. *Vakrokti,* in plain words, is strikingness of speech. According to this school, an elevated style of expression constitutes the essence of poetry. This elevation of style is secured by the employment of figures in the body of poetry so as to make it striking. Thus, figures are regarded by this school as different aspects of *Vakrokti*. *Rasa, guṇa* and *dhvani* etc., are merely subservient to *Vakrokti* in a *kāvya*. Kuntaka was the great exponent of this doctrine, who carried it too far in his enthusiasm to oppose the *dhvani* system. On account of its pitting itself against the well-established *dhvani* theory, the *Vakrokti* school could not grow popular nor secure adherents; neverthless, it raised *alaṅkāra* from a position of insignificance and secured for its a position of importance among the essentials of

a *kāvya* so much so, that later writers like Mammaṭa could not ignore the claims of *alaṅkāra* when they formulated their definitions of *kāvya*.

On the above lines some are inclined to accept a sixth school i.e. the *Aucitya* school of Kṣemendra, the Kashmirian polymath of the eleventh century A.D. In his *Aucityavicāracarcā* Kṣemendra propounds the theory of *Aucitya* (propriety). He defines *Aucitya,* distinguished it from other constituents of poetry e.g. figures of speech, excellences, blemishes and others, speaks of places where it should be present and calls it the very soul of poetry-the word, the verb, gender, number, case, place, time, name and wish- every one of these limbs of poetry do have *Aucitya,* as its soul, pervades and permeates. But we do not find even a single writer in Alaṅkāraśāstra, who does not recongnise the importance of *Aucitya* and so being a quality acceptable to all, it need not be given a separate name of school. But the principle of propriety is always related to something else; and one would always ask the question: 'appropriate to what' and this 'what' constitutes the soul of poetry, not the principle of propriety itself. Hence no one gives much importance to this poetic theory and it has not found any following.

The great stalwarts in the field of Sanskrit Poetics who have made some kind of important contributions to the development of Sanskrit Poetics and widened its nature and scope are Mahimabhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Vāgbhaṭa, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Keśavamiśra, Jagannātha, Viśvanāthadeva, Viśveśvara Paṇḍita, Yajnesvara Dīkṣita and Devaśaṅkara Purohita. Apart from these there are numerous poeticians who have also contributed to this field but

unfortunately they have not been successful in earning names of sublime reputation. In the present work we have concentrated only on the important works of prominent poeticians as listed above.

In course of the development of this science of poetry some rhetoricians take help of other disciplines like Vyākaraṇa and philosophical systems and incorporate their ideas in poetic works. It is natural that one discipline has to take help of other disciplines for its development. It is impossible to think of anything which is entirely not influenced by something else. Hence, it is a truism that no system can develop in isolation. Sanskrit poetics, not being an exception to this general phenomenon, is more or less influenced by other Śāstras of Indian tradition.

In fact, the same idea lies in the verses of Bharata and Bhāmaha, in which they observe that *Śabda, Artha,* all types of Śāstra and all types of *Kalā* have their place in poetry. De rightly remarks[19].

> This concept of the *Sāhitya* of *Śabda* and *Artha,* from which literature itself came to take the designation of *Sāhitya*, is not new; but it had a grammatical origin. It means the general grammatical and logical relation between word and sense in all linguistic expression and did not at first connote any special poetic relation between the two. We know that, like Sanskrit Grammar, Sanskrit Poetics started as an empirical and normative discipline; and since, from the very beginning Poetics accepted the authority of the science of grammar, to which it was closely related, the grammatical speculations on speech in general not only

prompted its speculations on speech on poetic speech, but also influenced its method and outlook. It is no wonder, therefore, that both Bhāmaha and Vāmana, two of the earliest formulators of poetic theory, devote whole sections of their works to the question of grammatical correctness; and the grammatical analysis of word and sense came to possess an important place in rhetorical speculation.

We will now see below how other disciplines have influenced Sanskrit Poetics.

I.2 Influence of Grammar

Grammar is considered to be the most important of all the Śāstras. Explaining the importance of Grammar Bhāmaha rightly says :

सूत्राम्भसं पदावर्त्तं पारायणरसातलम्।
धातूणादिगणग्राहं ध्यानग्रहबुहत्प्लवम्।। ६१।।

धीरैरालोकितप्रान्तममेधोभिरसूयितम्।
सदोपभुक्तं सर्वाभिरन्यविद्याकरेणुभिः।। ६२ ।।

नापारयित्वा दुर्गाधममुं व्याकरणार्णवम्।
शब्दरत्नं स्वयंगम्यमलं कर्त्तुमयं जनः।। ६३ ।।

All the Śāstras in Sanskrit literature have contributed little or more to the development of Sanskrit Poetics. But the Vyākaraṇaśāstra has exercised a profound influence on it.

From the Ṛgvedic age the Vyākaraṇaśāstra has enjoyed a significant position and therefore has been considered as one of the six Vedāṅgas. Prime importance has been attached to it by calling it the mouth of *Vedapuruṣa*. Dictums like - *Kānādam*

Pāṇinīyam ca sarvaśāstropakārakam also reflect the importance and necessity of the study of Grammar for the knowledge of all Śāstrās.

It is therefore not surprising that eminent literary theorists like Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Ānandavardhana have been considerably influenced by the concepts developed by the grammarians. Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka* (Dh.A) makes a clear reference to them by saying that grammarians are the first scholars,[20] since all branches of study are built upon the ground work of Grammar. Further, Ānandavardhana's fundamental doctrine of *dhvani* itself is admittedly an extension of the principle of *sphoṭa* first enunciated by the Grammarians. *Sphoṭa* is the all-pervading, eternal and indestructible word-principle and *dhvani* manifests it as said in the *Vākyapadīya*.

The discussion of the meaning of words which we find in the *Alaṅkāra* works is mostly based on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* (KP) of Mammaṭa quotes twice from the *Vākyapadīya* as helping in the determination of the meaning of a word that has several significations.[21] The definition of the figure of speech, *Vibhāvanā* given by Mammaṭa in his KP is based on the view of Grammarians that *kriyā* means *hetu*.[22] The subdivisions of *Upamā alaṅkāra* found in Udbhaṭa's KASS,[23] Mammaṭa's KP[24] and Viśvanātha's SD[25] are based on grammatical rules of Pāṇini about *kyac, k[illegible]* and *ṇamul*.

Vāmana, the author of KASV and the ch[illegible] protagonist of the *Rīti* school is also referred to as authority on deciding certain gr[illegible] issues.[26]

The KASV, to a great extent, is endowed with the flavour of grammatical work. It is the earliest and only work on poetics which is written in the *Sūtra* style. In doing so, very probably he adopts *Sūtra* style of Grammar. It is significant to note that like the Grammarians Vāmana employs the device of *Anuvṛtti*. For example, a rule of the KASV, runs as : *nityam saṁhitaikapadavat padesvardhāntavarjam*. This is followed by the rule-*na padāntalaghor gurutvam ca sarvatra*[27]. This latter rule is to be augmented with a part of the earlier rule dragged in by the device of *Anuvṛtti*.

Vāmana names the Śāstras to be studied by one who aspires to be a poet. He begins the list of Śāstras with *śabdasmṛti* which is nothing but Grammar[28]. While discussing the *doṣas* Vāmana dwells first of all with the *padadoṣas* and among the *padadoṣas*, firstly *Asādhu* which occurs because of grammatical incorrectness of words. By giving it the first place he establishes the importance of Grammar.

The influence of Grammar on the KASV is most prominent in the second *Adhyāya* of the fifth *Adhikaraṇa*. In this *Adhyāya* he determined the purity of words on the basis of Grammar. Since the whole *Adhyāya* is directly concerned with grammatical issues it looks more like a work of Grammar than of poetics. Other rhetoricians like Jagannātha Paṇḍita also were influenced by the system of Grammar and therefore they have used some grammatical principles of *Sūtras* of *Pānini* while discussing their poetic theories.

Bhoja in his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (Śṛ.P.) has dealt with grammatical subjects under (chapter-18), *Śabda, Artha* and the grammatical part of *sāhitya*. Numberless

quotations from Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali appear in these chapters. These chapters on Grammar contain the essence of the *Sūtras*, the *Vārttikas* and the *Bhāṣya* and form a succient and useful contribution to the Vyākaraṇaśāstra.

I.3 Influence of Philosophical Systems

Indian philosophical systems viz., Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Pūrva- Mīmāṁsā, Uttara-Mīmāṁsā or Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya have influenced the poetic theories and poeticians of great importance.

(A) Sāṁkhya System

The influence of the Sāṁkhya system is mainly found on the interpretation of the concept of *Rasa*. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of *Rasa* known as *Bhuktivāda* seems to be originated because of the profound influence of the Sāṁkhya system.

The enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* consists of the states of *druti* (fluidity), *vistāra* (dilatation) and *vikāśa* (expansion). It is characterised by a resting *(viśrānti)* on one's own consciousness (*saṁvit*), which due to the emergent state of *sattva* is pervaded by beatitude *(ānanda)* and light *(prakāśa)* and is similar to the tasting of the supreme *Brahman.*[29]

The light of the Self, does not reveal itself, in the *sāṁsārika* existence, but is conditioned by the three constituent elements of mental substance *(buddhi), sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but mingled together in unequal proportions. The three constituent elements viz., *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* are associated

with three states of consciousness called respectively, expansion *(vikāśa)* provoked by an absolute predominance of *sattva,* fluidity *(druti)* determined by a contact of *sattva* with *rajas* and dilatation *(vistāra)* determined by a contact of *sattva* with *tamas.*

It is important to note that even prior to the *Rasa* theory of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, a brief Sāṁkhyan interpretation of *Rasa* is available in Abhinavagupta's commentary on NS.[30] But the work does not provide any information about the propounder of this view. Hemacandra in his *Kāvyānuśāsana* also clearly maintains this view of *Rasa.*[31]

The source of this Sāṁkhyan interpretation of *Rasa* is three *Guṇas* - *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* and their relation with *sukha, duḥkha* and *moha* as described in the Sāṁkhya philosophy.[32] *Guṇas* are of the nature of the *prīti, aprīti* and *viṣāda.*[33] According to this theory, since all the wordly objects including *Rasa* are endowed with three qualities they are of the nature of *sukha, duḥkha* and *moha.*

According to the Sāṁkhya theory of causality (*satkāryavāda*), an effect (*kārya*) prior to its production exists in its cause and after the *kāraṇavyāpāra* it gets manifested in the form of an effect.[34] In the same way *sukha, duḥkha* and *moha* elements which remain present in the *antaḥkaraṇa* in an unmanifested form get manifested while they come in contact with the external causal factors. Similar is the process of the realisation of the *Rasa,* which exists in unconspicuous form in its causes i.e. *vibhāva* etc., and in due course of time, because of the *kāraṇavyāpāra* transforms into the state of *Rasa.*

(B) Yoga System

Like the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga school of Patañjali has also influenced poetic theory of *Rasa*. While dealing with *Śāntarasa* one clearly realises that Yoga system has had its impact on it. Bharata's theory of *Śāntarasa,* its existence etc.,*(vibhāvādi)* and latent emotion *(sthāyibhāva)* seem to be influenced by the Yoga system.[35] The concepts like *Yama, Niyama* and *Dhāraṇā* used in the description of *Śāntarasa* are referred to the technical terms of *Yogasūtras.*[36] The word *liṅgagrahaṇa* also indicates eight limbs of *Yoga.*[37] In this connection Abhinavagupta quotes a number of *Sūtras* from the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali to substantiate his position.

Masson and Patwardhan support this position. They opine that Abhinava and *Yogavāśiṣṭha* reveal very close similarity to each other[38]. The data found in the *Yogavāśiṣṭha*[39] about *Śāntarasa* can be compared with that of NS.[40]

According to the NS., (the portion interpolated at the end of the chapter VI. according to the editors of NS. Vol. I, GOS) *Śāntarasa* can be realised only in the state of salvation when the original nature of the Self is realised. Further, four *vṛttis* of mind namely, *muditā, maitrī, karuṇā* and *upekṣā,* which cause *Śāntarasa* as described in the *Daśarūpaka* [41] of Dhanañjaya are taken from the Yoga system.[42]

Secondly, the Yoga system has also influenced the poetic doctrine of figure of speech *(alaṅkāras)*. The *alaṅkāra, Bhāvika* is an example. In the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali there is a description of the three *Pariṇāmas* of *Saṁyama* [43] by which a *Yogī* acquires the knowledge

of the past and future objects. The *Bhāvika-alaṅkāra* seems to be based on this conception, for, this *alaṅkāra* as described by Bhāmaha,[44] Udbhaṭa,[45] Mammaṭa,[46] Ruyyaka,[47] Appaya[48] and Viśvanātha[49] gives an idea that the objects of past and future are described as the objects of the present perception.

The poetic doctrine of *Doṣa* also reveals some awareness of the Yoga system though we may not call it an influence of Yoga. In the fifth chapter of KP, Mammaṭa describes the following *Yogaśāstraviruddha-doṣa* under the heading of *Śāstraviruddha-doṣa.* He gives the following example :

अष्टाङ्गयोगपरिशीलनकीलनेन
दुःसाधसिद्धिसविधं विदधद्विदूरे।
आसादयन्नाभिमतामधुना विवेक–
ख्यातिं समाधिधनमौलिमणिर्विमुक्तः।। (KP.VII.P.392)

Here it is described that a *yogī* obtains release immediately after discriminative wisdom. But according to the Yogaśāstra, first of all the *Yogī* obtains discriminative knowledge followed by concrete meditation and abstract meditation and finally release.

While enumerating different *tattvas* according to the different philosophical systems, Bhoja in his Śṛ.P. mentions the Yoga system which gives the subject in four sections called *Yoga, Sādhana, Vibhuti* and *Kaivalya.*[50] In the same section, Bhoja quotes the *Yogasūtra* (II.15)[51] and while giving the various conception of *niḥśreyasa* mentions the Yoga conception, quoting the *Yogasūtra* (1.3)-*tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpavasthānam.*

(C) Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā System

The system of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is mainly concerned with the interpretation of Vedic texts relating to the sacrificial rituals, and evolves the main principles of interpretation of Vedic sentences. It is the Mīmāṁsā school that started detailed study of the structure of sentences and developed elaborate canons of interpretation. Hence, during the discussion of the doctrine of *Śabda* and *Artha* in the rhetoric works the impact of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system can be easily marked.

According to the Mīmāṁsakas the primary meaning of word is the universal *(Jāti)*[52] which is the essential quality common to all the particular instances of that class. It is admitted that while the cognition of the meaning brought about by the word pertains to the universal and all the practical activities that follow the word pertain to the *vyakti* (individual). It is the primary relation of the word that must be to the universal. Mammaṭa refers to the view of Mīmāṁsakas in his KP.[53] Hemacandra[54] and Viśvanātha [55] also follow in the footsteps of Mammaṭa who gives full discussions of *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda* in the second and fourth chapter of KP.

The poeticians seem to be more attentive to the *Anvitābhidhāna* theory of the Mīmāṁsakas of the Prābhākara school. They consider *dhvani* or *vyañjanā* to be included in the primary function *abhidhā* itself, for, according to them, the meaning of a word is that what is conveyed by it. There is no restriction for the significative force of a word. In a sentence a word

conveys not only its own individual meaning, but also its relation with the other words in the sentence. The *saṁsarga* or the mutual relation of the word-meanings suggested by their juxtaposition in a sentence is also included in the primary meaning itself. In certain context the word may suggest new ideas beyond its normal sense but all of them come under *Abhidhā* itself.[56] Just as the range of force with which it is discharged, the meaning of a word can be extended to any length.[57]

Ānandavardhana and his followers attack this view from the standpoint of the *Abhihitānvaya* theory. The suggested sense cannot be conveyed by the power of *Abhidhā,* for it is only the definite conventional sense which is directly related to the word and conveyed by *Abhidhā*. The power of the primary function of the word is exhausted when this task is performed.[58] Even the sentence-meaning cannot be expressed by the words through the primary function alone. Another function has to be accepted to explain the suggested meanings. The primary sense is directly related to the word, but the suggested sense is at times, known only indirectly through the expressed sense. The primary sense is definite and fixed but the suggested sense changes according to the changes in the contextual factors. The primary sense of a word can be objectively learnt by any one from a lexicon but the suggested sense in poetry can be fully appreciated only by a man of taste.[59]

The influence of Mīmāṁsā is seen on Mammaṭa who in his KP[60] quotes Kumārilabhaṭṭa's definition of *Lakṣaṇā*. He says that for pure *lakṣaṇā* there need not

be any invariable concomitance between the primary and the actual reference. If there is an invariable association between the two, there could be no transfer of meaning in cases like *mañcāḥ krośanti* (the cots cry) since the relation between the cots and the children is only temporary. Moreover, there will be no necessity to resort to transference, since the related sense could be derived through implication itself. If the relation is one of similarity then the transfer is qualitative *(gauṇī);* if it is any other relation such as that of cause and effect, owner and owned, measure and measured, part and whole etc., it is pure *Lakṣaṇā.* All these instances prove that Mīmāṁsā system of philosophy has influenced some of the prominent concepts of Indian Poetics.

(D) Uttara-Mīmāṁsā System

The Uttara-Mīmāṁsā system known by the name Vedānta has also influenced the rhetoricians and their important doctrine of *Rasa.* According to this school bliss *(ānanda)* is of the form of *Brahmānanda,* for bliss constitutes the essential nature of the *Brahman,* the highest transcendental reality. This concept of *Brahman* has influenced *Rasa* theory. Some poeticians like Jagannātha and Viśveśvara quote statements like *raso vai saḥ*[61] , *raso hyevāyam labdhvānandī bhavati* etc. in order to describe the blissful state of the realisation of *Rasa.*

In Upaniṣads, the term *Rasa* is used with various meanings. In *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* the essential entity of the word is titled as *Rasa* and that is described as the

only source of the realisation of bliss. In Sanskrit Poetics *Rasa* is considered as the soul of poetry. Just as in Vedāntic texts all the factors are described with the main goal of attaining *Brahman,* similarly in Sanskrit Poetics also all factors like *alaṅkāra, guṇa, rīti, dhvani* etc., serve to achieve the realisation of *Rasa.*

Further, as *Brahman* is described as unitive *(akhaṇḍa),* being devoid of any parts in the Upaniṣads as well as in Vedāntic texts, similarly, unitive nature of *Rasa* is described in the poetic works like SD.[62]

(E) Vaiśeṣika System

The Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy propounded by Kaṇāda had separate origin. In its initial period it had developed as an independent system but later on it merged in the Nyāya school of Gautama. The earliest extant work of the Vaiśeṣika system is the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda also called *Vaiśeṣika Darśana.*

Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy exerts a little influence on Sanskrit Poetics. Only Bhoja in his Śṛ.P. quotes some *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda and makes some references to his doctrine.

(F) Nyāya System

An intensive study of some important works of Sanskrit Poetics leads one to the conclusion that Nyāya system of logic has made a profound impact on the science of poetry. Among the philosophical systems which have exerted tremendous impact on Alaṅkāraśāstra as shown above, the Nyāya system, the

Indian science of logic and reasoning, may be ranked as one of the two most important ones, the other being Grammar. This is because the Nyāya system has propounded some logical and scientific principles which are quite necessary for the scientific elucidation of poetic theories. No Śāstra or science in any field of human knowledge can stand independently without logic and scientific principles. Sanskrit Poetics is no exception to it. If we understand the term Śāstra in the sense of a science, a systematic body of knowledge, then, we must admit that it is definitely based on logical principles. As such Alaṅkāraśāstra from its very beginning, has followed the logical principles which have been mainly propounded by Naiyāyikas of ancient India. This fact is also proved by the term *Sāhityaśāstra* which is often used as a synonym of Alaṅkāraśāstra, as a science of aesthetic and logical relation *(Sahitasya bhāvaḥ)* of sound and sense constituting the corner stone of Sanskrit Poetics. V. Raghavan observes[63]:

> Poetry, being expression in 'language' is based on Grammar which helps to secure correct expression. Its subject- matter is 'thought' and Nyāya which is the Grammar of thought also comes up naturally into the fold.

In making and maintaining the aesthetic and logical relation of word and meaning the poet's task becomes arduous. He has to compose a *kāvya* of which word, meaning, logic and aesthetic form ingredients, Therefore all- *śabda, artha,* sciences and all types of arts *(kalās)*constitute the body of *Kāvya* as very rightly

pointed out by Bharata[64] and after him Bhāmaha.[65] The special mention of the term 'Nyāya' by Bhāmaha makes it clear that the role of Nyāya is unavoidable in poetics. Nyāya has its place in poetry within an aesthetic framework. Mukulabhaṭṭa rightly says:

पदवाक्यप्रमाणेषु तदेतत्प्रतिबिम्बनम् ।
यो योजयति साहित्ये तस्य वाणी प्रसीदति ।।

Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā Verse 13

Since Nyāya (logic or reasoning) is the most essential element of every science, the importance of Nyāyaśāstra which exclusively deals with it, is recognised by the scholars of ancient India as the light of all the branches of learning. Because the logicality of any proposition or any structure of arguments is fundamental to the presentation of any science worth the name. Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh) very rightly eulogises Nyāya as :

प्रदीपः सर्वविद्यानामुपायः सर्वकर्मणाम् ।
आश्रयः सर्वधर्माणां विद्योद्देशे प्रकीर्तिता ।।

(NBh. p. 12)

The system has influenced more or less all the Śāstras of ancient and medieval India.

It is significant to note that in Indian philosophical literature the term *Nyāya* has been used in a number of senses. *Nyāya* is genitically a term of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system and denotes the upshot of the ratiocination employed in reconciling the apparently contradictory texts in the Vedic literature particularly

the *Brāhmaṇas*. This is the import of the definition of the Nyāya of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Thus there are Nyāyas in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā like *jāteṣṭinyāya* and others. How Nyāya forms the very backbone of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā system can be judged by the nomenclature of several Mīmāṁsā works, particularly that of Jaimini, which is called *Nyāyamālā*.

It is easy to understand how the term Nyāya which first denoted reasoning in the sphere of Vedic rituals came to be applied to all reasoning irrespective of its bearing on the Vedic rituals. The term attained a much wider application on wordly as well as scientific levels. *Nyāya* like *sthuṇanikhanana-nyāya* came into existence. Again, the Vedānta system speaks of *adhyāropa* and *apavādanyāya*. Jaina logicians also speak of *Nayas*.

Nyāya or the Nyāyaśāstra which comprises logic, epistemology, and metaphysics of the particular school has been regarded as an important branch of learning in India since very early times. Nyāya is also known by various names, e.g. Hetuvidyā, Hetuśāstra, Pramāṇaśāstra, Tarkaśāstra, Tarkavidyā etc. Another name[66] of Nyāya is *Ānvīkṣikī*.[67] Bhāmaha perhaps refers to this system by using the term Nyāya in his KA. Rājaśekhara also in his *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* makes references to *Ānvīkṣikī*.[68] As the term Nyāya popularly signifies reasoning, the Nyāyaśāstra is considered as the science of sound reasoning and correct judgement. One can understand therefore why the Nyāya system of Gautama which primarily teaches how to reason came to possess that name.

I.4 Brief History and Development of the Nyāya System

The most ancient available work on Nyāya is the *Nyāyasūtra* (NyS) of Gautama or Gotama alias Akṣapāda (200 A.D.). The earliest available commentary on the NyS is the NBh of Vātsyāyana. On this NBh Uddyotakara wrote his super-commentary, *Nyāyavārttika* on which again Vācaspatimiśra wrote his super-commentary, *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā*. Udayanāçārya wrote *Pariśuddhi* on *Tātparyaṭīkā* and Viśvanātha wrote independent commentany on NyS. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Kashmirian author of reknown (third quarter of the 9th century A.D.) has contributed to the Nyāyaśāstra an elaborate *Vṛtti* (only on select *Sūtras* of Gautama) called *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM). In the tenth century a great Naiyāyika by name Udayanācārya wrote number of works such as *Kiraṇāvali, Ātmatattvaviveka, Nyāyakusumāñjali* etc. Thus the period of Prācīna Nyāya school starting from Akṣapāda to Udayanācārya is an important phase of development in the history of Nyāyaśāstra in India.

The second phase of the development of the Nyāya system is known by the term Navya-Nyāya (the Modern school of Indian logic). It is commonly believed to have been founded by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (12th century A.D.) the illustrious author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (TC).But Udayanācārya actually stands on the threshold of ancient and modern ages of the Nyāya system.[69] His *Pariśuddhi* rounds up and is practically the last important work of the ancient age of Nyāya, but he also enjoys the privilege of heralding the modern age of Nyāya system with his work *Kusumāñjali*. However, the

actual ushering of the modern age of Nyāya is credited to Gaṅgeśa whose work TC is called to be the first landmark of Navya-Nyāya. With Gaṅgeśa and after him, the Nyāya system became a rigorous quest for precision of meaning.

Like the NyS of Gautama, the TC of Gaṅgeśa also gained such popularity that the whole school went on developing for the next six hundred years in the form of commentaries and sub-commentaries on this great work. Later on the galaxy of astute logicians headed by Jayadeva Miśra, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra,Gadādhara Bhaṭṭ-ācārya etc., to mention only a few, developed this branch of Nyāya to a great extent.

Prācīna Nyāya mainly deals with metaphysical, logical and some methodological topics. Navya-Nyāya is basically an epistemological and linguistic system. Analysis of statements and concepts and theory of knowledge etc. form the subject of Navya-Nyāya. We find subtle logic at its extreme in the works of this period. It is the turning point which pioneers an altogether new method of philosophical investigation.

The unique feature of Navya-Nyāya is its techniques which are so thorough and subtle that it is almost impossible to conceive more perfect and unambiguous method of expression in Sanskrit for that matter, in any other language.

The Navya-Nyāya is a comprehensive system of philosophy having for its subject-matter not only logic but epistemology, grammar and many other topics of interest. To quote Prof. Ingalls :

> These philosophers (Navya-Naiyāyikas) have written on logic, epistemology, physics and grammar, but logic has been the most distinctive of their disciplines.[70]

The highest possible perfection and extreme thoroughness of analysis are the outstanding features of Navya Nyāya. This system has developed its own way of interpretation with the help of numerous abstracts, cliches and technicalities. In this respect the Navya-Nyāya has been thoroughly systematic and perfect. The subtle analysis of objects and ideas necessitated the forming of a very difficult and complex system of terminology and hence the system of language of Navya-Nyāya appears to be an altogether different language as compared to that of the other Sanskrit scientific literature.

The third phase of the development of the Nyāya school is known as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The two schools-Nyāya of Gautama and Vaiśeṣika of Kaṇāda were separate in their origin as well as in the early course of their development. From the earliest times so many doctrinal similarities between the two schools were there, but from the tenth century onwards we find treatises in which the subject matter of both the systems has been formally amalgamated. A preliminary study of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manual like *Tarkasaṁgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa and *Kārikāvali* with *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali* both of Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana are the two famous works of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

I.5 Buddhist Logic

Another phase of the development of the Nyāya system is Buddhist logic. The period from fifth to eleventh century is most significant in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. During this period Nyāya system got developed as a result of constant conflict with the Buddhists. It is the period of conflict and development. To this period belongs the galaxy of thinkers such as, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and Śāntarakṣita of the Buddhist camp, and Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Jayanta and Udayana on the orthodox realistic side. The interaction gave rise to a distinct system of logic in India known by the name Buddhist Logic.

The term Buddhist Logic (Bauddha Nyāya) means a system of logic and epistemology, originated in the field of Buddhist philosophy with the advent of great master Diṅnāga. This system gave more emphasis on the logical and epistemological aspects of Buddhist philosophy than its metaphysical and ontological aspects. It developed and flourished in India till the end of the 11th century A.D.

So far as the seeds of the Buddhist logic are concerned, they are present to some extent even in the teachings and discussions of Lord Buddha. But Nāgārjuna extended this system further. He wrote two tracts-*Vigrahavyāvartini* and *Vaidalyasūtraprakaraṇa* in which he refuted *pramāṇa* etc., and established his own theories of relativity *(sāpekṣatā)* through a very unique dialectical method which shows his efficiency in dialecticism. It is, however, true that an independent

nature of the Buddhist logic was not yet developed. The tradition laid down by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of Akṣapāda Gautama was being followed. Long after Nāgārjuna, there appeared two brothers named Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (5th century A.D.). Among them Vasubandhu has earned a reputation as a good logician. Vasubandhu had composed three works on the art of debate viz., *Vādavidhi, Vādavidhāna* and *Vādahṛdaya*. Besides these, one *Tarkaśāstra* is also ascribed to Vasubandhu. It apears that a background for the Buddhist logic was already prepared by Vasubandhu and others, but a systematic form was given to it by Diṅnāga, a great master of Buddhist Logic. Several treatises are mentioned on his name. The *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is one of the greatest literary monuments of Diṅnāga. The *Nyāyapraveśa* is another excellent work on logic by him. The other works like *Ālambanaparīkṣā, Trikālaparīkṣā, Hetucakrasamarthana* and *Nyāyamukha* are his other works. Some other writers like Paramārtha, Śaṅkaraswāmī, Dharmapāla, Ācārya Śīlabhadra etc., also have made significant contribution to the development of Buddhist logic.

The Buddhists in upholding their logical tenets offered a bold challenge to Hindu Naiyāyikas. To dispel the error of Diṅnāga, the Brahmin logician Uddyotakara wrote his *Nyāyavārttika.* He in his turn was assailed by the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti who defended Diṅnāga. After Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra a large number of Buddhist logicians appeared in the field to vindicate the Buddhist logic from the attacks of Hindu Naiyāyikas. They fought valiently against the Hindu

Naiyāyikas for nearly seven hundred years from 4th century A.D. to 11th century A.D. This gave rise to one independent system of logic known by the term Buddhist logic.

Thus the system of Nyāya Philosophy developed in India and divided into three streams such as Hindu Logic, Buddhist Logic and Jaina Logic. Like Buddhist Logic, Jaina Logic also developed through the efforts of the philosophers exclusively belonging to the Jaina philosophical tradition. But as far as the Jaina Logic is concerned it hardly differs from the Hindu Logic which is at its root. Though it has been given some independent status it is not so substantial in its contents as well as approach as the system of Buddhist logicians. Again, in the context of Sanskrit Poetics the Jainas have not achieved any special success as the Buddhist poeticians have. We, therefore, can safely omit the historical development of Jaina logic and its influence on Sanskrit Poetics. The influence is almost nil and does not deserve a special treatment in the present thesis.

Both the Nyāya system and Sanskrit Poetics have taken great strides together in India. The parallel development opened the scope for Sanskrit Poetics to borrow whatever was important and necessary from the Nyāya system. As Nyāyaśāstra had something substantial to offer it naturally attracted the poeticians and influenced them. And the influence is deep and varied. We will discuss them in detail in the following pages. But the influence is so deep and varied that however hard we may try we shall be able to show only some representative aspects of it.

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3. Bhāmaha, KA, I. 13;24;II.4;57;III. 4 ; IV. 12.
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7. Shastri, M.C., *Buddhist Contribution to Sanskrit Poetics,* P.33
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15. *Vārttika,* I. 3.21; II. 1. 55;2.24; 4.71; III. 1.10.
16. De, S.K., *Sanskrit Poetics,* Vol. I, Ch. II, P.18.
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19. De. S.K., *Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics,* P.2
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    Dh.A., p.26.

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"गौः शुक्लश्चलो डित्थ इत्यादौ चतुष्टयी शब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः" इति महाभाष्यकारः। KP, PP. 33-36
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KP. X. P. 89
23. KASS., I. P.17.
24. वादेर्लोपे समासे सा कर्मधारयक्यचि क्यङि कर्मकर्त्रोणमुलि।
KP.X. P.89.
25. आधारकर्मविहिते द्विविधे च क्यचि क्यङि।
कर्मकर्त्रोर्णमुलि च स्यादेवं पञ्चधा पुनः।। SD. Ch. X. P. 295
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29. रसोऽनुभवस्मृत्यादिविलक्षणेन रजोस्तमोऽनुवेधवैचित्र्यबलाद्द्रुति–विस्तारविकासलक्षणेन सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्विश्रान्ति–लक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यत इति।
ABh., Ch. VI. P. 271.
30. येन त्वभ्यधायि–सुखदुःखजननशक्तियुक्ता विषयसामग्री बाह्यैव सांख्यदृशा सुखदुःखस्वभावा रसः। *Ibid.* P 270.
31. Hemacandra, *Kāvyānuśāsana.* P. 73.
32. Iśvarakṛṣṇa, *Sāṁkhyakārikā,* 13
33. *Ibid.* 12
34. *Ibid.* 9

35. अथ शान्तो नाम भावात्मको मोक्षप्रवर्त्तकः। शमस्थायि ....
——तस्य यमनियमाध्यात्मध्यानधारणोपासन–
सर्वभूतदयालिङ्गग्रहणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः।
NS. Ch. VI, PP. 326-7

36. (a) तत्राहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिग्रहा यमाः। YS.II.30.

(b) शौचसन्तोषतपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि नियमाः।
Ibid. II. 32.

(c) धारणासु च योग्यता मनसः। *Ibid.* II. 53

37. यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टावङ्गानि।
Ibid. II. 29.

38. *Śāntarasa and Abhinava's Philosophy of Aesthetics,*
pp. 30-31

39. न दुःखमस्ति न सुखं शान्तं शिवजं जगत्।
Yogavāśiṣtha, P.32

40. न यत्र दुःखं न सुखं न द्वेषो नापि मत्सरः।
समः सर्वेषु भूतेषु स शान्तः प्रथितो रसः।।
NS., Ch. VI, p. 328

41. अथापि तदुपायभूतो मुदितामैत्रीकरुणापेक्षादिलक्षणस्तस्य च विकाशविस्तारक्षोभ–विक्षेपकरूपपन्नैवेति तदुक्तयैव शान्तरसास्वादो निरूपितः। *Daśarūpaka,* 4.45.

42. YS. I. 33.

43. परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानम्। YS. III. 16

44. भाविकत्वमिति प्राहुः प्रबन्धविषयं गुणम्।
प्रत्यक्षा इव दृश्यन्ते यत्रार्था भूतभाविनः।। KA, III. 53

45. प्रत्यक्षा इव यत्रार्था दृश्यन्ते भूतभाविनः।
अत्युद्भुताः स्यात्तद्वाचामनाकुल्येन भाविकम् ।।
KASS, Ch. IV, P.....60..

46. प्रत्यक्षा इव यद्भावाः क्रियन्ते भूतभाविनः तद् भाविकम्।
KP, Ch. X

47. अतीतानागतयोः प्रत्यक्षायमाणत्वं भाविकम्। AS, p. 671

48. भाविकं भूतभाव्यर्थसाक्षात्कारस्य वर्णनम्। *Kuvalayānanda*, P.22

49. उद्भुतस्य पदार्थस्य भूतस्याथ भविष्यतः।
यत्प्रत्यक्षायमाणत्वं तद्भाविकमुदाहृतम्।। SD, Ch. X, p. 365

50. चत्वारि यथा–योगः साधनं विभूतिः कैवल्यमिति।
Śr.P., Vol. III. P. 328

51. *Ibid.* P.327.

52. The early Mīmāṁsakas like Jaimini, Śabara, Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Prabhākara and Murāri use the term *ākṛti* in the sense of *Jāti* or the universal. Kumārila says: जातिमेवाकृतिं प्राहुः व्यक्तिः आक्रियते यथा। (*Ślokavārttika, Ākṛti* Section, Verse 3). Later writers use the term *jāti* itself for the universal.

53. संकेतितश्चतुर्भेदो जात्यादिर्जातिरेव वा। KP., Ch. II. P.12

54. जातिरेव संकेतविषया इत्येके। *Kāvyānuśāśāna*, P. 26

55. SD. Ch. II. 4

56. प्रभाकरदर्शनेऽपि दीर्घदीर्घो व्यापारः। *Locana,* P. 188

57. पदानि हि स्वं स्वमर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि ।
Śabara on Jaimini-Sūtra I.I.25 ;
विशेष्यं नाभिधा गाच्छेत् क्षीणशक्तिः विशेषणे।
KP. Ch. II. 10

58. Dh.A. I. 7.

59. उक्तं चान्यत्र "अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणोच्यते। लक्ष्यमाण-गुणैर्योगाद्वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता" इति। अविनाभावोत्र संबन्धमात्रं न तु नान्तरीयकत्वम्। तत्त्वे हि 'मञ्चाः क्रोशन्ति' इत्यादौ न लक्षणा स्यात्। अविनाभावे चाक्षेपेणैव सिद्धेर्लक्षणाया नोपयोग इत्युक्तम्। KP. Ch. II. P 24.

60. *Ibid.*

61. रसौ वै सः। रसं ह्यैवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति।

Taittirīya Upaniṣad, Brahmānanda Valli, 7

62. तादात्म्यादेवास्याखण्डत्वम्। SD, Ch III, P. 63

63. BŚP., P. 723

64. न तज्ज्ञानं न तच्छिल्पं न सा विद्या न सा कला।
नासौ योगो न तत्कर्म नाट्येऽस्मिन् यन्न दृश्यते।।

NS, Ch. I. 116, P. 41.

65. न स शब्दो न तद्वाच्यं न स न्यायो न सा कला।
जायते यन्न काव्याङ्गमहो भारो महान्कवेः ।। KA, V, 4.

66. NBh., on NyS I. 1.1 चतुर्थीयमान्वीक्षिकी न्यायविद्या---।

67. सेयमान्वीक्षिकी, प्रमाणादिभिः पदार्थैविभज्यमाना।

NBh. on NyS. P. 11.

68. पौरुषेयं तु पुराणं आन्वीक्षिकी मीमांसा स्मृतितन्त्रमिति चत्वारि शास्त्राणि। *Kāvyamīmāṁsā,* P. 3.

69. Bhattacharya, Dineshcandra, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila,* P.1.

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CHAPTER II

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON ŚABDAVṚTTIS

The present chapter gives a brief analysis of *Śabdavṛttis* treated by the Sanskrit poeticians and attempts to show the influence of Nyāya philosophy on them.

The treatment of *Śabdavṛttis* in connection with the problem of meaning is given an important place in Sanskrit Śāstras. It has attracted the attention of philosophers, grammarians and poeticians throughout the ages. In ancient India the philosophers such as Mīmāṁsakas, Naiyāyikas, Vaiyākaraṇas and rhetoricians have devoted much thought to the problem of meaning and evolved different theories to explain manifold aspects of *Śabdavṛttis*. The Śāstrakāras differ among themselves and hold diversant views about the nature and purpose of *vṛttis* on their own grounds. Being a Śāstra dealing with the relation of *śabda* and *artha (sāhitya),* Alaṅkāraśāstra naturally has to make its own contribution to the problem of *vṛttis*. But a perusal of the rhetorical works gives an impression that the poeticians have given more attention to the discussion of *Rasa* and *Alaṅkāra* than to *Śabdavṛttis*. Even though

Ānandavardhana has made monumental contribution to the treatment of *vṛtti,* yet he is confined only to the treatment of *vyañjanā.* A few works have been written on the problem of *vṛttis* such as Mukulabhaṭṭa's *Abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā,* Mammaṭa's *Śabdavyāpāravicāra* (which is almost a summary of the discussions contained in his KP), Appaya's *Vṛttivārttika* and Āśādhara's *Triveṇikā.* From a study of the rhetorical works it is known that the Ālaṅkārikas mainly follow the views of Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṁsakas in their treatment of *Śabdavṛttis.* As far as the influence of Nyāya philosophy on this particular aspect is concerned, there is not much of it in Sanskrit poetics. The following analysis will clarify the points on which the influence of Nyāya philosophy is observed. We shall briefly discuss here only such points or cases which reveal Nyāya influence without dwelling much on details.

II.1 Concept of *Vṛtti* and Its Kinds

The term *Vṛtti* in Sanskrit literature has been used in a number of senses. Āśādhara defines[1] *vṛtti* as a function by which word conveys a particular meaning. Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa in his *Vṛttidīpikā*[2], a work on grammar says that *vṛtti* is the cause of *Śābdabodha*, a relation of word and its meaning which is congenial to the presentation of that meaning from that word. Gadādhara in his *Śaktivāda*[3] defines *vṛtti* as will (*icchā*) or indication *(saṁketa)* in the form of 'let this word indicate this meaning' and 'this meaning is to be understood from this word'. The terms like *vyāpāra* and *kriyā* are said to be synonyms of *vṛtti.*[4] Viśvanātha in his SD[5] uses the term *śakti* for *vṛtti* while many other writers restrict the word *śakti* to only *Abhidhā,* the

primary function of word, one of the *Vṛttis*. The word *vyāpāra* has been used in the sense of *vṛtti* as is known from the work, *Śabdavyāpāravicāra* of Mammaṭa. In the second *ullāsa* of KP Mammaṭa uses also the term *vyāpāra* in the sense of *vṛtti*.[6] Thus *vṛtti* is used in the sense of power or function of word.

There is a great difference of opinion regarding the number of *vṛttis* among the philosophers, grammarians and poeticians. Mahimabhaṭṭa recognnises *Abhidhā* alone as *vṛtti*. The Naiyāyikas accept two *vṛttis, śakti* and *lakṣaṇā*[7] while poeticians accept three *Vṛttis-Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyañjanā*.[8]

II.2 *Abhidhā*, the Primary Function of Word

The primary function of word, *Abhidhā* (denotation) conveys the realisation of the meaning which belongs to the word. Naiyāyikas used the term *Śakti* for *Abhidhā*. "The relation existing between *pada* and *padārtha* is *Śakti*".[9] It is defined as a god-ordained convention that such and such meaning would be understood from such and such word.[10] According to this definition each word in every language is capable of conveying a particular sense because the God has so willed it. This is the view of the Prācīna Naiyāyikas. The Navya Naiyāyikas say *icchāmātram śaktiḥ* thereby intimating that even the human will can endow words with meanings as the cases of proper names like 'Devadatta' etc. Thus it is seen that Naiyāyikas identify *śakti* and *saṅketa* or *icchā*. On the other hand the Mīmāṁsakas consider *Śakti* as an independent *padārtha*. They say that it is apprehended from the convention. When a man

ascertains that a particular word has a convention in respect of a particular sense then only he recognises the power of the word to express that particular sense. But some influence of Nyāyaśāstra is also seen in this connection. Keśavamiśra, for example, in his *Alaṅkāraśekhara* says :

शक्तिरीश्वरेच्छा या संकेत इत्युच्यते। (p. II)

His definition seems to be formulated on the basis of the definition of *Śakti* as given by the Naiyāyikas like Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and Viśvanātha who in their *Śaktivāda* and NSM have given similar definitions of *Śakti*. The concept of *Śakti* as the will of God (*īśvarecchā*) is accepted by the ancient logicians. Keśavamiśra, therefore, seems to follow the view of the Prācīna Naiyāyikas as recorded in the NSM of Viśvanātha.

Again, Jagannātha's treatment of *Abhidhā* also exhibits an influence of Nyāya. Though he mainly follows grammarians in the treatment of *Abhidhā,* yet we can trace the Nyāya influence on it on the basis of two points. Jagannātha defines *Abhidhā* in the following words :

शक्त्याख्योऽर्थस्य शब्दगतः शब्दस्यार्थगतो वा
सबन्धविशेषोऽभिधा। (RG. p. 176)

He further explains it as अर्थस्य शब्दगतः etc. Now the terms *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin* are two concepts of Navya Naiyāyikas meaning respectively 'substratum' and 'dependent'. *Abhidhā* otherwise called *Śakti* is a particular relation (*sambandhaviśeṣa*) between the *śabda* and *artha*. The relation being connected with two

objects one of them is technically called *pratiyogin* and the other *anuyogin*. But in the absence of any deciding factor in the present context both of them can be called *pratiyogin* or *anuyogin*. Defining *Abhidhā* in this manner Jagannātha postulates a relation of *anuyogin* and *pratiyogin* between that of *śabda* and *artha* only. To maintain the absolute validity of an expression the logicians have postulated certain relations. Since the validity of an expression involves both epistemic and ontological consideration it is difficult to determine the exact nature of *Śābdabodha*. Words hold different position in *Śābdabodha* and signify also something more than what they have to express. As such there is no unique property characterising them. In a stipulative way the logicians try to characterise them through certain relations. To avoid ambiguity and multiplicity the Naiyāyikas have generalised certain relations. *Anuyogitā-pratiyogitā* is one of such relations. It determines the *pratiyogin* (counter-co-relate) and the *anuyogin* (subjunct). But *anyogin* may refer to different things on different occassions. In case of absence *(abhāva)* the *anuyogin* is the locus of absence. For instance, when we say there is absence of pot on the ground *(bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti)* we understand ground as the *anuyogin* and *ghaṭa* as *pratiyogin*. When it is conceived as a relation the absence of pot is said to be connected with its locus *(bhūtala)* through such a relation.

Though Jagannātha brings into the discussions of *Abhidhā*, the relation of *anuyogi* and *pratiyogi* yet he is not able to reach a definite conclusion because of the complicated nature of the relation of *śabda* and *artha*.

Secondly, Jagannātha presents the Naiyāyika view of *Śakti* in the following words :

अस्मात्पदादयमर्थोऽवगन्तव्य इत्याकारेश्वरेच्छैषाभिधा। तस्याश्च विषयतया सर्वत्रासत्त्वात्पटादीनामपि घटादिपदवाच्यता स्यात् अतो व्यक्तिविशेषोपधानेन घटादिपदाभिधात्वं वाच्य-मित्यपरे।

(RG. pp. 176-7)

Nāgeśa, the commentator clearly says that the word *apare* refers to Naiyāyikas.[11] Here Jagannātha seems to refer to the views of Gadādhara and Viśvanātha who were his elder contemporaries.

Apart from this in Appaya Dīkṣita's treatment of *Abhidhā* the influence of Nyāyaśāstra is observed. In his *Vrttivārttikam* while referring to the types of meaning Appaya refers twice to the views of the Naiyāyikas at length without mentioning the name of the author or his work.[12]

After explaining the nature of *Śakti* Appaya proceeds to discuss its three-fold classification in details. The classification of *Abhidhā* made by Appaya seems to have some relation with other divisions of *pada* made by the Naiyāyikas. So here before entering into the discussion of Appaya's treatment of *Abhidhā* an acquaintance with the view of the Naiyāyikas on the matter is necessary.

The Naiyāyikas define *pada* as endowed with an expressiveness (*śakti*) and classify it into four types- *yaugika, ruḍha, yogaruḍha* and *yaugikaruḍha*.[13] In bringing out the characteristic features of these four types of *padas*, the Naiyāyikas point out that a term which signifies a concept conveyed by its component parts is one of *yaugika* type. This is exemplified by such term as *pācaka* and the like. As regards the *ruḍha* type of word they maintain that the meaning pertaining

to the word as a whole signifies the concept quite independent of the meaning belonging to the component member. It is illustrated by such term as *go*, *maṇḍapa* and the like. What is understood by *go* is not a mooving thing but an animal possessing a particular physical form. Similarly what is meant by the term *Maṇḍapa* is not one who drinks gruel but the covered area.

In sharp contrast to the *yaugika* and *ruḍha* type of words the variety known as *yogaruḍha* is one in which the *śakti* belonging to the component members and that belonging to the words as whole conjointly bring a concept into light. For example, the word, *pañkaja*, which neither refers to the objects which sprung from mud nor the land-lotus *(sthalapadma)*, but the lotus sprung from mud. The word *pañkaja* can etymologically convey the idea of all the objects growing from mud, for example, the lily as well through the *Śakti* belonging to its members alone, because lily also grows in water. But it is of no avail, because it militates against the dictum that the cognition of a content presented by the word as a whole stands in the way of comprehension of the idea presented by its component members. The Naiyāyikas explain the cognition of the idea of the lily, from the term *pañkaja* and say that *Abhidhā* does not present the idea of lily, but what presents this content is the function of *lakṣaṇā* which is called to play only when the *Abhidhā* proves itself unable to present the intended meaning.

Yaugikaruḍha (both derivative and conventional) is that when their meanings are determined either by the potency of the whole or by those of the parts, for

example, the word *udbhidha*. It means a germ or the sprouting of a seed or a sacrifice.

Appaya defines *Abhidhā* as the capacity to signify a meaning with the help of *śakti*. In summing up the discussion on the issue Appaya maintains that the term *pañkaja* signifies the lotus of a particular kind through the word's denotative power of the third *yoga-ruḍha* type. In this context he refers to the Naiyāyikas' view. According to Naiyāyikas in such cases both the ideas conveyed through *śakti* belonging to the word as a whole and through *śakti* pertaining to the component members are cognised and at late state, the term *pañkaja* signifies the lily and other water-born flowers. In order to explain such cases the Naiyāyikas take help of *lakṣaṇā* which, according to them, present the sense of one grown in the mud only. Appaya, however, does not subscribe to their viewpoint on this issue.

Secondly, Appaya records the viewpoints of the Naiyāyikas on the exact part played by the restrictive factors *(abhidhāniyāmakas)*. When the meaning is comprehended, it has no bearing on the context only because the particular word is used to signify that particular meaning. It is evident that the context does not regulate the function of *Abhidhā*. The inability of the context to restrict *śakti* pertaining to terms is evident from non-recollection of contextual meanings, even in those cases where the particular word has not gained currency to signify that particular meaning. Thus the Naiyāyikas contend that the meaning is comprehended in all those cases where convention is present, even

though it has no bearing on the context. On the other hand the recollection of the meaning related strictly to the context does not ensue in those cases where convention is not present. This view, therefore, controverts the thesis of the rhetoricians that the context and the other allied factors are competent to regulate the denotation of terms. *Abhidhā* is restricted by the dexterity of the comprehender in recollecting *śakti* pertaining to the words. As the comprehender cognises for the first time the *śakti* pertaining to a term, the knowledge that a particular term is endowed with the capacity to signify a particular meaning, the impression of that *śakti* remains in him; as he subsequently cognises that a particular term, the impression deposited by that term regarding *śakti* is awakened. As a result of it, he recollects the corresponding idea and understands the meaning. The restriction of *Abhidhā* by the restrictive factors, therefore, is a myth. This restriction is made by the sensitiveness of the congniser to the impression deposited by the word. In reply to the question as to what then is made by the restrictive factors, the Naiyāyikas hold that they go only to ascertain the intention of the speaker, and nothing else. In illustrating the point they cite the word *Hari* which is treated as a multi-meaninged term in Sanskrit lexicons and say that the term *Hari* is able to present a number of ideas, the context goes to determine the intention of the speaker and thereby to point out the exact meaning signify which the particular word is used.

In this connection it is significant to note that if one accepts the *yogarūḍha* type of *Abhidhā* as its third type

it straightway encroaches upon the concept and the area of *ruḍhilakṣaṇā*. On account of this the area of the *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* will also be restricted. Even in the cases of *Alaṅkāras* like *Samāsokti* the *aprākaraṇikārtha* will also have to be expressed by *Abhidhā*. Therefore, *śleṣa* in such cases will not be suggested but expressed.

Thus, Appaya's treatment of *Vṛttis* reveals that he has great respect for the Naiyāyikas whose views he records.

II.3 Sources of *Śaktigraha*

Keśavamiśra in his *Alaṅkāraśekhara* gives the following verse which refers to the different means of *śaktigraha* ;

कोशव्याकरणाप्तोक्तिवाक्यशेषोपमादितः।
प्रसिद्धपदसम्बन्धात् व्यवहाराच्च बुध्यते।। (p.II)

This is directly from the *Nyāyaśāstra* where the same eight sources of *śakti* (denotation) are found in a number of *Nyāya* works. Keśavamiśra is possibly mentioning these from Viśvanātha's NSM and Jagadiśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* where the verse occurs with slight variations. But the oldest standard work referring to them is the TC. The relevant verse is as follows :

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमानकोशाप्तवाक्याद् व्यवहारतश्च।
वाक्यस्य शेषात् विवृतेर्वदन्ति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः।।
(TC.p. 649)

1. ***Vyākaraṇa*** : The meanings of the roots, terminations and rules are learnt from the Vyākaraṇa. *(dhātuprakṛtipratyāḍīnām śaktigraha vyākaraṇāt bhavati).*

2. ***Upamāna*** : Analogy is the instrument of assimilative cognition which consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by it. This may be illustrated thus : A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word *gavaya.* From a forester, he hears that a *gavaya* is similar to a cow : he goes to a forest, sees the animal called *gavaya*, which is similar to a cow and recollects the information conveyed by the assimilative proposition *(atideśavākya)*. Then the assimilative congnition, 'this is the animal denoted by the word *gavaya'* arises.

3. ***Kośa*** : the words which have several meanings are understood through the help of a dictionary.

4. ***Āpatavākya*** : *Śabdapramāṇa* is defined as *āptavākya*. *Āpta* means a person who speaks the truth.[14] *Āptavākya* or the direct statement of a trustworthy authority is another way by which people generally understand the meanings of words.[15] In this case the learning is conscious and deliberate. When parents or their relations directly point out with the finger the various persons and objects, and says child, 'this is your father' etc., the child can understand the relation between the words and the persons or objects denoted by them.[16] We may also know the meanings or certain words when an authority tells us that such and such words denote such and such objects.

5. ***Vyavahāra*** : This is the most useful method for a child to learn the language.It is the most important among all the eight methods and is the natural way of observation in actual life. Jagadīśa, the great Naiyāyika

says that the first and foremost method of learning the meanings of words is that of observing the use of language in actual life.[17]

6. *Vākyaśesa* : This method is used in obtaining the correct meaning of a word. The meaning of the word *yava* generally used by the Āryas in the sense of the long-bearded barley, and the *Mlecchas* in the sense of the panic seed in the sentence *yavamayascarur bhavati.* It is known to be the long bearded barley from the rest of the passage i.e. *yatrānya ausadhaya mlāyante athaite modamānā ivatisthanti* (when the other plants droop down, these stand up as if they are happy). [18]

7. *Siddhapadasānnidhya* : Syntactic connection with the words already known. In the sentence 'the *pika* sings beautifully on this mango tree' the meaning of the word *pika* is known to be 'cuckoo' from the presence of the other well-known words.[19]

8. *Vivṛtti* : The meanings of words are known from a commentary giving the synonyms of the word, or describing the meaning.

11.4 *Lakṣaṇā*, the Secondary Function of Word

That brings us to the next function of the word, *Lakṣaṇā* (indication). The rhetoricians define *Lakṣaṇā* as:

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् ।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया ।।

(KP. II. 9)

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्युक्तो ययाऽन्योऽर्थः प्रतीयते ।
रूढे़ प्रयोजनाद्वाऽसौ लक्षणा शक्तिरर्पिता ।। (SD. II.5)

लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धः । (*Alaṅkāraśekhara*, p.11.)

शक्यसम्बन्धसहकारिणी वृत्तिर्लक्षणा । (*Triveṇikā*, P.12)

When there is incompatibility of the primary meaning of a word, a secondary meaning, connected with the primary sense, and arising either through usage or some intention of the speaker is also understood. This meaning is called the *lakṣya* meaning, and the power, by which such a meaning arises, is called *Lakṣaṇā*. This function of the word, indicating a referent different from its normal and primary one, but somehow related to it, is also called *upacāra* ; other terms like *gauṇivṛtti* and *bhakti* are also used to refer to the secondary function of the word. As it is not possible to include all the meanings of the words under *Abhidhā,* there must be another *vṛtti* to explain the meanings which are not directly denoted but are indirectly indicated. Earliest indications of an attempt to explain such indicating power and indicated senses are found in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama[20] and the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali.[21] As time went on *Lakṣaṇā* was accepted as an independent *vṛtti*.

Among rhetoricians themselves there is great divergence of opinion. Vāmana[22] and the author of the *Agnipurāṇa* (AP)[23] treat *Lakṣaṇā* as one of the *alaṅkāras* based on similarity. Kuntaka also includes it under *vācya* and *vācaka*. With Ānandavardhana has come the scientific treatment of this power of word. Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and others have mostly toed his line.

Gautama in his NyS applies the term *Upacāra* for this secondary function of words. He says that such transfer of meaning is quite common, when actual referent is closely related to the normal and primary referent. He enumerates with examples ten such relations.

1. ***Sahacaraṇa*** (Association) : e.g. *yaṣṭikam bhojaya* (feed the stick). In this sentence the Brahmin is referred to as 'stick'as he is always associated with the stick which he carries. Another example of the same relation is the use of the term *kuntāḥ* (lances) for the lance-bearers in the sentence, *Kuntāḥ praviśanti* (the lances enter).

2. ***Sthāna*** (location) : e.g *mañcāḥ krośanti* (the cots cry). Here the term *mañcāḥ* (cots) is used to refer to the children on the cot.

3. ***Tādarthya*** (purpose) : e.g. *kaṭam karoti* (He makes a mat). The sentence means : 'He collects reeds for the purpose of making mat'. Here the reeds intended for making a mat are referred to as mat.

4. ***Vṛtta*** (behaviour) ; e.g. *yamorājā*. Here the term *yama* is used in the sense of 'one who acts like Yama', god of death.

5. ***Māna*** (measure) : e.g. *adhakasaktavaḥ* (one *adhaka* of flour). Here the term *adhaka* denoting the measure is used to mean that which is measured *(adhakena mitāh saktavaḥ).*

6. ***Dhāraṇa*** (weight) : e.g. *tulācandanam* (one *tulā* of candana). Here the term *tulā* is used in the sense of that which is weight in the balance *(tulāyām dhrutam candanam).*

7. ***Sāmipya*** (proximity) : e.g. *gaṅgāyām gāvaḥ caranti* (the cows are grazing on the Ganges). Here Gangā is used in the sense of the bank of the Ganges.

8. ***Yoga*** (inherent connection) ; e.g. *kṛṣṇaḥ sāṭakaḥ* 'the black cloth'. The word black primarily means 'blackness' but here it means 'the thing having

blackness'. The use of the term denoting quality for the thing qualified (e.g. 'I love beauty') comes under this.

9. *Sādhana* (cause) : e.g. *annam prāṇāḥ* (food is life). Here food which is the cause of life is referred to as life itself.

10. *Ādhipatya* (prominence) : e.g. *ayam kulam* (he is the family). Here *kula* is used in the sense of the prominent person in the *kula* (family).

In this way, Gautama gives popular examples of figurative usages from everyday life, the list intended only to be illustrative, and not to be exhastive. He also refers to the Mīmāṁsakaś view that the primary meaning of every word is the universal and that the particular to which it refers in a sentence is known through the secondary function, *upacāra* ; but he does not accept that view, since according to him a word means all the three things : universal, the form and the particular.[24]

II.5 Definition of *Lakṣaṇā*

The definition of *Lakṣaṇā* given by Viśavanātha Nyāyapañcānana in his NSM is : *Lakṣaṇā Śakyasaṁbandhaḥ tātparyānupapattitaḥ.*[25] The definition of *Lakṣaṇā* given by the rhetoricians like Jagannātha and Keśavamiśra are quite similar to this.[26] They seem to follow the view of the Naiyāyikas in defining *Lakṣaṇā*. Even Mammaṭa's definition appears essentially to be not different from the Naiyāyika's definition. He defines *Lakṣaṇā* as :

मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात्।
अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत् सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया।।

(KP. P.40)

In this *kārikā,* Mammaṭa combines the definition, cause and the purpose of *Lakṣaṇā.* The presence of *Lakṣaṇā* anticipates three things : 1. the incongruity of the *mukhyārtha* 2. connection between the *vācyārtha* and the *lakṣyārtha* 3. any of the two purpose, *rūḍhi* or *prayojana. Mukhyārthabādha* is a real cause. But the *Mukhyārtha-yoga* is the *svarūpa* of the *Lakṣaṇā,* or, in other words *'Śakya-sambandhā lakṣaṇā'*. The term *prayojanāt* explains the reason why *Lakṣaṇā* has to be accepted at all. His definition of *Lakṣaṇā* is accepted by almost all the *Ālaṅkārikas* including Viśvanātha. But Jagannātha and Keśavamiśra following the Naiyāyikas define *Lakṣaṇā* as *śakya-sambandhā.*

About the *hetu* or *bīja* of *Lakṣaṇā* there are two views : *Anvayānupapatti* and *Tātparyānupapatti.* Naiyāyikas accept *Tātparyānupapatti* as the *bīja* of *Lakṣaṇā.* Though there is *anvayānupapatti* in cases like *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, for, gaṅgā (the *pravāha* of Ganges) cannot be the *adhikaraṇa* of *ghoṣa*, still *Tātparyānupapatti* is to be accepted as the cause of *Lakṣaṇā.* For in cases like *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām,* there is no *śakyārthabādha* or *anvayānupapatti* but *tātparyabādha* is there. For what is meant to be conveyed is that *dadhi* should be protected from all the birds that destroy it and not from crows only. Jagannātha accepts *tātparyānupapatti* as the *bīja* of *Lakṣaṇā* and seems to follow the Naiyāyika view as stated in the NSM.

II.6 Relations Causing *Lakṣaṇā*

Āśādhara in his *Triveṇikā* explains three types of relations which cause *Lakṣaṇā (Lakṣaṇā prayojakasaṁbandha).*[27] They are, according to him, *saṁyoga, samavāya* and *viśiṣṭabuddhiyogya.* The definition of

saṁyoga as given by him is : *dravyayoreva samyuktabuddhihetu saṁyogo guṇaviśeṣaḥ.*[28] He explains a number of varieties of *saṁyoga* such as : *vyāpyavyāpakabhāvasaṁyoga, dhāryadhārakabhāvasaṁyoga, bhartṛbhāryātvam saṁyoga, ādheyādhārabhāvasaṁyoga* etc. His definition of *saṁyoga* is formulated on the basis of the definition of *saṁyoga* given by Keśavamiśra and Annambhaṭṭa.[29] Naiyāyikas accept *saṁyoga* as a *guṇa.*[30] Here also Āśādhara accepts *saṁyoga* as a *guṇa* as well as the cause of *saṁyuktavyavahāra* with the only difference that he accepts a very large variety of *saṁyogas* while Naiyāyikas accept only three types of it. Similarly his definition of *samavāya, nityasaṁbandhaḥ samavāya* and its elucidation as the relation occuring between *avayava* and *avayavi* etc.,[31] clearly reveals that he borrows the concept from some Nyāya work.[32]

II.7 *Tātparya,* Another Function of Word

Sanskrit poeticians have treated *Tātparya* in a significant manner. The treatment of *Tātparya* by some of the poeticians also reveals the Nyāya influence.

Almost all the schools of Indian Philosophy, Grammar and Poetics recognise the importance of *Tātparya* in the understanding of sentence meaning. The Naiyāyikas define *Tātparya* as the intention of the speaker[33]. The intention of the speaker as an essential factor in *śābdabodha* is admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Some Naiyāyikas are even of the view that in common sentences like *ghaṭam ānaya* the meaning of *ghaṭa* is understood by *Tātparya.* Otherwise the pot may indicate

a piece of cloth in a particular context through *Lakṣaṇā.*[34] It is the incompatibility of the expressed sense with the intention of the speaker that prompts the hearer to interpret the sentence by resorting to *Lakṣaṇā*. In the sentence like *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ,* the intention of the speaker gives the meaning, *gaṅgātīra* to the word *gangā*. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the intention need to be that of the actual speaker, but could sometimes be traced to the original author of the statement.[35]

Some Naiyāyikas believe that *Tātparya* need not be treated as a separate condition of *śābdabodha*. It could be included under *ākāṅkṣā* itself. *Ākāṅksā* is the need of a word for another in order to convey the intened meaning of the speaker.[36] In the sentence *ayam iti putro rājñaḥ puruṣo'paśāryatām,* it is the knowledge of the speaker's intention that decides that the word *rājñaḥ* (of the king) is to be construed with the word *putra* (son) and not with the *puruṣa* (man), to satisfy its *ākāṅkṣā*.

According to Gaṅgeśa and Viśvanātha the knowledge of the *Tātparya* is the fourth condition necessary for *śābdabodha*. Some are of the view that *Tātparya* is an all-embracing factor and it has a part to play in the working of the first three factors.[37] Naiyāyikas say that the contextual factors help only indirectly by showing the meaning intended by the speaker.[38] Some of the early Naiyāyikas, prominently Jayantabhaṭṭa, accepts *Tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti*. Navya-Naiyāyikas call this function as *saṁsargamaryādā*.[39]

Abhinavagupta in his *Locana* refers to *Tātparya* as accepted by some Naiyāyikas as a separate *vṛtti* in the context of *Abhihitānvayavāda* while explaining the

syntactic unity of a sentence. He speaks of four distinct functions of a word, *Abhidhā, Tātparya, Lakṣaṇā, Vyañjanā* and arranges them under four separate classes.[40] In a sentence the individual words by their primary function *Abhidhā* refer only to the isolated word-meanings. The syntactic relation of the words is conveyed by the *Tātparyaśakti* of words. The intention of the speaker gives a unified purposeful meaning of a sentence. Hence words are considered to have the power to convey the syntactic relation among the various isolated word-meanings. Ānandavardhana also refers to the importance of the speaker's intention in conveying the meaning of a sentence.[41] But he does not accept *Tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti*.

Bhoja (1050. A.D) in his *Śṛngāraprakāśa* treats *Tātparya* in a unique way.[42] He uses the word in a general sense of the total meaning and divides it into three types, *abhidhiyamānavācya* (expressed), *pratīyamāna* (implied) and *dhvanirūpa* (suggested).[43] Bhoja does not accept both the theories of *Abhihitānvaya* and *Anvitābhidhāna* but prefers a third view according to which the word conveys the sentence meaning by their cumulative effect *(saṁhatyakāritā)*.[44] In this regard he seems to follow Jayantabhaṭṭa who in his NM advocates this view by attributing the cumulative effect to the *Tātparya Śakti* of words.[45]

Dhanika in his commentary on *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya also treats *Tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti*. According to him *Dhvani* could be included in *Tātparya* and it is not necessary to recognise an independent function called *dhvani*.[46] He refutes the *ghaṭapradīpanyāya* given by Ānandavardhana to explain the

relationship between the expressed and the suggested meaning, since the two senses are not as distinct as the pot and the lamp. The relation between *kāvya* and *rasa* is *vācyavācaka* or *lakṣyalakṣaka*. There can be no limitation of the term *Tātparya* to the expressed sense. It can also include the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implication coming in the trend of the expressed sense.

Mammaṭa in his KP refers to the *Tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti* for conveying the syntactic relationship among the various word-meanings according to the *Abhihitānvaya* theory. We will discuss them in detail in the context of *Abhihitānvayavāda.* Viśvanātha in his SD repeats the same idea and refers to *Tātparyavṛtti* as accepted by the *Abhihitānvaya* theorists. It is the sentence as a whole that conveys the *Tātparyārtha* and so the power of *Tātparya* must rest with the sentence as a whole.[47] Many of the later rhetoricians have also refered to *Tātparyavṛtti* mainly on the basis of the statement of Abhinava and Mammaṭa.

It is interesting to note that Jayantabhaṭṭa (10th century A.D.) in his NM was the first to bring forward the theory of *Tātparya* as a separate *vṛtti.* According to him the words in a sentence express their isolated word-meanings by the power of *Abhidhā* but the mutual relationship among the word-meanings is indicated by *Tātparyaśakti.* The function of *Tātparyaśakti* is to reveal the meaning of words contained in a sentence as being mutually related. This power belongs to all the words generally and lasts till the intended meaning is finally produced.[48]

The *Tātparyavṛtti* of the Prācīna school of Nyāya philosophy is the same as the *saṁsargamaryādā* of the Navya-Nyāya school. In the words of S.Kuppuswami Sastri :[49]

> The additional element conveyed by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of the concept *(padārthasaṁsarga)* and this additional element, which is the distinctive feature of a verbal judgement *(vākyārtha)*, is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words *(saṁsargamaryādā)* and not through a primary or secondary significative power of words, *(abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā)*.

II. 8 *Abhihitānvaya* Theory

The *abhihitānvaya* theory advocated by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas does include the concept of *Tātparya* and as treated by poeticians particularly Mammata it does need some elaboration here. According to this theory the meaning of a sentence is a concatenation of the individual entities expressed by the word. The individual words have in themselves a meaning which can be comprehended separately. On hearing a sentence, we first understand the separate meanings of the words one after the other. Then we put together these meanings according to the three factors : *ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā* and *sannidhi* and as a result, get the meaning of the sentence.

As shown above, Abhinavagupta accepts Jayanta's modified form of *Abhihitānvaya* theory, not that of the

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. The *Abhihitānvaya* theory though primarily propounded by the Mīmāṁsakas is also accepted by the Naiyāyikas. It is a fact that early Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Vātsyāyana have not discussed the problem of the sentence. They have discussed only the exact import of a word. But they believe that the sentence is only a collection of words, and the sentence meaning is only the mutual association of the word-meanings.[50] After discussing in detail the various theories about *Śābdabodha* held by various schools, Jayanta, perhaps for the first time, advocates a modified form of the theory.

Mammaṭa in the second *ullāsa* of his KP presents the theory of *vākyārtha* upheld by the *Abhihitānvayavādins* as follows :

तात्पर्यार्थोऽपि केषुचित्। II. 6.

आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिवशाद्वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपाणां पदार्थानां समन्वये तात्पर्यार्थो विशेषवपुरपदार्थोपि वाक्यार्थः समुल्लसतीत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम्।

From the above presentation itself it is not very clear who, in fact are intended by the term *abhihitānvayavādins*. Since the theory of *Abhihitānvaya* is advocated by both the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas, it becomes difficult to decide whose view Mammaṭa is refering to. The subtle difference however is this: according to *Abhihitānvaya*, the individual words of a sentence denote only universals and through their *anvaya* one gets the *vākyārtha* which must refer to particulars. The distinction between the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā theory of *Abhihitānvaya* is that while Naiyāyikas believe this *anvaya* as a result of

Tātparyavṛtti, the Mīmāṁsakas believe it to be of *lakṣaṇāvṛtti*. Among the commentators of Mammaṭa's KP both ancient and modern there is a lot of controversy about whose *abhihitānvayavāda* Mammaṭa refers to. A host of commentators seem to believe that Mammaṭa accepts the view of Naiyāyikas and *keṣucit* means Naiyāyikas.[51] Many modern commentators like P.V. Kane, G.N. Jha believe that by the word *keṣucit* Mammaṭa is refering to Mīmāṁsakas since the theory of *abhihitānvaya* was so popular and prevalent among the ancient Mīmāṁsakas.[52] However, the word *tātparyārtho'pi* in *Kārikā* II.6. quoted above the presence of *tātparya* itself clarifies Mammaṭa's position and shows without doubt that he follows Nyāya and not Mīmāṁsa, because *tātparya* is a *nyāya* term.

Thus Mammaṭa seems to present the *Abhihitānvayavāda* mainly of Jayantabhaṭṭa, a prominent representative of the Prācīna school of Nyāya philosophy,who has given a status of *vṛtti* to *tātparya* and who considers *tātparyārtha* as *vākyārtha*. The fact that both the authors belong to the same age and hail from the same region also goes to corroborate this inference.

REFERENCES

1. वर्तते शब्दोऽर्थे प्रवर्ततेऽनयेति वृत्तिः। *Triveṇikā*, P.1
2. वृत्तित्वञ्च शाब्दबोधहेतुशब्दार्थोपस्थित्यनुकूलशब्दतदर्थ–सम्बन्धत्वम्। *Vṛttidīpikā*, P. 1
3. 'इदं पदमिमर्थं बोधयतु इति, 'अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य' इति वेच्छा, संकेतरूपा वृत्तिः। *Śaktivāda*, P.5.
4. वृत्तिर्व्यापारः क्रिया चेति पर्यायशब्दाः। *Triveṇikā*, P.4.
5. तिस्रः शब्दस्य शक्तयः। SD., Ch. II, P. 26.
6. स मुख्योऽर्थस्तत्र मुख्यो व्यापारोऽभिधोच्यते।

   KP. Ch. II, P. 39.
7. संकेतो लक्षणा चार्थे वृत्तिः। *Śaktivāda*, P.1.
8. तिस्रो वृत्तयः पदानां भवन्ति, शक्तिर्लक्षणा व्यञ्जना चेति।

   Alaṅkāraśekhara, P. II.
9. शक्तिश्च पदेन सह पदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः। NSM. P. 295.
10. सा च....... ईश्वरेच्छारूपा। आधुनिके नाम्नि शक्तिरस्त्येव, "एकादशेऽहनि पिता नाम कुर्यात्" इतीश्वरेच्छायाः शक्तिरिति सम्प्रदायः। नव्यास्तु–ईश्वरेच्छा न सत्वात्। आधुनिकसंकेतिते तु न शक्तिः, किन्तु इच्छैव।

    NSM., P. 295.
11. अपरे नैयायिकाः। Nāgeśa, *Gurumarmaprakāśikā*, P.177
12. *Vṛttivārttikam,* P. 58 13., cf. न्यायमते शक्तिस्त्रिविधा योगः रूढिः योगरुढिश्चेति। *Nyāyakośa*, P. 855.
13. शक्तं पदं, तच्चर्तुविधम् । NSM. P. 381.
14. आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः। NyS. I. 1.7.
15. आप्तः खलु साक्षात्कृतधर्मा यथादुष्टस्याऽर्थस्य चिख्यापयिषया, प्रयुक्त उपदेष्टा। NBh. on NyS I.1.7.

16. *Nyāyakośa* P. 860.

17. व्यवहारादपि शक्तिग्रहो यथा घटं नय गामानय इत्याद्यावपोद्वा-पाभ्यां पार्श्वस्थबालस्य घटादिपदस्य घटमात्रे शक्तिग्रहो भवति।
Ibid. P.859.

18. *Ibid*.

19. *Ibid*.

20. सहचरण-स्थान-तादर्थ्य-वृत्त-मान-धारण-सामीप्ययोग-साधनापित्येभयो-ब्राह्मण-मञ्च-कट-राज-सक्तु-चन्दन-गङ्गा-शाटकान्न-पुरुषेष्वन-तद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः। NyS II. 2. 63.

21. *Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇinisūtra*, V. 1. 48.

22. KASV, IV. 3.8

23. AP., Ch. 344, Verse II.

24. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः । NyS. II. 2. 67.

25. NSM. P.319.

26. शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणा। RG. 185;
लक्षणा शक्यसम्बन्धः। *Alaṅkāraśekhara*, P. II.

27. स त्रिविधः—संयोगः समवायो, विशिष्टबुद्धियोग्यश्चेति।
Triveṇikā, P.17

28. तत्र द्रव्ययोरेव संयुक्तबुद्धिहेतुः संयोगो गुणविशेषः।
Triveṇikā, P. 17

29. सयोगः संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः, TB. P. 79; संयुक्तव्यवहारहेतुः संयोगः। TS. P. 16.

30. TS. P.4.

31. नित्यसम्बन्धः समवायः। स पञ्चविधः— अवयवावयविभावो, गुणागुणिभावः, क्रियाकियावद्भावो, जातिव्यक्तिभावो, विशेषनित्यद्रव्यभावश्चेति। *Triveṇikā*, P.18.

32. यथा अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिव्यक्ती विशेषनित्यद्रव्ये चेति। TB. P.6.

33. वक्तुरिच्छा तु तात्पर्यं परिकीर्तितम्। NSM, P. 421.
34. *Nyāyakośa*, P.327.
35. प्रयोक्ता चाभिसंधापयितृमात्रम् न तु वक्तैव। NM. P. 24.
36. *Nyāyakośa*, P.327.
37. तात्पर्यगर्भा चासत्तिः। NSM. P. 303.
38. *Ibid*. P. 315.
39. शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थसंसर्गः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते।
Gadādhara, *Vyutpattivāda* P.1.
40. त्रयो ह्यत्र व्यापाराः संवेद्यन्ते–पदार्थेषु सामान्यात्म स्वभिधाव्यापारः, समयापेक्षार्थावगमनशक्तिः, अविधासमयश्च । तावत्येव न विशेषांशे। आनन्त्यात्व्यभिचाराच्च। एकस्य ततो विशेषरूपे वाक्यार्थे तात्पर्यशक्तिः परस्परान्विते। *Locana*, P.19.
41. Dh.A. I. 10.
42. V. Raghavan, II Edn. P. 173.
43. *Ibid*, P. 21.
44. *Ibid*
45. NM. P. 371.
46. Dhanika, *Avaloka on the Daśarūpaka,* p. 156.
47. SD. II. 20.
48. NM. P. 371
49. Sastri, S. Kuppuswami, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, P. 258.
50. NM., P. 333.
51. Kunjuni Raja, K., *Indian Theories of Meaning*, P. 222.
52. *Ibid*. P. 218

CHAPTER III

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON POETIC BLEMISHES

III. 1. Concept of Poetic Blemishes

In the Alaṅkāraśāstra an important place is given to the treatment of poetic blemishes *(kāvyadoṣas)*. Almost all the prominent Ālaṅkārikas beginning from Bharata have dealt with the nature and types of blemishes which are definitely to be avoided in the literary compositions because they mar the aesthetic beauty of poetry. *Doṣas*, are, therefore, very rightly defined as the causes of diminution *(apakarṣa)* of *kāvya*.[1] The absence of *doṣa* is counted by Bhoja as the first condition which makes an utterance fit to be called *kāvya*.[2] Among the four poetical relations of *śabda* and *artha* the first is the avoidance of *doṣas (doṣahāna)*. Only after taking due care to avoid all flaws a poet can think of embelishing his speech with excellences. Emphasising on the avoidance of *doṣas* in *kāvya*,Bhāmaha states that nobody is enjoined by scriptures to write poetry under compassion or coersion or punishment, but to be a bad poet is declared by the wise to be death itself.[3] Similarly, Daṇḍin observes that one should not make even an insignificant blemish in a poem as a handsome body may cause disgust on account of a single leprous spot.[4] Even the poeticians like Mammaṭa explicitly and oth-

ers like Viśvanātha and Jagannātha implicitly advocate the rejection of blemishes in the definitions of *kāvya*.

Generally the poetic blemishes are classified under different headings such as *padadoṣas, vākyadoṣas*, *rasadoṣas* etc. But all these *doṣas* can be classified as shown by V. Raghavan under the following heads[5] :

1. Grammatical
2. Literary
3. Logical

A thorough examination of the concept of poetic blemishes reveals the fact that poeticians have emphasised upon the logical aspect of *śabda, artha* and their relations. As a result it is found that some of the faults are based on breach of logical doctrines and concepts of Nyāyaśāstra. All those *doṣas* which seem to have been influenced by Nyāyaśāstra are discussed in the following pages.

III.2. Bharata's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

In the literature of Sanskrit poetics, Bharata's NS is known to be the oldest extant work dealing with the concepts of poetics. Therefore, an examination of the concept of *doṣa* should begin with Bharata's treatment of it. Bharata's chief concern being dramaturgy and the techniques to be employed in the composition of drama for stage performance he deals with various ways and modes of expressions, which add beauty, force and dignity to the speech.[6] As defective expressions detract from the beauty of verbal and formal aspects of poetry, he, therefore, has taken note of blemishes which are to be avoided by the dramatists. The list of blemishes propounded by Bharata appears to be the oldest formulation of the concept and later writers have made it their starting point. Bharata enumerates ten blemishes in poetic composition.[7] They are as follows :

1. *Gūḍhārtha* (circumlocution) 2. *Arthāntara* (superfluous expression) 3. *Arthahīna* (devoid of meaning) 4. *Bhinnārtha* (defective significance) 5. *Ekārtha* (tautology) 6. *Abhiplutārtha* (elliptical expression) 7. *Nyāyādapeta* (logical lapse) 8. *Visama* (unevenness of metre) 9. *Visandhi* (hiatus) 10. *Śabdacyuta* (grammatical impurity).

Of these, the five *doṣas*, viz., *Gūḍhārtha, Arthāntara, Arthahīna, Ekārtha* and *Nyāyādapeta* are more important from our point of view. The following analysis will show how all these *doṣas* are formulated on the basis of the logical defects enumerated in the NyS.

1. *Gūḍhārtha*

Gūḍhārtha is defined by Bharata as *paryāyaśabdābhihita*.[8] It occurs when the meaning becomes hidden owing to the use of synonymous words. Bhāmaha does not define this *doṣa*. But he says :

गूढशब्दाभिधानं च न प्रयोज्यं कथञ्चन।
सुधियामपि नैवेदमुपकाराय कल्पते।। (KA. I. 45)

The use of difficult words with a hidden meaning is a defect. *Kāvya* with such an expression fails to appeal to a connoisseur who finds difficulty in appreciating its beauty. For example :

असितर्तितुगाद्रिच्छित्स्वः क्षितां पतिरद्विदृक्।
अमिद्व: शुभ्रदृग्दृष्टैर्द्विषो जेघ्नीयिषीष्ट वः।। (KA. I.46)

(May the son of fire destroy your foes entirely by his white and terrible glances, he, who is the piercer of mountain and lord of the inhabitants of *svarga* and is possessed of more than two eyes).

The unusual, and therefore, difficult usages are to be explained as follows.

(a) *asitarti*, he who has a black (*asita*), path (*rti*)-Fire, his son (*tuc*) is lord Skanda.

(b) *adricchit*-piercer (*chit*) of a mountain (*adri*)

(c) *svaḥksitām patiḥ*-the lord (*pati*) of the dwellers *(kṣitām)* of heaven (*svaḥ*). He is the commander of the army of gods. (d) *advidṛk*-not having two (*dvi*) eyes (*dṛk*); hence, many eyed may destroy again and again (*jeghniyāt*), your enemies (*vaḥ dviṣaḥ*) with his fearful (*amidbhiḥ*) and white (*śubhra*) glances (*dṛṣṭa*).

Here the meaning is understood with the great labour. Bhāmaha's *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna* may be compared with Gautama's *Avijñātārtha* (Unintelligible statement), one of the *nigrahasthānas* propounded by the Naiyāyikas of the Akṣ -apāda school. It is defined by Gautama[9] as the argument which is not understood by the audience or by the opponent though it is repeated three times. Disputant being opposed by a stronger opponent tries to hide his inability to defend himself by using words with double meaning, or of uncommon use, or which are too quickly uttered to be intelligible.[10] For example, *śveto dhāvati*, it means a white animal runs. But if a person uses it in the sense of a dog runs away from here (*śvāito dhāvati*), he commits this defect. In this blemish meaningful but unintelligible words are uttered.

From the above point of view Bhāmaha's example of *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna* may be taken as a case because it contains unintelligible words which are not in common use. Raghavan rightly remarks[11] :

> The second of these, *apratītaśabda* (one of the causes of *avijñātārtha*) as given by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya* is met with in Alaṅkāraśāstra. It is akin to Bhāmaha's *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna*.

2. *Arthāntara*

Arthāntara is defined by Bharata as : *avarṇyam varṇyate yatra tadarthāntaramīṣyāte*[12] i.e.when anything not to the point is described it constitutes the fault called *Arthāntara*. This is regarded so because it is uncalled for description. It expressly states what is implicitly contained in the essential nature of the subject. Bharata does not give an example of it. Abhinavagupta gives the following example :

चिन्तामोहमनङ्गमङ्ग तनुते विप्रेक्षितं सुभ्रुवः । (P. 331)

(The beautiful lady's look spreads indeed love as well as anxiety and stupor).

Here the mention of anxiety and stupor is not to the point. Love includes these states of mind and therefore they are understood. There is no need of its special mention in the verse. Though the above statement is not nonsensical it is certainly illogical.

The influence of the Nyāyaśāstra can be observed here. *Arthāntara* is one of the *nigrahasthānas* of the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines it as :

प्रकृतादर्थादप्रतिसंबद्धार्थमर्थान्तरम् । (V. 2.7)

Vātsyāyana says that one gets defeated in an intellectual debate if he falls a prey to this flaw of irrelevant digression. He gives a humorous illustration of this flaw. If one has to prove *nityatva* of *śabda* he should give a valid *hetu* which can prove it. But instead of giving a *hetu* in support of his proposition if he derives the word *hetu* from its root, points out the *pratyaya* and shows how it is a *kṛdantapada* and then proceeds to give various kinds of *padas*, he commits the flaw of *Arthāntara*.[13] Bharata's concept of *Arthāntara* seems to be identical with the concept of Gautama's *nigrahasthāna*.

3. *Arthahīna*

Arthahīna is defined by Bharata[14] as :

अर्थहीनं त्वसंबद्धं सावशेषार्थमेव च।

Bhāmaha calls it *Apārthaka* and defines as :

समुदायार्थशून्यं यत्तदपार्थकमिष्यते।
दाडिमानि दशापूपाः षडित्यादि यथोदितम्॥ (KA. IV. 8)

It occurs when the combination as a whole is devoid of meaning. There is not a single harmonious meaning inherent in all *padas* of a verse. The incoherence is of two types viz., incoherent words and incoherent sentences. Ten pomegranates, six cakes, goat's skin, lump of meat are examples of inherent words (*pada-apārthaka*) 'A person rice in a tank eating goes and bathing', is an example of incoherent sentence (*vākya-apārthaka*).

Apārthaka also is a *nigrahasthāna* in Gautama's philosophy. According to Gautama, *Apārthaka* is an argument of which words or sentences are combined without any syntactical order and do not convey any connected meaning.[15] The example of *pada-apārthaka* is straightway taken from Vātsyāyana's NBh; in fact Bhāmaha is clearly referring to Vātsyāyana since the example is taken verbatim from Vātsyāyana, and again as is clear from his words *ityādi yathoditam*. We should also note, however, that the two types of *Arthahīna* that of *pada* and of *vākya* are not mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*; they are introduced by Bhāmaha himself. Daṇḍin follows Bhāmaha in this manner.

4. *Ekārtha* (Tautology)

It is defined by Bharata as *aviśeṣābhidhānam yat*.[16] This fault occurs when the indiscriminative use of many words

for a single purpose is made. Abhinavagupta cites an example of this defect as : कुन्देन्दुहारहरहाससित (यशस्ते) ।[17]

(your fame is white like the kunda flower, the moon, the garland of pearls and the laughter of Śiva).

In this example, all words have practically one and the same purport. Any one simile would have been enough. Each simile here serves the same purpose and hence tautology has occured. Since *yaśaḥ* is regarded to be white in poetic convention and *hāsa* is also regarded white, it consists of reduplication of the same idea without adding anything new or special to the sense.

It is significant to note that Gautama in his NyS speakes of *Punarukta* as a *nigrahasthāna*.[18] Bharata's *Ekārtha* may be similar to Gautama's *Punarukta*. Raghavan rightly remarks[19] :

Punarukta is very well-known and is seen as *Ekārtha* in Bharata.

Bhāmaha also borrows from Bharata the concept of the *doṣa* called *Ekārtha*. He defines it as :

यदभिन्नार्थमन्योन्यं तदेकार्थं प्रचक्षते ।
पुनरुक्तमिदं प्राहुरन्ये शब्दार्थभेदतः ।। (KA. IV. 12)

(when statements convey the same meaning as stated before, it is a fault called *Ekārtha*.)

Bharata does not give any divisions of it while Bhāmaha divides it into those of *śabda* and *artha*. He does not examplify *śabda-ekārtha* and calls it *sthūla* (obvious). He further notes that repetition is not a defect if the same word is repeated under the influence of fear, sorrow, jealousy etc., e.g. *gaccha gaccha*. He gives the example of the second type as follows :

तामुत्कमनसं नूनं करोति ध्वनिरम्भसाम्।
सौधेषु घनमुक्तानां प्रणालीमुखपातिनाम्।। (KA. IV. 16)

(The sound reproduced by the rain falling from the clouds on the roof of the house and discharging through the mouth of sprouts renders her anxious.)

Here the word *utka* includes the meaning of *manas* in its own meaning and so the use of the word *manas* is futile.

It is important to note that Bhāmaha identified *Ekārtha* with *Punarukta*. He says : *Punaruktam idam prāhuḥ anye*. To whom does he refer by *anye* is not clear. At least, Bharata does not call it *punarukta*. It could be some other poetician prior to him whose work is now lost or it could also possibly be the NBh of Vātsyāyana since in his treatment of *Apārtha* and *Vyartha* he has alluded to it, and the two faults of *Vyāghāta* and *Punarukta* occur in the NBh together in the same *sūtra*.

Daṇḍin and Vāmana also follow in the foot-step of Bhāmaha. But, Mammaṭa calls it *Punarukta*. He, however, before treating this *doṣa*, treats another *doṣa* named *Anavikṛta* which has a close similarity with that of *Punarukta*. It is a repetition of the same set of words or phrases without giving some variation through turns of expression. For example :

प्राप्ताः श्रियः सकलकामदुघास्ततः किं
दत्तं पदं शिरसि विद्विषतां ततः किम्।
संतर्पिताः प्रणयिनो विभवैस्ततः किं
कल्पं स्थित तनुभृतां तनुभिस्ततः किम्।।

(KP. VII. P. 393)

(All-affording wealth has been attained-so what? the foot has been placed on the head of the enemy-so what? Friends have been fully supplied with riches-so what? The bodies of men have lasted for a whole cycle-so what?)

Here the frequent use, the repetition of *takaḥ-kiṁ* is monotonous and it adds nothing new to the meaning.

This *doṣa* corresponds to the *Artha-paunaruktya* as illustrated by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. V. Raghavan remarks:[20]

> Both Gautama and Vātsyāyana speak of *Śabda-paunaruktya* and *Artha-paunaruktya*. The latter, illustrated by Vātsyāyana corresponds to what Mammaṭa has given among his *Artha-doṣas* as *Anavikṛta*.

The *Agnipurāṇa* (AP) in its 11th chapter of *Alaṅkāra*-section deals with *Punarukta*. In transferring the logical defect of *punaruktatā* to the sphere of poetics the AP certainly follows Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and even perhaps Vāmana who all mention and define this fault under the name of *Ekārtha*. The AP defines it as : *ābhikṣṇyādabhidhānam*. It means continued repetition (*ābhikṣṇasya bhāvaḥ*). It is of two kinds : 1. *Arthāvṛtti* (the repetition of meaning) and 2. *Padāvṛtti* (repetition of words). Again, *Arthāvṛtti* is of two kinds : 1. *Prayuktavaraśabdena* (use of a better word different from the used one) and 2. *Śabdāntareṇa* (use of an altogether different word).[21] In giving the above division of *Punarukta* AP differs from earlier poeticians and in this respect it seems to follow Gautama's division of *Punarukta* as given in the NyS. But it should be noted that the two divisions of *Arthāvṛtti* and *prayuktavaraśabdena* also do not appear to be different from *padāvṛtti*. Therefore in our present state of knowledge, nothing can be said either about the source of the AP's classification of *Arthāvṛtti* or about the classification itself.

Ruyyaka, the author of *Alaṅkārasarvasva* (ASS) defines and illustrates *Punarukta* in the context of *Punaruktavadābhāsa*. According to him *Punarukta* is of three types viz., *śabdapunarukta, arthapunarukta* and *śabdārthapunarukta*.[22] But in the context of *lāṭānuprāsa alaṅkāra* he quotes the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama which is the definition of *Punarukta Nigrahasthāna* i.e. *śabdārthayoḥ punarvacanam punaruktam anyatrānuvādāt*. (NyS. V. 2.14)

Jayaratha, the commentator in his *Vimarśiṇī* also identifies that *sūtra* by giving the name of *Akṣapādāhurityākṣapādāḥ*.[23]

5. *Nyāyādapeta*

The fault *Nyāyādapeta* occurs in a poetic expression of a sentence when it deviates from or is devoid of logical propriety. It is defined by Bharata as : *pramāṇaparivarjitam*[24] 'an expression devoid of meaning'. Abhinavagupta divides it into two kinds: 1. *deśakālaviruddha* (defying the limitation of place and time) 2. *kalāśāstraviruddha* (contradicting the established notions of arts and sciences etc.). The example of the first type is :

सुवीरेष्वस्ति नगरी मथुरा नाम विश्रुता।
अक्षोटनालिकेलाढ्या यस्याः पर्यन्तभूमयः ।। (ABh. P.333)

(There is a city called Mathurā in Suvīra (Panjab) whose vicinities abound with oilnuts and coconuts).

Here one observes lapse of logical propriety with reference to place. The city of Mathurā is not situated in Punjab but in the Uttarapradeśa. This shows the writer's ignorance of Geography. Oilnuts grow in Kashmir and coconuts in the South India. Coconuts flourish in the regions adjacent to the Sea and oilnuts in cold mountainous regions. Hence the above statement is in

conflict with Geographical and topographical data and hence suffers from the fault of *Nyāyādapeta.*

Abhinavagupta does not give any instance of the second type of this defect. But an example of it can be furnished if a Buddhist is represented as an upholder of the soul theory (*ātmavāda*) which is flagrantly inconsistent with his creed because the Buddhists never believe in the metaphysical reality of a person; or if a Naiyāyika declares the objective world as an illusion like the *Vijñānavādins.*

This fault has been treated by the later poeticians by making a little modifications. Bhāmaha treats it by the name *Nyāyavirodhi* but the word *Nyāya* according to him stands for Śāstra in general. While treating this fault Daṇḍin briefly deals with its sub-divisions as *deśa, kāla, kalā* and *lokaviruddha* and pays more attention to *hetuvidyā* (*nyāya*). According to him the term *Nyāya* means *hetuvidyā*. Later on the poeticians like Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha treated this fault by using the term *Śāstraviruddha* or *Vidyāviruddha*. While treating this, Puñjarāja, the author of the *Śiśuprabodha-kāvyālaṅkāra*, particularly gives an example of *Tarkaviruddhadoṣa* as follows :

यथार्थानुभवादन्या प्रमा सेयं ममोदिता। (P. 14)

This sentence is incorrect from the Tarkaśāstra point of view for, according to Tarkaśāstra, *anubhava* is of two types: *yathārtha* (valid) and *ayathārtha* (invalid). *Yathārthānubhava* is called *pramā*. But here in this verse *pramā* is said to be different from *yathārthānubhava* and therefore is not reasonable. This shows Puñjarāja's knowledge of the Tarkaśāstra.

Above analysis of this fault makes it clear that form NS onwards, this *doṣa* is continuously recognised under the Nyāya influence. Bharata does not use the term *Nyāya* in a

general sense of propriety etc., but in sense of *pramāṇa*. We, may, therefore, conclude that he and all the poeticians after him propound this *doṣa* with the Nyāya principles in their mind. P.V. Kane rightly remarks :[25]

The discussions about logical matter in the province of poetry were started by Bharata. His *Nyāyādapeta* which is defined as '*pramāṇaparivarjitam*' is an example of this defect. The *pramāṇas* are the special province of logic.

III. 3 Bhāmaha's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

Bhāmaha in his treatment of *kāvyadoṣas*, not only follows Bharata but also adds many more new faults to the list. He enumerates more *doṣas* based on Nyāyaśāstra than his succesors. He not only just gives importance to the grammatical accuracy and aesthetic values of the word and sense in poetry but also endeavours to focus the light on the requirement of logical accuracy.

Of the seven *doṣas* treated by him under the Nyāya influence viz., *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna, Ayuktimat, Apārthaka, Vyartha, Ekārtha, Apakrama* and *Nyāyavirodhi*. *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna, Apārthaka, Ekārtha* and *Nyāyavirodhi* are already discussed above. The remaining three are taken up here.

1. *Ayuktimat*

Ayuktimat occurs if a poet makes the cloud, the moon, the wind, the bee, the bird etc., a messenger in poetry.

अयुक्तिमद्यथा दूता जलभृन्मारुतेन्दवः ।
तथा भ्रमरहारीतचक्रवाकशुकादयः ।। (KA. I. 42)

Such delineations do not fit in with Reason, argues Bhāmaha, and suffer from the sense of impropriety. But if these are addressed by persons suffering from an excess of longing, it

is not considered as a blemish. This device is adopted by the poets of outstanding genius. For example, Kālidāsa in his *Meghadūtam* describes the cloud as messenger. But he, perhaps aware of this fault, supplies a rationale for it.

कामार्त्ता हि प्रकृतिकृपणाश्चेतनाचेतनेषु ।

Ayuktimat may be translated as 'illogical'. The example given by Bhāmaha suggests that he emphasises extreme and empirical reality provable by *pramāṇas* only. He does not approve of superficial imaginations which are contradictory to the *pramāṇas*. Similarly, Nyāyaśāstra also accepts the validity of the things which are cognised only by the *pramāṇas*, and asserts the falsity of other. From this point of view, Bhāmaha's *Ayuktimat* agrees with this concept of Nyāyaśāstra. It takes place only where the things presented in a poem cannot be proved by any valid means of knowledge.

2. *Vyartha*

This fault arises when the subsequent statements contradicts the previous one.[26] He gives the following example :

सखिं मानं प्रिये धेहि लघुतामस्य मा गमः ।
भर्त्तुश्छन्दानुवर्त्तिन्यः प्रेम ध्नन्ति न हि स्त्रियः ।।

(KA. IV. 10)

(O friend ! do show your anger towards your lover, do not become mild to him; women who follow the wishes of their husbands do not hamper their lover.)

Here, the first statement *mānam dhehi* (show anger) and the second statement *chandānuvartinyaḥ* (follower of husband's wishes) are opposed to each other.

It is significant to note that the *Vyartha* of Bhāmaha may be compared with *Vyāghāta* of Gautama. The discussion of

Vyāghāta takes place in the section of *Śabdapramāṇa* of NyS of Gautama where the *pūrvapakṣa* argues against the validity of the verbal knowledge because of its flaws as *anṛta* (untruth), *vyāghāta* (discrepancy) and *punarukta* (tautology).[27] *Vyāghāta* is explained by Vātsyāyana as that between the enjoinments of two *mantras*. For instance, there are some *mantras* directing a person to offer oblation before or after sunrise or when the stars are shining and the Sun is not visible. Regarding these three time for the oblations, there are corresponding deprecatory texts : oblations offered at three different times are eaten by different kinds of dogs. The simple answer to this accusation is that once a person has aggreed to offer an oblation at a certain time, the time that he has accepted should not be altered. The texts in question are meant to carry approval of alteration in the procedure already adopted. From this point of view Bhāmaha's *Vyartha* seems to be identical with the *Vyāghāta* of Gautama. Daṇḍin follows Bhāmaha in treating this *doṣa* by naming it *Pūrvāpara-viruddha*.

3. *Apakrama*

This fault occurs due to the reversal of the order of the statement (*krama*). Since syntactical regularity demands that the things attributed should follow the order of the first statements,violation of this regularity results in the defect called *Apakrama*. [28]

For example :

विदधानौ किरीटेन्दु श्यामाभ्रहिमसच्छवी ।
रथाङ्गशूले बिभ्राणौ पातां वः शम्भुशार्ङ्गिणौ ।। (KA. II.21)

(May Śiva and Viṣṇu who carry the crown and the moon, who have splendour of a black cloud and a snow like lustre, who carry the disc and a triedent, protect you.)

Here the *dharmas* should have been mentioned in the same order as their *dharmis* i.e. Śiva and Viṣṇu. But this order is violated and therefore it is a case of *Apakrama*. This fault may be compared with the *aprāptakālanigrahasthāna* of Gautama.[29] *Aprāptakāla* consists in stating the members of an inference in an illogical order. There is a definite order among the members of an inference; 1. *pratijñā* (preposition) 2. *hetu* (reason) 3. *udāharaṇa* (example) 4. *upanaya* (application) and 5. *nigamana* (conclusion). The logical order among them conveys a connected meaning of the argument. If it is reversed it cannot convey any connected meaning. Bhāmaha has taken up the words of Vātsyāyana such as *viparyāsa* and *krama* to explain his concept of *Apakrama*.[30] For this *doṣa* there is an agreement in the concept as well as expression of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin.

Apart from the treatment of faults as shown above Bhāmaha also explains the *pratijñāhīnādidoṣas* which are purely logical faults. He has definitely borrowed the concepts from Nyāya treatises. The *pratijñā* (preposition) is the most important feature of *anumānavākya*. Bhāmaha first of all explains the defects of the *pratijñā* (an *avayava* of syllogistic statement). It consists of a statement in which a subject (*pakṣa*) is already known specifically to both the parties in a discussion and a predicate in a specific form is proposed to be established in the subject.[31] In other words it is in the form of a definite proposition. Its chief purpose is to bring about a definite knowledge of the *pakṣa* as such or what is proposed to be proved as having a *sādhya*. Gautama in his NyS defines *pratijñā* as *sādhyanirdeśa*.[32] But Bhāmaha defines *pratijñā* as a statement of *pakṣa* in which *dharmi* and its *dharma* are present.

Bhāmaha explains all the six varieties of *pratijñādoṣas*[33] with the examples as follows:

(1) *Tadarthavirodhinī* : It is the proposition which contradicts its own meaning. In other words it is a self-contradictory statement.

Example : यतिर्मम पिता बाल्यात्सूनुर्यस्याहमौरसः ।

(KA. V. 14)

(My father is a celibate monk from his childhood and I am his legitimate *aurasa* son).

(2) *Hetuvirodhinī* : The proposition contradicted by its reason *(hetu)*. It is illustrated by a case which is a subjcet of dispute.

Examples :

अस्त्यात्मा प्रकृतिर्वेति ज्ञेया हेत्वपवादिनी ।
धर्मिणोऽस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्तद्धर्मोऽपि न सेत्स्यति ।।
शाश्वतोऽशाश्वतो वेति प्रसिद्धे धर्मिणि ध्वनौ ।
जायते भेदविषयो विवादो वादिनोर्मिथः ।।

(KA. V. 14 & 16)

Here the proposition whether the soul is existent or the *prakṛti* is a *hetuvirodhinī-pratijñā*. Since in the above proposition *dharmi* (*ātmā* or *prakṛti*) is not established, its *dharma* cannot also be established. Here in the given proposition both *dharmi* and *dharma* are unestablished in the absence of proof.

3. *Svasiddhāntavirodhinī* : The proposition which contradicts one's own *siddhānta*.

Example : कणभक्षो यथा शब्दमाचक्षीताविनश्वरम् ।

(KA. V. 17)

According to the Vaiśeṣika school of Kaṇāda, *śabda* is *anitya*. But if a proposition like *śabdaḥ nityaḥ* (sound is

eternal) is made by a Vaiśeṣika, that will be *svasiddhānta-virodhinipratijñā* because the later contradicts the former.

4. *Sarvāgamavirodhinī* : The proposition which is contradicted by all the Śāstras.

Example: यथा शुचिस्तनुस्त्रीणि प्रमाणानि न सन्ति वा।

(KA. V. 18)

This is illustrated by the contradiction of a position which is universally accepted. The proposition like 'the body is pure' is in contradiction with the assertion with all the schools of philosophy. Similarly the assertion that there are no *pramāṇas* is a case in point.

5. *Prasiddhadharamavirodhinī* : The proposition which is contradicted by its excessive popularity.

Example : श्रोत्रग्राह्यो ध्वनिर्यथा। (KA.V.19d)

What is accepted by all and not subject of doubt does not require an express statement.

6. *Pratyakṣabādhini* : The proposition which is contradicted by direct perception.

Example : यथा शीतोऽनलो नास्ति रूपमुष्णः क्षपाकरः।

(KA. V. 20)

The statements like 'fire is cool', 'moon is hot' are contradicted by direct perception.

According to Bhāmaha there should not be an absence of any member like *hetu* etc., in the *Pratijñāvākya* because it leads to the defective *anumāna*.

Duṣaṇābhāsas (illusion of fault), according to Bhāmaha, are called *jāti* and they are numerable and therefore not explained by him.[34]

The foregoing discussion of *pratiñā* etc., says Bhāmaha, is useful in the poems which are Śāstra-like in nature.[35] But in other *Kāvyas*, *Pratijñā* etc., of different types occur. Because poetry depends on worldly experience and Śāstras depend on truth. A poet cannot be bound when he composed a general *kāvya* but he has to follow the rules of the Śāstras when he specially composes *Śāstrakāvyas*. Bhāmaha gives definition of other types of *pratijñā* etc., i.e. the undertaking of desired task which are likely to occur in *kāvyas* based on worldly experience (*lokāśritakāvyas*). It is of four types as the desired task pertains to *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *kopa*.

About the nature of *hetu* Bhāmaha says that in poetry too *hetu* has three aspects as in Śāstra. *Anumāna* is based on *anvaya* (agreement) and *vyatireka* (difference). Bhāmaha also gives the example of it, the analysis of which can be made in the form of *sādhya* and *sādhana*.

यथाऽभितो वनाभोगमेतदस्ति महत्सरः ।
कूजनात्कुररीणाञ्च कमलानाञ्च सौरभात् ।।

(KA. V. 48)

Here the existence of pond is known by the *kūjana* of *kurarī* and fragrance of lotuses. The *anumāna* may be put in the following form :

वनाभोगे महत्सरः अस्ति कुररीणां कूजनात्, कमलानां सौरभात् च ।।

Here, *vanābhoge* is *pakṣa*, *mahatsaraḥ asti* is *sādhya* and *kūjana* and *saurabha* are *sādhanas* or *hetus* by which the existence of *sara* in the forest is inferred.

Even in the stock example *parvato vahnimān dhūmāt* this depends on the inevitable relation between *sādhya* and *sādhana*. The smoke seen in the sky is instrumental in effecting the inference of the fire only in the mountain. In

poetry sometimes reason is not distinctly stated from *sādhya* and the latter is established even without positive and negative concomitance.

The example : दीपदीप्रा निशा जज्ञे व्यपवृत्तदिवाकरा।

(KA. V. 51a)

Here, night is the substratum which is the objcet of inference *sādhyadharmiṇi* and disappearance of the sun is *sādhyadharma*. Long disappearance of the sun can be logically proved only by the reason *dipra dipatvam* possessing brilliantly shining lamps.

The *hetu* in poetry is also liable to be vitiated by the three defects which violates the triple character of probans (*hetu*) in the Nyāya logic. Bhāmaha gives several examples of these defects which arise due to ignorance or doubt or false knowledge of the person concerned. Thus the statement :

काशा हरन्ति हृदयममी कुसुमसौरभात्। (KA. V. 53a)

(the *kāśas* captivate the hearts of people by fragrance of their flowers).

This is wrong statement because the *kāśa* has no fragrance. It is an evidence of the ignorance of the speaker. The poetic reason as stated above i.e. fragrance of flower, is absent in the *pakṣa*. All these are to be understood as harmful or injurious on account of their vicinity to water. This gives rise to doubt as it is not an established fact that all things which grow in the neighbourhood of water are harmful. Another statement, certainly this is *cakora* because it has white corners in the eyes, is based on false knowledge, for the *cakora* bird is known for red corners in its eyes. So this statement gives false information as the *hetu* 'white corners' is falsely attributed to the bird.[36]

The *dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa* consists in stating a parallel to the subject. Bhāmaha does not illustrate it. The kitchen in which smoke and fire are found together is cited as an example for inferring fire on the hill on the basis of smoke observed on it.

Bhāmaha then refutes[37] the contention that simile is a case of inference. There is no statement of *hetu* in simile. The statements of probans (*sādhana*) and probandum (*sādhya*) is only appropriate in the cases already noticed. The face is like a lotus is the case of simile without reference to *sādhana* and *sādhya*. The simile above stated is entirely different from the following statement.

इति प्रयोगस्य यथा कलावपि भवानिह।
श्रेयान्वृद्धानुशिष्टत्वात्पूर्वे कार्त्तयुगे यथा।।

(KA. V. 57)

(You are pre-eminent even in this fallen age. Just as you have been taught by man of superior intellect and wisdom, just as people were in the older age (*kṛtayuga*).

Here one comes across a *hetu* and *sādhya* along with an example. But all the examples are not illustrative of concomitance of *hetu* and *sādhya*.

भरतस्त्वं दिलीपस्त्वं त्वमेवैकः पुरूरवाः।
त्वमेव वीर प्रद्युम्नस्त्वमेव नरवाहनः।।

(KA. V. 59)

The conclusion that particular king possesses certain qualities is not possible simply on account of the example as the relation of *sādhya* and *sādhana* is not present. The use of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) alone results in *neyārtha doṣa*.

Thus Bhāmaha almost devotes his entire fifth chapter on the discussion of the logical defects with regard to *anumāna* and its related matter. He discusses various kinds of *doṣas* pertaining to *anumāna*. This shows his deep knowledge of Nyāya philosophy especially logic and epistemology as well as his great genius in relating the topics of logic with poetics. He seems to be profoundly influenced by the Nyāya system of logic in postulating the doctrine of poetic blemishes. To which Nyāya system he adheres to, will be discussed in the chapter on Buddhist Logic.

Daṇḍin closely follows Bhāmaha in treating the poetic blemishes. So his treatment is not specially discussed here. As far as the *pratijñāhīnādidoṣas* (logical faults) are concerned he does not follow Bhāmaha and shows his independence of mind in rejecting them. He makes a cursory reference of it for its outright condemnation and says "the deliberation whether the defect of *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta* is a flaw or not (poetry) is almost tough what is the good of pursuing it?"[38] Vāmana also follows Daṇḍin in leaving the blemishes of *Pratijñāhetu-dṛṣṭānta-hīna-doṣas* out.

Similarly, we do not find something concrete in the treatment of Bhoja so we have left him. But he in his Śr.P deals with *virodha*, one of the *vākyadoṣas*. He classifies it into *pratyakṣavirodha*, *anumānavirodha* and *āgamavirodha*. Under *anumānavirodha* he includes Bhāmaha's *pratijñāhīnādidoṣas*.[39]

III.4. Treatment of Poetic Blemishes in the *Kalpalatāviveka*

Chronologically, AP's treatment of *doṣas* should follow that of Bhāmaha but since the treatment of the anonymous author of *Kalpalatāviveka* is very close and complimentary to Bhāmaha we here put aside the chronological order as an exception and deal with *Kalpalatāviveka* first.

Bhāmaha's treatment of *Anumāna* and poetic blemishes like *Pratijñāhīnādi* have exerted profound influence on *Kalpalatāviveka*, a valuable work on Sanskrti Poetics. The *Viveka* is a sub-commentary on the *Pallava*, a commentary on the *Kalpalatā*. The author of the *Kalpalatā* and *Pallava* is Ambāprasāda, the chief minister of Siddharāja Jaisiṁha (1094-1143 A.D.) of Patana (Gujarat). The author of the *Viveka* is not known.

Kalpalatā is divided into four chapters viz. *Doṣadarśana*, *Guṇavivecana*, *Śabdālaṅkāradarśana* and *Arthālaṅkāra-darśana*. Since the treatment of *doṣa* is the most important topic of the work it devotes a complete chapter constituting nearly half of the entire work and gives it a prime place. The *Viveka* largely follows Mammaṭa in his treatment of *doṣas* and classifies them into four varieties viz. *padadoṣa*, *vākyadoṣa*, *arthadoṣa* and *rasadoṣa*. Accordingly the first *pariccheda* is divided into four sub-sections of the same names. Since *padadoṣas*, *vākyadoṣas* and *rasadoṣas* don't reveal any influence of Nyāya, only other *doṣas* would be of direct interest to our purpose.

Under the *arthadoṣas* the *Viveka* comprehensively discusses some logical faults and closely follows Bhāmaha regarding *partijñāhīnādidoṣas* and explains them (see the Table on page 81).

After *pratijñādoṣas*, the Vivekakāra deals with *hetudoṣas*. Bhāmaha also has dealt with them, but he did not give illustrations whereas Vivekakāra does. The divisions of *hetudoṣas* as given by the Vivekakāra are as follows:

A *hetu* must have three aspects viz., *pakṣasattva*, *sapakṣasattva* and *vipakṣāsattva*. If a *hetu* is deficient in any one or more or all of them it becomes defective. When a *hetu* is deficient in one of the aspects three *hetvābhāsas* viz. *sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika*, *asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika* and *asidhha*

TABLE

प्रतिज्ञादोषाः (Intro. p.68)

- साधकप्रमाणाघातत्वे (when *pratijñā* is vitiated by a means of a proof proving it)
- बाधकप्रमाणाघातत्वे (When it is vitiated by a means of a proof disproving it)
  - बाधकप्रमाणाघातत्वे (When it is against perception)
  - अनुमानेन बाधिता (When it is against Inference)
  - शब्देन बाधिता (When it is against word)
    - अभ्युपगतशब्दबाधिनी (When it is against word which is accepted as authoritative by one'e own self)
      - तात्कालिकरूपेण (temporarily or presently it is तदर्थविरोधिनी)
      - कालान्तराङ्गीकृता (at some other time it is सिद्धान्तविरोधिनी
    - अभ्युपगतशब्दबाधिनी प्रमाणैः (when it is aganist the word accepted as authoritative by all. Hence आगमविरोधिनी)

arise. When it is deficient in two aspects three other *hetvābhāsas* viz. *viruddha*, *asiddha-sādhāraṇa-anaikāntika* and *asiddhasādhāraṇa* arise. When the *hetu* is deficient in all the three aspects other *hetvābhāsas* which are illustrated and explained in the *Viveka* are as follows :

1. विरूद्धः—नित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वात्. Here the *hetu*, 'being a product' is not present in the similar case (*ākāśa*) as well as dissimilar case (*ghaṭa*).

2. असिद्धासाधारणानैकान्तिकः—Here the *hetu*, 'having limitedly extended body', is absent in the *pakṣa* (*śabda*) as well as present in *vipakṣa* (*ghaṭādi*) and also in *sapakṣa* (*paramāṇvādi*).

3. असिद्धासाधारणः—नित्यः शब्दः अप्रमेयत्वात्। Here the *hetu*, 'not being cognisable' is absent both in the *pakṣa* (*śabdā*) and the *sapakṣa* (*paramāṇvādi*) and also from the *vipakṣa* (*ghaṭādi*).

4. साधारणानैकान्तिकः—अनित्यः शब्दः अमूर्तत्वात्। Here, the *hetu* 'not having limitedly extended body' is present in *pakṣa* (*śabda*), *sapakṣa* (*buddhi*) and in the *vipakṣa* (*ākāśa*).

5. असाधारणानैकान्तिकः—अनित्यः शब्दः श्रावणत्वात्। Here the *hetu*, *śrāvaṇatva* 'being apprehended by the sense of audition', is present in *pakṣa* (*śabda*) and absent in both the *vipakṣa* (*ākāśa*) and the *sapakṣa* (*ghaṭa*).

6. असिद्धः—अनित्यः शब्द चाक्षुषत्वात्। Here, the *hetu* being perceived by vision is present in *sapakṣa* (*ghaṭa*) and absent in *vipakṣa* (*paramāṇvādi*) and the *pakṣa* (*śabda*).

7. असिद्धविरूद्धः—अनित्यः शब्दः अकृतकत्वात्। Here, the *hetu* not being a product is present neither in the *pakṣa* (*śabda*) nor in the *sapakṣa* (*ghaṭādi*) but on the contrary present in the *vipakṣa* (*ākāśa*). Hence it is deficient in all the three aspects whereas the first three of the above are deficient in two aspects and the next three in one.

Thereafter, the *Viveka* explains and classifies the *dṛṣṭāntadoṣas* which are as follows:

1. *Śādhyavikala : Dṛṣṭānta* becomes defective when it is deviod of *sādhya* e.g. शब्दोऽनित्यः अमूर्तत्वात् आकाशवत् । Here the *sādhya* in absent in the *Dṛṣṭānta* which is *nitya*.

2. *Sādhanavikala* : If *dṛṣṭānta* is devoid of *sādhana* it becomes defective. e.g. शब्दोऽनित्यः अमूर्तत्वात् घटवत् । Here the *sādhana* is absent in the *dṛṣṭānta* which is *mūrta*.

3. *Ubhayavikala* : If the *dṛṣṭāna* is devoid of both *sādhya* and *sādhana* it becomes defective. e.g. शब्दोऽनित्यः अमूर्तत्वात् परमाणुवत् । Here neither the *sādhya* nor the *sādhana* is present in *dṛṣṭānta* which is *nitya* and *mūrta*.

From the above exposition of *Kalpalatāviveka's* treatment of *arthadoṣas* it is clear that Vivekakāra is closely following Bhāmaha and where Bhāmaha could not enter into details or exemplification of it, Vivekakāra fulfils that lacuna in a very able way. Bhāmaha tried to show by examples from wordly life like *bharatastvam dilipastvam* etc., or *yatirmama pitā* etc., but did not give theoratical explanations of it, Vivekakāra supplies the theoratic explanation of Bhāmaha's practical exposition and thus compliments his efforts.

III.5 Treatment of the Poetic Blemishes in the *Agnipurāṇa*

The important feature in the treatment of poetic blemishes of the AP is that it touches upon *Hetvābhāsas* (logical fallacies) as *kāvyadoṣas*. The AP does not give any definition of *Hetvābhāsas* or *hetudoṣas* which are treated under the term *hetvasamarthatā*. It is defined as *iṣṭasādhanavyāghātānukāri* (an impediment to the accomplishment of the desired objcet, the *iṣṭa* being *anumiti* in the case of *anumāna*.)[40] Though the AP does not explain how *hetu* becomes *asamartha* in achieving its desired object because of the impediment standing on its way it may be explained as follows :

Example : ***Parvataḥ dhūmavān vahnimattvāt***

Here the *hetu, vahnimattva* is defective and therefore *asamartha* in producing *anumiti* i.e. the knowledge of smoke on the mountain, it is because the *vyāpti, yatra yatra vahnimattvam tatra tatra dhūmavattvam* is not correct. As in the burning iron-ball (*tapta ayaḥ golaka*) though *vahni* is present *dhūma* is not present. This *hetu* is *sopādhika* (endowed with an adjunct). Hence it is fallacious.

The AP gives eight varieties wich are in fact the causes leading to *hetvasamarthatā* [41] as follows :

1. *Asiddha* (non-existent)
2. *Viruddha* (contradictory)
3. *Anaikāntika* (inconclusive)
4. *Satpratipakṣa* (antimonic)
5. *Kālātītā*
6. *Pakṣāsattva* (absence in *pakṣa*)
7. *Sapakṣāsattva* (absence in *sapakṣa*)
8. *Vipakṣasattva* (presence in *vipakṣa*)

As regards the first five varieties of *hetvasamarthatā* enumerated in the AP, Gautama (1.2.45) seems to be the source of the AP, though it differs from it in its order, and nomenclature.

The AP's *Asiddha*, *Anaikāntika* and *Satpratipakṣa* are synonymous with Gautama's *Sādhysama*, *Savyabhicāra*, and *Prakaraṇasama* respectively. Gautama himself (1.2.46) explains *Savyabhicāra* as *anaikāntika*. Gaṅgeśopādhyāya (12th century A.D.) inserts *Satpratipakṣa* and *Asiddha* for Gautama's *Prakaraṇasama* and *Sādhyasama*. Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana (16th century A.D.) in his NSM employs the terms similar to that of the AP viz. *Anaikāntika*, *Viruddha*, *Asiddha*, *Pratipakṣa* and *Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*[42].

As regards the last three varieties, the AP obviously follows Bhāmaha who speaks about the three essential attributes of a *hetu* viz. *pakṣasattva*, *sapakṣasattva* and *vipakṣāsattva* in the absence of which the reason becomes defective. The AP puts them fourth in the reverse order, mamely, *pakṣasattva*, *sapakṣasattva* and *vipakṣāsattva*.

Thus on the basis of the bove discussion it may be concluded that the author of AP reveals some influence of the Nyāya system and incorporates their logical doctrines in the form of *Kāvyadoṣa*. It is possible that they might have received this influence via Bhāmaha.

III.6. Mammaṭa's Treatment of Poetic Blemishes

It is interesting to deal with Mammaṭa's method of presentation of poetic blemishes which reveals the Nyāya influence. He deals with them in the following order :

1. *Padadoṣas* (blemishes of the word)
2. *Padāṁsadoṣas* (blemishes of the part of the word)
3. *Vākyadoṣas* (blemishes of the sentence)
4. *Arthadoṣas* (blemishes of the meaning)
5. *Rasadoṣas* (blemishes of the sentiment)

The important point here to note is that Mammaṭa treats the *padadoṣas* first and then the *padāṁsadoṣas*. Generally the reverse order is expected. But in doing so he perhaps follows the technique called *saṅgati* (relevance of sequence), which occupies a significant position in the Nyāya school as Mathurānātha in his commentary on the *Vyāptipañcaka* says *nāsaṅgatam prayuñjeta*. The author of a work must first state his *prayojana* and discuss issues followed by topical statement in a logical order. All scientific works should always be governed by logical consideration. The issues which logically arise from the previous statement should be discussed. The

author must write in response to an actual or hypothetical question likely to be put to the student or the enquirer of truth for whose edification the book is written. All logically considered assertions are of the nature of answers to questions posed implicitly or explicitly. The next assertion must be such as could naturally satisfy that question. This is in nutshell the meaning of *saṅgati*.[43] The logic treating the *padadoṣas* first instead of *padāṁsadoṣas,* says Govinda Thakkura in his commentary, *Kāvyapradīpa* on KP is the consideration of *saṅgati* and logical economy. The *padāṁsadoṣas* are fewer in number and are identical with those of *padadoṣas*. So after treating the *padadoṣas* Mammaṭa speaks of *padāṁsadoṣas* by way of extention (*atideśa*). This constitutes economy. Had the process been reversed he would have to give fresh definitions of all those *padadoṣas* which are not included in the list of *padāṁsadoṣas*. Govinda Thakkura's observation gives us a clue to understand that Mammaṭa was following the principle of Nyāyaśāstra to make his presentation logically sound.

Most of the *padadoṣas* of Mammaṭa have already been treated before alongwith those of Bharata and Bhāmaha. Only *Nirarthaka* is left out which we deal herewith.

Nirarthaka

Mammaṭa defines *Nirarthaka* as follows :

निरर्थकं पादपूरणमात्रप्रयोजनं चादिपदम् । (KP. VII. p. 273)

Its example is :

उत्फुल्लकमलकेसरपरागगौरद्युते मम हि गौरि !
अभिवाञ्छितं प्रसिद्धयतु भगवति युष्मत्प्रसादेन ।।

(KP. VII. P. 47)

(O blessed Gauri, whose complexion is bright like the pollen of the full-blown lotus, may my desired object be accomplished by your kindness.)

In this verse the particle *'hi'* is *nirarthaka*.

Gautama in his NyS treats *Nirarthaka* as a *Nigrahasthāna*, which is defined as-*varṇakramanirdeśavat nirarthakam* (V.2.8).

Vātsyāyana gives the following example :

nityaḥ śabdaḥ kacaṭatapānām jabagaḍadasatvāt jhabhaghaḍhadhasavat.

The letters *kacaṭatapa* etc., in the above are just arranged in the sequential order but they do not convey any significant meaning. It is clear that Mammaṭa is employing the term in a sense different from one in Nyāyaśāstra.

Mammaṭa also reveals a rare command over the loops and corners of Nyāyaśāstra in the method of presentation, in his arguments in the course of his exposition,in the tricks with which he traps the oponents and takes advantage of their inaccuracies and in such other aspects of his exposition. In this chapter, however, we are limiting our concern with Mammaṭa only to the limit of his treatment of *doṣa*.

In the preceding pages of this chapter we have tried to show how the treatment of *kāvyadoṣas* of some poeticians reveal an influence of Nyāyaśāstra on them. They are Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Mammaṭa, Bhoja, Agnipurāṇakāra and *Kalpalatāvivekakāra*. Other poeticians have more or less repeated the topics discussed by their predecessors with a little change in language or in terms without adding something substantial to the doctrine of *kāvyadoṣas*. They, therefore, do not need any special mention in this chapter.

We have seen that Bharata's treatment of poetic blemishes is mainly concerned with the dramatic performance. Keeping in view the perfection of oratorial expressions or dialogues (*vācikābhinaya*) he has conceived and formulated the *doṣas* which are supposed to occur at the time of stage performance. Gautama also has formulated some *vādadoṣas* (faults which occur during the process of *vāda*) keeping in view the process of debate which takes place between a proponent and an opponent or two groups, for either to reject or to establish one's own position. Thereafter Gautama in his exposition enumerates also some *doṣas* which are supposed to occur at the time of argumentation leading to the defeat. Both Gautama and Bharata intend the same thing. Since, a statement devoid of any kind of flaw is necessary both in case of a *naṭa* and a debator all the flaws have been formulated in Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* and Bharata's NS keeping that purpose in view. That is why we find some similarity in the treatment of some logical and poetical defects.

The *Nyāyasūtras* of Gautama deal with *doṣas* twice. The first is the section on *śabdapramāṇa*, where the *pūrvapakṣa* states that the verbal source of knowledge is not valid since it is liable to such flaws as *Anṛta* (untruth), *Vyāghāta* (contradiction) and *punarukta* (tautology).

Secondly, a large number of *doṣas* are met with towards the end of the *Nyāyasūtra* where the *Nigrahasthānas* are enumerated. Here the flaws in the methodology of debate which would result in defeat, are given,

However, the direct reference to the Nyāyaśāstra with regard to poetic blemishes are not found in the works of poeticians who seem to be influenced to certain extent by the logic of Nyāyaśāstra. From a critical examination we find similarities both conceptual and linguistic in their treatement of *doṣas*. The logical faults like *Vyāghāta* and *punarukta*

propounded by the Naiyāyikas are also found in the works of Alaṅkāraśāstra. We have shown in this chapter that *Vyāghāta* of Naiyāyika is the *Vyartha* of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin; Mammaṭa, Agnipurāṇakāra and others directly deal with this fault without even changing the name. Further, the *Artha-punarukta* corresponds with Mammaṭa's *Anavikṛta*. And Ruyyaka while dealing with *Punarukta* even quotes a *Nyāyasūtra* which is also identified as that of Akṣapāda by Jayaratha.

The *Nigrahasthānas* of Gautama are also accepted by the poeticians as they develop their concept of blemishes under their influence. *Arthāntarae* is found in Bharata's NS, *Nirarthaka* in Mammaṭa ; *Avijñātārtha* is akin to Bhāmaha's *Gūḍhaśabdābhidhāna*. *Apārthaka* is exactly identical with the *Apārthaka* of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. The *Nyūna* and *Adhika nigrahasthānas* of Nyāyaśāstra which refer to *nyunatā* and *ādhikya* of the syllogistic statement like *pratijña* etc., are met with in the *nyūnapada* and *Adhikapada* of Rudraṭa, Bhoja, Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. Thus we may conclude in the light of the above discussion that Nyāya philosophy has definitely influenced some main poeticians in their treatment of poetic blemishes.

REFERENCES

1. रसापकर्षका दोषाः। SD, Ch. VII, P. 327.
2. प्रथमं दोषहानमेव विधेयं यतः कमनीयरूपादि संपदुपेतमपि वपुः कुष्ठबिन्दुनैकेनापि दौर्भाग्यमनुभवति।
Śṛ.P. Vol. II. Ch. XI. pp. 144-5
3. नाकवित्वमधर्माय व्याधये दण्डनाय वा।
कुकवित्वं पुनः साक्षान्मृतिमाहुर्मनीषिणः।। KA. I. 12.
4. तदल्पमपि नोपेक्ष्यं काव्ये दुष्टं कथंचन।
स्याद्वपुः सुन्दरमपि श्वित्रणैकेन दुर्भगम् ।। KD, I. .7
5. BŚP., P. 208
6. वाचि यत्नस्तु कर्तव्यो नाट्यश्चैषा तनुः स्मृता।
अङ्गनैपथ्यसत्वानि वाक्यार्थं व्यञ्जयन्ति हि।।
NS, Vol. II, Ch. XIV. 2. P. 220.
7. *Ibid.* Ch. XVI, P.. 331.
8. *Ibid.*
9. परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहितमप्यविज्ञानमऽविज्ञातार्थम्।
NyS. 5.2.9.
10. NBh. on NyS. V. 2.9.
11. BŚP. P. 215
12. Vide reference No. 1.
13. NBh. on NyS. V. 2. 7.
14. NS., Ch. XVI, P. 332
15. पौर्वापर्यायोगादप्रतिसबद्धार्थमपार्थकम्। NyS. V. 2.10;
यत्राऽनेकस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा पैर्वापर्येणान्वययोगो नास्ति इत्यसंबद्धार्थत्वं गृह्यते तत्समुदायार्थस्याऽपायादपार्थकं यथा 'दश

दाडिमानि, षडपूपाः, कुण्डमजाजिनम्, पललपिण्ड...... इति।
NBh. on NyS V. 2.10.

16. cf. 14.

17. ABh. P. 332. Abhinava quotes only upto सितम्। The line is completed by Jha Bechan by adding the words यशस्ते, though he does not quote the source.

18. शब्दार्थयोः पुर्नवचनं पुनरुक्तमन्यत्रानुवादात्। NyS, V. 2.14

19. BŚP., P. 295.

20. *Ibid.*

21. अर्थावृत्तिः पदावृत्तिरर्थावृत्तिरपि द्विधा। AP. XI. 15.

22. ASS, P. 70.

23. *Vimarśinī* on ASS., P. 70.

24. NS., Ch. XVI, P. 333.

25. HSP., P. 110.

26. विरूद्धार्थं मतं व्यर्थं विरुद्धं तूपदिश्यते।
पूर्वापरार्थव्याघाताद्विपर्ययकरं यथा। KA. IV. 9.

27. तदप्रामाण्यम्–अनृतव्याघातपुनरुक्तदोषेभ्यः। NyS. II. I. 57

28. यथोपदेशं क्रमशो निर्देशोऽत्र क्रमो मतः।
तदपेतं विपर्यासादित्याख्यातमपक्रमम्।। KA. IV. 20.

29. अवयवविपर्यासवचनमऽप्राप्तकालम्। NyS. V. 2.11.

30. प्रतिज्ञादीनामवयवानां यथालक्षणमर्थवशात्
क्रमः तत्रावयवविपर्यासेन वचनमऽप्राप्तकालम्
असंबद्धार्थं निग्रहस्थानमिति। NBh. on NyS. V. 2.11.

31. KA. V. 12.

32. NyS. I.1.33.

33. KA. V. 13.

34. *Ibid.* V. 29.

35. *Ibid*. V. 30.

36. *Ibid*. V. 53 & 54.

37. *Ibid* V. 55 & 56.

38. प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तहानिर्दोषो न वेत्यसौ।
विचारः कर्कशः प्रायस्तेनालीढेन किं फलम्।। KD. III. 127.

39. ŚṛP. P. 216.

40. इष्टव्याघातकारित्वं हेतोस्यादसमर्थता। AP. XI. 20.

41. *Ibid*. 21.

42. अनैकान्तो विरूद्धाश्चाप्यसिद्धः प्रतिपक्षितः ।
कालत्ययापदिष्टश्च हेत्वाभासश्च पञ्चधा। NSM. P. 216

43. अनन्तराभिधानप्रयोजकजिज्ञासाजनकज्ञानविषयीभूता संगतिः।
Māthurī, on *Vyāptipañcakam,* P.3.

CHAPTER IV

INFLUENCE OF NYĀYA ON POETIC FIGURES OF SPEECH

Most of the Sanskrit rhetoricians have alloted a major portion to the treatment of *Alaṅkāras* in their works.On close examination it is found that they have attempted to classify and formulate some *Alaṅkāras* on the basis of some Nyāya principles, logical terms and concepts. The present chapter makes an attempt to identify and analyse them.

IV. 1. Principle of *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* and *Anvayavyatirekibhāva*

It is known that the *Alaṅkāras* are classified into *Śabdālaṅkāra*, *Arthālaṅkāra* and *Ubhayālaṅkāra* as they pertain to the word or to the sense or the both. The simple classification of *Śabdālaṅkāra* and *Arthālaṅkāra* is started from Rudraṭa's time. But Rudraṭa does not mention the *Ubhayālaṅkāras*. The AP appears to be the earliest known work to mention the third division.[1]

It is interesting to note that for the classification of *Alaṅkāras* Sanskrit poeticians follow two principles, *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* and *Anvayavyatirekibhāva*. These two principles seem to have their beginning in Rājānaka

Tilaka's commentary on the KASS of Udbhaṭa wherein he gives these principles by which the *Alaṅkāras* are decided as belonging to *śabda* or *artha*. It is the discussion on the *Śleṣa Alaṅkāra*, its definition and illustration in Udbhaṭa that brings the issue to a head and results in the clear formulation of the principle of the classification of *Alaṅkāras* into those of *śabda* and those of *artha*.

In the *Vivṛtti* on Udbhaṭa'a illustration of *Artha-Śleṣa,* Tilaka says that *Guṇa*, *Doṣa*, or *Alaṅkāra* are classified into that of *śabda* or *artha* by the principle of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*.[2] In Udbhaṭa's illustration :

स्वयं च पल्लवाताम्रभास्वत्करविराजिनी।
प्रभातसन्ध्येवास्वापफललुब्धे हितप्रदा।।

(KASS. P. 40)

If we replace *bhāsvatkara-virājita* by *bhānu-dīpyamāna*, then, the *Alaṅkāra* disappears due to the change of words. Since the *Alaṅkāra* here depends upon the persence or otherewise of certain words it is a case of *Śabdālaṅkāra*. It is clear that Tilaka is propounding the principle of *Anvaya-Vyatireka* for deciding an *Alaṅkāra* as belonging to *śabda* or *artha*.

V. Raghavan believes that Mammaṭa borrows the principle of *Anvaya-Vyatireka* in his KP from Tilaka.[3] As he says :

"The text of Tilaka is found reproduced to some extent by Mammaṭa". But the formal actual inclusion of these two principles in the theoretical structure is made by Mammaṭa and then by Ruyyaka. Mammaṭa clearly mentions that the *Guṇas*, *Doṣas* and *Alaṅkāras* are characterised as belonging to *śabda* or to *artha* only by the principle of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*. To quote his words:

इह दोषगुणालंकाराणां शब्दार्थगतत्वेन यो विभागः सः अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव व्यवतिष्ठते। तथाहि कष्टत्वादिगाढ़त्वाद्यनु-प्रासादयः व्यर्थत्वादि प्रोढ्याद्युपमाद्यस्तद्भावतदभवानुविधायित्वादेव शब्दार्थगतत्वेन व्यवस्थाप्यन्ते।

(KP. IX. P. 518)

Mammaṭa also mentions *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* and explains that even to determine the *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* one has to use *Anvaya-Vyatireka* principle. Hence it is better to distinguish *Śabdālaṅkāras* from *Arthālaṅkāras* through the principle of *Anvaya-Vyatireka.*[4]

Ruyyaka differes from Mammaṭa in that he propounds *Āśrayāśarayibhāva* as the differentiating principle. He in his AS says :

लोकवदाश्रयाश्रयिभावश्च तत्तदलंकारनिबन्धनम्। अन्वयव्यति-रेकौ तु तत्कार्यत्वे प्रयोजकौ, न तदलंकारत्वे। तदलंकारप्रयोजकत्वे तु श्रौतोपमादेरपि शब्दालंकारत्वप्रसङ्गात्। तस्मादाश्रयाश्रयिभावेनैव चिरंतनमतानुसृतिरिति....

(AS. II,P. 751)

Concluding the deliberations of Mammaṭa's views at the close of the consideration of the view of Tilaka, Ruyyaka explains that the *Anvaya-Vyatireka* theory can prove *śabda* or *artha* only as the *kāraṇa*. Resorting to that theory one can only say that a certain *Alaṅkāra* is the *kārya* either of *śabda* or of *artha*. If one *Alaṅkāra* of a *śabda* is due to the presence of *śabda* then *Śrautopamā*, which due to the *anvaya* of *iva* is actually an *Arthālaṅkāra*, will be a case of *Śabdālaṅkāra*. But there is no *Alaṅkāra* or special figurative beauty added to the poem by its being a case of *Śrautopamā* with the *anvaya* of the word *iva*. So there is no *Alaṅkāra* as there is *iva* and it will be

contradictory and absurd if one has to say that since there is *iva-śabdānvaya*, it is a case of *Śabdālaṅkāra*. So the *Anvaya-Vyatireka* theory must be discarded.

Now both these principles are the principles of Nyāya philosophy. According to Nyāyaśāstra, *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* is a relation existing between two objects (*dravya*) like *avayava-avayavi*, *guṇa-guṇi*, *kriyā-kriyāvān* and *jāti-vyakti*. Naiyāyikas explain their relations viz., *Saṁyoga* and *Samavāya* on the principle of *Āśrayāśrayibhāva*. *Saṁyoga-saṁbandha* takes place between two objects only (*dravyayoreva saṁyoga*) out of which one becomes the *Āśraya* and the later *Āśrayi*.[5] For instance, a bird is sitting on the branch of a tree. Here exists the relation of *saṁyoga* between the bird and the branch, out of which the former is *Āśrayi* and the latter is *Āśraya*. *Saṁyoga-saṁbandha* is temporary. The *Samavāya*-relation is explained by Kaṇāda as *kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*,[6] the relation of cause and effect. Keśavamiśra, the Naiyāyika, in his TB defines it as *ayutasiddhayoḥ saṁbandhaḥ*,[7] the inherent relation between the two inseparable objects. *Ayutasiddha* means proved to be not joined (*yu* to join) or proved to be not separated (if *yu* means separate) that is, things that are always together until one of them is destroyed. For example, the relation of *avayava* with *avayavi* (e.g. *tantu* and *paṭa*) out of which *avayava* is *Āśraya* and *avayavi* is *Āśrayi*. Thus the relation of either *Saṁyoga* or *Samavāya* is in fact one of *Āśrayāśrayibhāva*.

Secondly, *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka* are two technical terms of Nyāya philosophy. The relation of *Vyāpti* which obtains between *hetu* and a *sādhya* is basically of two types; the positive and negative invariable concomitance, technically known as *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*.[8] *Anvaya* is

defined in the Nyāya texts as *yat-sattve yat-sattvam* and *Vyatireka* as *yadabhāve yadabhāvaḥ*. The concept of *Anvaya-Vyatireka* is very important in Navya-Nyāya. The invariable concomitance between *sādhya* and *sādhana* through the force of which the *sādhana* enables us to draw the conclusion, can be expressed in two ways, *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka*. Naiyāyikas classify the relation of *Vyāpti* in three categories such as *Anvaya-vyāpti*, *Vyatireka-vyāpti* and *Anvayavyatireki-vyāpti*. The *hetu* also is designated as *Kevalānvayi*, *Kevalavyatireki* and *Anvayavyatireki*. Similarly, Mammaṭa and his followers also classify the *Alaṅkāras* into *śabda*, *artha* and *ubhayālaṅkāra*. The principle of *Anvaya-vyatireka* is based on *kāraṇa-kārya* relation. As, according to Nyāya, *kāraṇābhāve kāryābhāva* or *vahnyābhāve dhūmābhāva,* similarly poeticians also hold the view imply in their propositions *śabdasattve alaṅkārasattvam* and *śabdābhāve alaṅkārābhāva*. From this point of view Mammaṭa's principle of classification is based on the Nyāya principle of relation particularly of *vyāpti*. And Ruyyaka's principle of *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* is based on the Nyāya theory of relation of *Saṁyoga* and *Samavāya*.

By advocating the relation of *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* Ruyyaka stresses the relation existing between the *śabda* and *artha* or both with *Alaṅkāra* and resulting into *kāvyasaundarya*. In case of *śabdālaṅkāra* this *saundarya* is based on *śabda*. So *śabda* is *Āśraya* and *saundarya* is *Āśrayi*. This is the same in the case of *Arthālaṅkāra* also.

IV. 2. Classification of *Arthālaṅkāras*

Ruyyaka in his AS makes an attempt for the first time to classify the *Arthālaṅkāras* on the basis of principle of Nyāya. He evolves three categories such as *Tarkanyāya, Vākyanyāya* and *Lokanyāya*.[9] The figures based on *Tarka*

are two-*Kāvyaliṅga* and *Anumāna*; the *Alaṅkāras* like *Yathāsaṁkhyam, Paryāya, Parivṛtti, Parisaṁkhyā, Arthāpatti, Vikalpa, Samuccaya* are based on *Vākyanyāya*; and the *Alaṅkāras* such as *Pratyanika, Pratipa, Milita, Tadguṇa, Atadguṇa* and *Uttara* are based on *Lokanyāya*. We may note that Ruyyaka does not give any justification for such a classification. Even the commentator Jayaratha and the later rhetoricians who accept this classification do not give us any rational. He does not define either of the term *Tarka* or *Nyāya*. But his categorisation of *Alaṅkaras* stands definitely on some rational otherwise it would not have been unanimously accepted by his successors only with some slight modifications here and there. Unlike Ruyyaka however, Vidyānātha, Appaya and Jagannātha include *Arthāntaranyāsa* also in the category of *Tarkanyāya*. Modern scholars have taken the term *Tarka* in the general sense of reasoning and according to them reasoning should be the result of poetic imagination. Logical perfection may not be present in the figures based on *Tarka*.[10] It may be presumed that logical perfection is not insisted upon for the constitutions of all these three figuers based upon *Tarka* but they should not lack in any way the poetic beauty.

Here the two terms *Tarka* and *Nyāya* must be defined carefully. No doubt Ruyyaka does not refer to the technical sense of the term *Nyāya* such as *pañcāvayavavākyam nyāyaḥ* or *pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam nyāyaḥ*. But it definitely refers to the logical principle on the strength of which Ruyyaka's classification is based. From the *Alaṅkāras* grouped under the heads like *Tarkanyāya*, *Vākyanyāya* and *Lokanyāya* it appears that he classifies them keeping in view the *Śāstras* such as Tarkaśāstra, Vākyaśāstra or Mīmāṁsā and others like the Laukika

Vyavahāra. Again, a close study of *Alaṅkāras* grouped under *Tarkanyāya* category reveals that the term *Tarka* decidedly refers to Tarkaśāstra in which *Anumāna* and *liṅga* occupy the place of prime importance. The perfection of *hetu* or *liṅga* is quite necessary for a valid *Anumāna*. The poeticians have definitely used the terms like *Anumāna* and *Liṅga* in the sense in which they are used by the Naiyāyikas and they have also insisted on the same kind of perfection. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, however, they deal with the objects of beauty in poetics. As Bhāmaha rightly points out, the poetic *Anumāna* differs from *Nyāyānumāna* in this respect because the sphere of *Nyāya* is altogether different from that of poetics.[11] Still, Ruyyaka consciously makes an attempt to categorise them as *Tarkanyāyamūlaka* and thereby differentiates them from the general sense of the term. Therefore, *Tarkanyāyamūlaka* means the figures based on the principles as given in the Tarkaśāstra. Similarly, the *Alaṅkāras* like *Yathāsaṁkhya, Arthāpatti* refer to the Mīmāṁsāśāstra in which these terms have been used in technical sense. This may be considered as a case of Nyāya influence on Ruyyaka and his successors.

IV.3. *Tarkanyāyamūlaka Alaṅkāras*

A number of Nyāya concepts and terms have been taken up by the poeticians for formulating their figures of speech, which reveal the conceptual influence of Nyāya school. The *Alaṅkāras* like *Anumāna*, *Kāvyaliṅga* and *Arthāntaranyāsa* based on *Tarkanyāya* are the examples of such influence. As it is not possible and not necessary here to deal with the development of these *Alaṅkāras* in historical perspective, we analyse them on the basis of some of the important definitions given by some prominent poeticians.

IV.3.1. *Anumāna Alaṅkāra* (Inference)

As far as the *Anumāna Alaṅkāra* is concerned nothing new is added to the Nyāya concept of *Anumāna* by the rhetoricians. All the rhetoricians accept the Nyāya concept and present it with hardly any difference. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa do not recognise this *Alaṅkāra*. Rudraṭa is the first among the ancients to include it under the large group of figures based on *Vāstava*. Bhoja, Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Vidyānātha, Vidyādhara, Viśvanātha, Appaya Dīkṣita, Jagannātha and even his successors deal with *Anumāna Alaṅkāra*. Jagannātha's definition of *Anumāna* is *anumitikaraṇama-numānam.*[12] This definition is exactly identical with the Naiyāyika definition of it as found in the works like *Tarkasaṁgraha.*[13] He refers to the views of both old and new Naiyāyikas with regard to the nature of *Anumiti-karaṇa.*[14] Old Naiyāyikas think that the *liṅga* which is cognised as *sādhya-vyāpya* is *anumitikaraṇa.*[15] But Navyas like Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana accepts the cognition of such a *liṅga* as *Anumiti-karaṇa*. In order to distinguish poetic *Anumāna* from the practical *Anumāna* of the Naiyāyikas Jagannātha states that the poetical *Anumāna* should contain *camatkāra* (aesthetic beauty).[16]

Rudraṭa gives two types of *Anumāna* - 1. where *sādhya* is mentioned first and then *sādhana*. 2. where *sādhana* is mentioned first and then *sādhya*. Rudraṭa attempts to extend the nature of *Anumāna* and to differentiate it from the Nyāya concept. But his attempt does not gain any significance as pointed out and refuted by Mammaṭa. As the order of *sādhana* and *sādhya* does not make any difference Mammaṭa does not accept such a division.[17]

In the *Vāgbhaṭālaṅkāra*, Vāgbhaṭa defines *Anumāna* as follows :

प्रत्यक्षाल्लिङ्गतो यत्र कालत्रितयवर्तिनः।
लिङ्गिनो भवति ज्ञानमनुमानं तदुच्यते।।

(p.58)

Where from a seen reason (*liṅga*) knowledge of *liṅgi* existing in all the three *kālas* (past, present and future) arises that is *Anumāna*.

Here, the word *kālatritayavartinaḥ* is very significant. This reminds us three divisions of *Anumāna* made by Gautama and his commentator Vātsyāyana. Gautama divides *Anumāna* into three kinds viz., *pūrvavat, śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[18] This is the oldest division available. *Pūrvavat Anumāna* occurs where one infers the effect from the cause, e.g. one infers that rain will fall when clouds gather in the sky.[19] *Śeṣavat* is the opposite of this i.e. when one infers the cause from the effect. When one sees a river in floods he infers that there must have been heavy rain somewhere up in its course.[20] All cases of inference other than these two fall under *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[21] Thus, if after seeing a person in one place one finds him in another place some time later we know that he must have gone from the first place to the other during the interval. We see the sun in morning in the east and find him in the west in the evening. We, therefore, infer *ādityasya gamanam* from the east to the west during the course of the day, though his movement is not directly perceived.

According to Vāgbhaṭa, *Anumāna Alaṅkāra* is of three types viz., *Atītānumāna, Vartamānānumāna* and *Bhavīṣyānumāna*. Their examples are given in order as follows:

1. *Atītānumāna*

नूनं नद्यस्तदाभूवन्नभिषेकाम्भसा विभोः ।
अन्यथा कथमेतासु जनः स्नानेन शुद्ध्यति ।।

(P. 58)

Definitely the rivers were created from the waters of the *abhiṣeka* of the Lord, otherwise how does a man gets purified by taking bath in them.

Here one infers the purifying capacity of rivers due to the water being that of the Lord's *abhiṣeka* by the purification of people because of their bath into those rivers. The commentator explains it clearly in the following manner :

नूनं विभोर्जिनस्याभिषेकाम्भसा नद्यस्तदाभूवन् ।
अन्यथा एतासु नदीषु जनः स्नानेन कथं
शुद्ध्यति । नदीस्नाने शुद्धिरेतल्लिङ्गं लिङ्गी च
विभोरभिषेकाम्भसा तदाभूवन्निति । एषोऽतीतानुमानालङ्कारः ।

(P. 58)

Thus the *Atītānumāna* of Vāgbhaṭa corresponds to the *Śeṣavat* type of *Anumāna* of Naiyāyikas.

2. *Vartamānānumāna*

This corresponds to the *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa Anumāna* which is generally based on the commonly known principles. For example :

मुखप्रभाबाधितकान्तिरस्या दोषाकरः किंकरतां विभर्ति ।
तल्लोचनश्रीहृतिसापराधान्यब्जानि नो चेत्किमयं क्षिणोति ।।

(P. 59)

As is seen in the case of a servant who does not tolerate the insult of his lord and takes immediate revenge on the defaulter, in the same way the moon as a servant takes revenge on the lotuses who being jealous of the *nāyikā's* beauty try to take that away.

3. *Bhaviṣyānumāna*

In the *Bhaviṣyānumāna* one infers the future incident from the present effect, technically saying one infers the effect from its cause. This exactly happens in case of *Pūrvavat Anumāna*. For example :

जंभभित्ककुभिज्योतिर्यथा शुभ्रं विजृंभते।
उदेष्यति तथा मन्ये खलः सखि निशाकरः।।

(P. 58)

Here one infers an object of future i.e. the rising of moon by looking into the present object or cause i.e. the whiteness of the direction of Indra.

This categorisation is Vāgbhaṭa's contribution to Sanskrit Poetics which clearly speaks of Nyāya influence in disguise.

Viśvanāthadeva in his *Sāhityasudhāsindhu* (SSS) a notable work on Sanskrit Poetics deals with *Anumāna Alaṅkāra*, which according to him, is of three types, viz., *anvayavyāptika, vyatirekavyāptika* and *anvayavyatireka-vyāptika*. But he does not define them. He gives two examples only of *anvayavyāptika* type of *Anumāna-Alaṅkāra*.

For example :

वचनमुपचारगर्भं दूरादुद्गमनमासनं सकलम्।
इदमद्य मयि तथा ते यथासि नूनं प्रिये कुपिता।।

(SSS. p. 496)

Here the hero infers the anger of the heroine. It can be said in the following Nyāya style as is rightly explained by the editor :

इयं नायिका मां प्रति प्रकुपिता उपचारवचनात्,
उद्‌गमनात्, आसनदानादिसकलकोपहेतुमत्त्वाच्च
यत्र यत्र उपचारवचनादिप्रयोगः तत्र तत्र कोपाभावः
यथा काचिदपरा नायिका तथा चेयमत एवेयं
मां प्रति प्रकुपिता।

(p. 496-7)

In Nyāyaśāstra *anvaya* is defined as *yat sattve yat sattvam (hetusattve sādhyasattvam)*. Here from *hetu* i.e. *upacāravacana, udgamana* etc., *sādhya* i.e. *kopa of nāyikā* is inferred. So the *vyāpti, yatra yatra upacāravacanādiprayogaḥ tatra tatra kopābhāvaḥ* occurs and thus the *Anumāna* is entitled *anvayavyāptika*.

Jayaratha in his commentaty *Vimarśiṇī* on AS identifies two types of *Anumāna* viz., *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*.

In the example furnished by Ruyyaka:

यथा रन्ध्रं व्योम्नश्चलजलदधूमः स्थगयति
स्फुलिङ्गानां रूपं दधति च यथा कीटमणयः।
यथा विद्युज्ज्वालोज्वलनपरिपिङ्गाश्च ककुभ–
स्तथा मन्ये लग्नः पथिकतरूतण्डे स्मरदवः।।

(p.550)

Here, smoke etc., having the characteristic of three essentials helps us in inferring the fire expressed by the word *dava*. The commentator, however, identifies it as an

example of *svārthānumāna* for, in this the person himself reaches the definite knowledge of his own *parāmarśa.*[22]

For *parārthānumāna,* since there is no example in Ruyyaka's text Jayaratha himself furnishes one:

तदस्ति तेषां तमसि प्रसर्पिणां
निशाचरत्वं यदि पारमार्थिकम्।
ततः प्रिये संनिहितेऽत्र वासरे
कथं नु तत्संचरणं भविष्यति।।

(p.552)

IV. 3.2. *Kāvyaliṅga Alaṅkāra* (Poetical Cause)

Udbhaṭa is the first to mention *Kāvyaliṅga* which, he says, occurs when something becomes cause of recollection. Bhāmaha does not mention *Kāvyaliṅga,* but mentions *hetu* and rejects it as an *Alaṅkāra.* Daṇḍin accepts it but Vāmana again rejects it. It is Udbhaṭa who accepts it and calls it *Kāvyaliṅga* which term thereafter stayed with this *Alaṅkāra.* The commentator, Pratihārendurāja clarifies that the *hetu* of the logicians is related with the worldly objects and followed by *pakṣadharmatva* and *anvayavyatireka.* Hence that does not create any charm. But the *hetu* of the *kāvya* is of different nature and creates a special charm. Hence the term *hetu* is rejected from and the word *kāvya* is incorporated in the definition.[23] Jagannātha defines *Kāvyaliṅga* as :

अनुमितिकरणत्वेन सामान्यविशेषभावाभ्यां चानालिङ्गितः प्रकृतार्थोपपादकत्वेन विवक्षितोऽर्थः काव्यलिङ्गम्।

(RG. P. 628)

The expression *anumitikaraṇatvena* excludes *Anumāna* where the *hetu* is a means of inference. The *hetu* in this

figure brings poetic charm when it is not expressely mentioned by an ablative or an instrumental case but is suggested. A case of *Kāvyaliṅga* presents invariably a case for inference also but the poet does not want to convey it to the readers. In *Anumāna* the poet or the speaker draws the conclusion for the readers. In *kāvyaliṅga* the reader himself gets the knowledge of *Anumiti* due to some reasoning.

A clear demarcation between *Kāvyaliṅga and Anumāna* is given for the first time in the KP of Mammaṭa. He defines *Kāvyaliṅga* as figure where the cause takes the form of the sense of a sentence or that of a word and *Anumāna* consists in the presentation of what is deduced (*sādhya*) As in logic, in Poetics also the cause of the *Anumāna* has three aspects.[24]

1. It serves as an attribute to the particular case (*pakṣa*).
2. It must be present in a positive case (*sapakṣa*).
3. It must be absent in a negative case (*vipakṣa*).

Ruyyaka in presenting these two figures follows Mammaṭa. He further observes that in *Anumāna* something not known before is inferred while in *Kāvyaliṅga* what is known already is supported by the presentation of a cause.

Kāvyaliṅga definitely differs form *Anumāna* because it gives stress on *hetu* and not on the process of *Anumāṅa*. Daṇḍin's *Hetu* is in fact *Kāvyaliṅga* but it has been made more distinct by adding the term *kāvya* to it. Accordingly it comes under *Tarkanyāya* and has been rightly included among *Tarkanyāyamūlaka Alaṅkāras*.

IV.3.3. *Arthāntaranyāsa Alaṅkāra* (Corroboration)

Vidyānātha, Appaya and Jagannātha hold that *Arthāntaranyāsa Alaṅkāra* is based on *Tarkanyāya*. Jagannātha defines:

सामान्येन विशेषस्य विशेषेण सामान्यस्य वा यत्समर्थनं तदर्थान्तरन्यासः। (RG. P. 634)

When a general proposition corroborates a particular proposition or when a particular proposition corroborates a general proposition the figure *Arthāntaranyāsa* takes place. Jagannātha generally follows Ruyyaka but there he differs from him. According to Jagannātha the corroboration of the general by a particular or of a particular by a general is based on some logic; for, a general consists of particulars, and the particular forms part and parcel of the general. Therefore *Arthāntaranyāsa* is a figure based on *Tarkanyāya*.

For example :

उपकारमेव कुरुते विपद्गतः सद्गुणो नितराम्।
मूर्च्छां गतो मृतो वा रोगानपहरति पारदः सकलान्।।

(RG. P. 634)

IV.4 *Hetvābhāsas* as *Alaṅkāras*

Hetvābhāsas are invalid reasons which appear to be *hetu* but in fact do not possess the characteristics of valid reasoning. The word *Hetvābhāsa* is used in two senses: first it means a fallacious reason, secondly, it means fallacy or the defect which renders a reason fallacious. It is interesting to note that Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita in his *Alaṅkārarāghava* (AR) (Part II) has treated *Hetvābhāsas* as sub-types of *Anumāna Alaṅkāra*. He perhaps for the first time and perhaps for the only time treats *Hetvābhāsas* as *Alaṅkāras*. Unlike Bhāmaha and the Agnipurāṇakāra who treat *Hetvābhāsas* as poetic blemishes, Yajñeśvara enumerates, under the treatment of *Anumāna Alaṅkāra* four *Hetvābhāsas* viz., *Asiddha* (with its three types), *Viruddha, Satpratipakṣa* and *Bādha*.

1. *Asiddha*

He defines *Asiddha Alaṅkāra* as the reason which does not remain present in its *pakṣa* and gives its three kinds, namely *Āśrayāsiddha*, *Svarūpāsiddha* and *Vyāpyatvāsiddha*. He, however, gives the examples only of *Āśrayāsiddha* and *Vyāpyatvāsiddha* and omits that of *Svarūpāsiddha*.

(a) *Āśrayāsiddha*

In the TB an instance of *Āśrayāsiddha* is given as *gaganāravindam surabhiḥ aravindatvāt sarojāravindavat.*[25] Here we find that a sky-lotus simply does not exist because it is only an imaginary thing. *Āśrayāsiddha* thus lacks the very first requisite of a valid *hetu* viz., *pakṣadharmatvam.*

Yajñeśvara gives the following example of *Āśrayāsiddha Alaṅkāra* :

अनुत्पन्नः पुमानेषः भवति प्रसवायुधः ।
असौ भवेदितरथा कथंकारमतिप्रियः ।।

(AR. P. 218)

In this example the *āśraya,* the person who is not born creates charm in mind. The *āśraya* i.e. *pumān* is absent.

(b) *Vyāpyatvāsiddha*

It is explained as *vyāpyatvam asiddham yasmin* in which the *Vyāpyatva* of the reason is not established i.e. in which the reason is not *Vyāpya* or invariably not associated with the *sādhya.* Yajñeśvara gives the following example of it :

बुधाः केसरिणः शावं त्वां वदन्ति मरुत्सुत ।
अन्यथा त्वं कथंकारं भवेत् चन्द्रनखायुधः ।।

(AR. P. 218)

In this example *candranakhāyudhatva* is the *hetu* and *keśariśāvatva* is *sādhya* and the *Vyāpti* between the two is not invariably connected. Since the *hetu* remains present in tiger, bears etc.

As mentioned above, Yajñeśvara does not give example for *Svarūpāsiddha*.

2. *Viruddha*

It has been defined as *sādhyābhāvena tadvyāpta viruddhālaṅkṛirmatā*. The *hetu* pervades the locus of *sādhyābhāva*. This means instead of tending to prove its proper *sādhya* the *hetu* proves exactly the opposite.

For example :

रामचन्द्र! वदन्ति त्वां सर्वद्वैतविवर्जितम्।
अन्यथा मद्विरौ भासि सद्वितीयः कथं वद।।

(AR. P. 219)

Here the *hetu, sadvitīyatva* does not prove its *sādhya* but actually proves its absence i.e. *sarvādvaitatva*.

3. *Satpratipakṣa*

It is defined as the reason for which there exists another reason of equal power proving the opposite of the *sādhya*. The famous example is *śabdo nityaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt śabdatvavat* and *śabdo nityaḥ kāryatvāt ghaṭavat*. Here we note that while *śravaṇatva* seems to prove the *nityatva* of *śabda, kāryatva* proves *anityatva* with equal force.

For example :

रघूत्तम! त्वामिह पूर्णचन्द्रं वदन्ति यत्पूर्णकलो विभासि।
स्तुवन्त्यचन्द्रं कवयः परोऽपि यतः प्रकाशातिशयः प्रबन्धः।।

(AR. P. 219)

Here one *hetu, purṇakalo bhānatvarūpa* has another reason *prakāśātiśayatva* to prove its opposite.

4. *Bādha*

It is defined as *sādhyābhāva pramā yatra sa bādhālaṅkṛtirmatā*. It consists in having the negation of its *sādhya* already ascertained by another proof. For example: *agniranuṣṇaḥ dravyatvāt*. We know by the perception of touch that fire is hot. Perception is a stronger proof than inference. *Uṣṇatva*, which we know through perception, contradicts the *anuṣṇatva* which is intended to be proved by the reason i.e. *dravyatva*.

Yajñeśvara gives the following example :

अपि कान्तारसञ्चारे रामो राजा न संशयः।
अन्यथैष कथंकारं भवेत्सिंहासनस्थितः।।

(AR. P. 220)

Here *hetu, siṁhāsanasthitatva* in the *kāntāra* contradicts the given *hetu*.

All these clearly prove that Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita was highly influenced by the Nyāya theory of *Hetvābhāsa*. He exactly formulates the definitions as given by the Naiyāyikas and fully accepts the divisions of the *Hetvābhāsas* made by Naiyāyikas.

IV. 5 *Pramāṇas* as *Alaṅkāras*

Another classification of *Alaṅkāras* was made by rhetoricians taking into consideration the *pramāṇas* as *Alaṅkāras*. This new classification started from Bhoja and later on developed by his successors. *Pramāṇas* as the source of valid knowledge have been given an important place in all the systems of Indian philosophy. Epistemology, an important branch of Philosophical thought, mainly

deals with, *pramā, pramāṇa, pramātā and prameya.* Among the philosophers of ancient India, Naiyāyikas are particularly known as *prāmāṇikas*. Gautama in his NyS, therefore, considers *pramāṇa* as the first *padārtha* among the sixteen *padārthas* enumerated therein. Naiyāyikas even define the term *Nyāya* as *pramāṇairarthaparīkṣaṇam nyāyaḥ*.

Pramāṇa literally means the principal instrument (*karaṇa)* of valid knowledge (*pramā)*. According to the Nyāyaśāstra *pramā* (cognition) is of four types : *Pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti* and *Śābda* (valid testimony), the source of attaining valid knowledge.

The different schools of Indian Philosophy are not unanimous about the nature and number of *pramāṇas*. The materialistic Cārvāka recognises perception alone, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika accept only two (perception and inference), the Sāṁkhya recognises three (perception, inference and analogy), the Nyāya recognises four (with addition of *śabda*), the Prābhākaras admit five with *arthāpatti,* the Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭas recognise six with *anupalabdhi* and the Paurānikas add two more *saṁbhava* and *aitihya*.

IV. 5.1 Bhoja

Bhoja in his Śṛ.P treats *Pramāṇālaṅkāras* in śāstric terminology viz., *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, arthāpatti, saṁbhava* and *abhāva*.[26]

According to Bhoja, the two means of knowledge, *Darśana,* the mutual seeing and *Śravaṇa* (hearing of each other) by which love may be developed between two lovers, bring in a long digression into the *Pramāṇas*. Bhoja takes *Darśana* as comprising all *Pramāṇas* based on *Pratyakṣa* which is *Darśana* par excellence, namely,

Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Saṁbhava and *Abhāva*. Similarly *Śravaṇa* is taken by Bhoja as all *Pramāṇas* based on *Śabda,* which is *Śravaṇa* par excellence, namely, *Śrutānumāna, Śrutopamāna, Śrutārthāpatti* and *Śrutasaṁbhava.*

Bhoja divides *Pratyakṣa* into six kinds : *sākṣāta, pratibiṁba, pratibhāna, utprekṣā, smṛti* and *svapna*. Bhoja defines *Anumāna* as *liṅgapratipattiranumānam*. He gives six varities of it : *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, viśeṣatodṛṣṭa, pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa, parokṣatodṛṣṭa, vidyamānaviṣaya* and *avidyamānaviṣaya*. All these are varieties of *svārthānumāna. Parārthānumāna,* Bhoja says, partakes of the character of *śabda* and hence each dealt with under *śabdālaṅkāra*. Bhoja quotes Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* I. 1.6.on *Upamāna*.But he classifies it into six kinds : *sādharmyopamāna, vaidharmyopamāna, mudropamāna, śilpopamāna, sañjnopamāna* and *abhiprāyopamāna*. According to Bhoja, the fourth part of the syllogism called *upanaya* is *upamāna*. Bhoja quotes here Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*. Bhoja has argued for the superiority of *Upamāna* among *pramāṇas* and concludes that this does not mean that the other *pramāṇas* are unnecessary. Bhoja bases his reply here on what Vātsyāyana says in reply to the point raised by himself regarding the separate enumeration of the opening *padārthasam, uddeśa sūtra* of categories which can be included in one or the other. Bhoja divides *arthāpatti* into two kind: *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* and *śṛtārthāpatti*. The former is divided again into six kinds : *pratyakṣapūrvikā, anumāna-pūrvikā, upamāna-pūrvikā, arthāpattipūrvikā, śabda-pūrvikā* and *anupalabdhi-pūrvikā*. Again, *Saṁbhava* is of six kinds : *saṁbhāvanā, saṁśaya, vitarka, prāyovāda, saṁpratyaya* and *pratyayānusandhi*. Then Bhoja deals with *Abhāva Alaṅkāra* and its six kinds : *prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsāb-hāva, itaretarābhāva,*

atyantābhāva, sambandhābhāva and *sarvābhāva*. *Abhāva* is a *padārtha* of the Naiyāyikas whom Bhoja deserts here. The Naiyāyikas recognise only four varieties of *Abhāva* viz., *prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva, atyantābhāva, sāmayika-abhāva*. Bhoja's *saṁbandhābhāva* is ancient Naiyāyikas' *sāmayika-abhāva* and *sarvābhāva* is not different from *atyantābhāva*. Bhoja then takes up the six *pramāṇas* of the *Śravaṇā*-class. As related to the *Śabdapramāṇa* Bhoja speaks of other six minor *pramāṇas, śabdāntara, abhyāsa, saṁjñā, sāṁkhya, guṇa* and *prakaraṇa*. All these are not necessary for our purpose. So we have left them.

IV. 5.2. Amṛtānanda Yogin

Amṛtānanda yogin (1250 A.D.) in his *Alaṅkārasaṁgraha* (Asaṁ) deals with *pramāṇas as Alaṅkāras*. He quotes the following passage from the *Tārkikarakṣā* of Varadarāja, a Naiyāyika of great repute :

प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः कणादसुगतौ पुनः ।
अनुमानं च तच्चाथ सांख्याः शब्दं च ते अपि ।।
न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवमुपमानं च केचन ।
अर्थापत्त्या सहैतानि चत्वार्याह प्रभाकरः ।।
अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।
संभवैतिह्ययुक्तानि तानि पौराणिका जगुः ।।

(Asaṁ. P. 57 *Tārkikarakṣā*, V. 51-54)

He then defines and explains with examples eight *Pramāṇālaṅkāras* viz., *pratyakṣa, anumāna, āgama, upamāna, arthāpatti, abhāva, saṁbhava* and *aitihya*.

The *Pratyakṣa Alaṅkāra* is defined as the knowledge arising out of the connection of sense organs with the objects. It is of six types with regard to five *jñānedriyas* and one mind.

Again, it is of two types-Nirvikalpaka and *savikalpaka*. The former is only of the nature of pure perception devoid of any definite knowledge while the latter is the special knowledge having name etc., as its object.[27] The definitions and divisions of *Pratyakṣa Alaṅkāra* given by Amṛtānanda seem to be quite similar with the definitions and divisions of *Pratyakṣa* given by Naiyāyikas.

He defines *Anumāna Alaṅkāra* as the knowledge of the *hetumat* i.e. *sādhya* by its *hetu.* It is of two types : *dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*.[28]

Āgama is defined as the *upadeśa* of a trustworthy person.[29] His definition is quite similar with the definition of *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ* and *āpta* as *yathārtha vaktā puruṣa* given by Annambhaṭṭa in his *Tarkasaṁgraha*.[30]

Upamāna Alaṅkāra has been defined as *sādṛśyāt sadṛśa jñānam,* which is essentially not different from the Nyāya concept of *Upamāna pramāṇa.*[31]

Amṛtānanda also includes *Abhāva* of the Naiyāyikas as an *Alaṅkāra*. *Abhāva* has been accepted as a *padārtha* by the Naiyāyikas like Annambhaṭṭa of syncretic school of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. There are in all four varieties of *Abhāva: prāgabhāva, pradhvaṁsābhāva, atyantābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva.*[32] *Ghaṭa-prāgabhāva* exists before the production of the *ghaṭa* and it exists from time immemorial. When the *ghaṭa* is produced *ghaṭa-prāgabhāva* comes to an end. *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* is produced when the *ghaṭa* is destroyed. *Atyantābhāva* is the absolute negation e.g. the absence of *rūpa* in air. *Anyonyābhāva* is illustrated by *ghaṭaḥ paṭa na* denying the relation of identity between *ghaṭa* and *paṭa*.[33]

Amṛtānanda also in the light of this Naiyāyika doctrine of *Abhāva,* propounds *Abhāva* as an *Alaṅkāra*. He defines it as the absence of an object. He then proceeds to illustrate its four varieties though he does not define them individually. The illustrations are as follows :

1. *Prāgabhāva :*

अनभ्यासेन विद्यानामसंसर्गेण धीमताम्।
अनिग्रहेण चाक्षाणां व्यसनं जायते नृणाम्।।

(Asaṁ. P. 60)

2. *Pradhvaṁsābhāva:*

धृतिरस्तमिता रतिश्च्युता विरतं गेयमृतुर्निरुत्सवः।
गतमाभरणप्रयोजनं परिशून्यं शयनीयमद्य मे।।

(Ibid.)

3. *Anyonyābhāva :*

कर्णोत्पलं न चक्षुस्ते न चक्षुः श्रवणोत्पलम्।
इति जानन्नपि जनो मन्यते दीर्घनेत्रताम्।।

(Ibid)

4. *Atyantābhāva :*

सव्यापसव्यत्यजनाद् द्विरुक्तैः पञ्चेषुबाणैः पृथगर्जितासु।
दशासु शेषा खलु तादृशा या तथा नभः पुष्पतु कोरकेण।।

(Ibid)

In the first example he has shown the absence of *kāraṇa* in *kārya* i.e. the absence of *abhyāsa* in *vidyā,* absence of *saṁsarga* in *dhīmati* etc. In the second example the destruction of *dhṛti, rati* etc., is shown as *pradhvaṁsābhāva*. In the third example, *karṇotpala* is not identical with eyes and eye is *śravaṇotpala*. In the fourth example, this situation was completely absent.

IV. 5.3. Appaya Dīkṣita

Appaya Dīkṣita also treats same eight *pramāṇas* as *Alaṅkāras* in his *Kuvalayānanda.* In the age when Appaya flourished, philosophers especially Naiyāyikas like Gaṅgeśa

Upādhyāya were seriously engaged with the problems of epistemology of which *pramāṇa* is the backbone. As Appaya was a good scholar of Nyāya as evinced from his language, style and his argumentative method he tried to incorporate *pramāṇa* doctrine in poetics and, in their light, framed figures of speech. Since we do not have something concrete as mark of Nyāya influence in Appaya, we shall not attempt here a comprehensive treatment of his *Pramāṇa-Alaṅkāras*. Instead, we shift our attention to other great poeticians whose treatment of *Pramāṇa Alaṅkāras* reflects an influence of the Nyāya doctrine of *Pramāṇa.*

IV. 5. 4 Viśveśvara Paṇḍita

Viśveśvara Paṇḍita (1700-1750 A.D.) also deals with the same eight *Pramāṇālaṅkāras* in his *Alaṅkārapradīpa* viz., *anumāna, pratyakṣa, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi, saṁbhava* and *aitihya.* He defines *Anumāna* as: *Vyāpyena vyāpakajñānamanumānam.*[34] He defines *śabda* as: *āptavākyam śabdāḥ*[35] We must mention here that Viśveśvara is a Naiyāyika himself and he also authored some Nyāya works like *Tarkakūtuhalam* etc. It is naturally therefore, that he uses the Nyāya technical terms like *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* in the definition of *Anumāna Alaṅkāra.* Even the definition of *Śabda Alaṅkāra* is exactly similar to Gautama's definition of *Śabda Pramāṇa.*

IV. 5.5. Devaśaṅkara Purohita

Devaśaṅkara (1750-1800 A. D.) in his *Alaṅkāramañjuṣā* (AM) treats *Pramāṇas* as *Alaṅkāras* under the heading *Pramāṇālaṅkāravivecanam.* According to him *Pramāṇālaṅkāras* occur where valid knowledge and its means are drawn upon by poets. Valid Knowledge (*Pramā*), says Devaśaṅkara is of four kinds: *Pratyakṣa, Anumiti, Upamiti,* and *Śābda,* and accordingly their means are of

four kinds viz., *pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna* and *śabda* The examples are as follows:

1. *Pratyakṣa:*

मुखं चन्द्रस्फीतं ह्यमृतलहरी सूक्तिसरणि–
र्मुखामोदोऽत्युच्चैर्वपुरपि शिरीषप्रतिभटः।
धरेऽपूर्वे द्राक्षारस इह युवा कोऽपि सुकृति
युवत्याः सम्भोगे त्वनुभवति सर्वेन्द्रियसुखम्।।

(P.223)

(The young damsel's face is bright like the moon; the continuous line of her sweet words is a wave of the nectar; the fragrance of her mouth is extremely intense; her body, too, vies with the śirīṣa flower; and there is grap-juice on her lower lip. A certain lucky youth in the course of his carnal enjoyment with the young damsel indeed directly experiences all the sensual pleasures of this earth.)

Here it is noticed that the *Pratyakṣa Alaṅkāra* is based on direct experience. This reminds us of the definitions of *Pratyakṣa* given by the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines *pratyakṣa* as: *indriyārthasannikarsotpannam avyapdeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakam* (NyS I. 1.4). Annambhaṭṭa defines *Pratyakṣa* as : *indriyārthasannikarṣajanyam jñānam.*[36] Hence the knowledge which is directly obtained through the contact of sense organs with objects is called *Pratyakṣa* and in the example given by Devaśaṅkara, direct experience, the young lover experiences is a testimony to this effect.

2. *Anumāna*

According to Devaśaṅkara, *Anumāna* is of two types: *Rūpakasaṁkirṇa* and *Śuddha*. The examples are in order :

(A)

अनुमितोऽपि चमूत्थितरेणुभिः।
नगगतैररिभिः परिशङ्कितैः।

व्यभिचचार न राघवराङ्गिको
ज्वलितशत्रुतृणो ज्वलनोऽपरः ।।

(AM. P. 224)

(The King named Rāghava who is another fire had burnt the straw in the form of his enemies, did not act wrongly, although, on account of the dust raised by his forces, he was inferred to be present by the frightened enemies taking shelter on the mountain.)

(B)

सरोजानां विकसनैः पतङ्गोदितशब्दितैः ।
लतालीनालिसङ्क्षोभैर्ज्ञायते ह्युदितो रविः ।

(P.224)

(From the blooming of the lotuses, from the cries uttered by the birds and from the commotion caused among the bees lurking within the creepers, it is learnt with certainty that the Sun has risen.)

Here in both the examples how a *sādhana* helps in cognising a *sādhya* is shown exactly as it happens in the *Nyāya-anumāna*.

3. *upamāna*

चापाकारे भ्रुवौ यस्मान्मुखं चन्द्रेण संनिभम् ।
पुण्डरीके इव दृशौ तदयं माधवप्रभुः ।।

(P.224)

(This person is decidedly king Mādhava, since his eye-brows are bow-shaped, since his face resembles the moon and since his eyes are like lotuses.)

Upamāna is one of the *pramāṇa* of Naiyāyikas. It is the instrument of *Upamiti* or analogical cognition which consists in the knowledge of the connection between a name and the object expressed by it.[37] For producing this *Upamāna* the

knowledge of similarity is necessary. Therefore *Upamāna* is analogical cognition. A person happens to be ignorant of the exact meaning of the word *gavaya,* which is similar to cow and recollects the information conveyed by the analogical extension *(atideśavākya)*. Then the analogical extension 'This is the animal of the bovine species' denoted by the word *gavaya* arises.

In this example King Mādhava is known from the analogical knowledge due to his similarity with other objects.

4. *Śabda*

(a) *Vaidika-śabda :*

नाघाय मृगया राज्ञामिति जानन्नपि स्वयम्।
जहौ तां माधवो वीरो न हिंस्यादिति भावयन्।।

(P. 225)

(Although himself aware of the *smṛti* that hunting does not conduce to a sin in the case of kings, heroic Mādhava gave it up, establishing the *Śruti* that one must not kill other beings.)

The words *Smṛti* and *Śruti* are added by the translator. The *smṛti-* dictum is well-known but where from does, he infer or refer to *śruti* is not clear.

(b) *Laukika-śabda*

इन्द्रप्रस्थं प्रति बली वलिष्ठैरभिवन्दितः।
यातीति प्रस्तुतं लोकात्पेषवा राघवप्रभुः।।

(P. 225)

(It is the current topic among the people that king Rāghava, the mighty Peśavā who is adorned even by the Mightiest is setting out for Indraprastha.)

Śabda is one of the *Pramāṇa* of the Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines *Śabda* as *Āptavākyam* (NyS I. 1.6). So *Śabda* is a sentence uttered by a trustworthy person or *āpta*. According to Gautama it is of two kinds: *Vaidika* and *Laukika*. In the examples given by Devaśaṅkara he has shown two types of *Śabda Alaṅkāra* as exactly found in the Nyāya works. Secondly, in the first example, he has shown the superiority of *Śruti* over *Smṛti* according to which the king Mādhava decided not to kill other beings. The second example is based on the *Laukika Śabdapramāṇa*.

Thus Devaśaṅkara accepts only the above metioned four *Pramāṇa Alaṅkāras* and not the remaining four. He opines that their field is duly covered by the four recognised by him; *saṁbhava* and *ceṣṭā* can be included in *Anumāna; aitihya* in *śabda* and *anupalabdhi* in *pratyakṣa*. Therefore, his treatment of these *Alaṅkāras* reveals a deep Nyāya influence on him, for, he accepts only those four *pramāṇas* which are accepted by the Naiyāyikas and includes the other *pramāṇas* in them just as Naiyāyikas do. Again, the definitions of *pramā* and *pramāṇa* given by him are quite similar to those found in the Nyāya works.

IV.6 Other Nyāyaśāstra related *Alaṅkāras*

(1) *Dṛṣṭānta* (Exemplification)

Dṛṣṭānta, one of the *Arthālaṅkāras,* is first propounded by Bhāmaha. Indurāja, the commentator of Udbhaṭa named it as *Kāvyadṛṣṭānta*. It is so named to distinguish it from the *Dṛṣṭānta* of Nyāyaśāstra. Except Vāmana almost all the Ālaṅkārikas accept it. According to Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Viśvanātha and Appaya Dīkṣita etc., *Dṛṣṭānta* is a figure where the *upamāna, upameya* and the common property are presented as if reflected i.e where no *yathā, iva* etc., are used; but the meaning of one sentence is a reflection as it were of that of another sentence. Viśvanātha defines it as:

दृष्टान्तस्तु सधर्मस्य वस्तुनः प्रतिबिम्बनम्।

(SD. P. 36)

He gives the following example :

अविदितगुणापि सत्कविभणितिः कर्णेषु वमति मधुधारा।
अनधिगतपरिमलापि हि हरति दृशं मालतीमाला।।

(SD. P. 36)

Dṛṣṭānta is one of the sixteen *padārthas* enumerated by Gautama in his Nyāyaśāstra. It is one of the five syllogistic statements *(pañcāvayavavākyam)* otherwise called *Udāharaṇa.* It has been mainly discussed in the context of *Anumāna.* It is defined by Gautama as :

लौकिकपरीक्षकाणां यस्मिन्नर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दृष्टान्तः।

(NyS I.125)

Both in poetry and philosophy *Dṛṣṭānta* is used to strengthen and to clarify the matter in hand. In both, the words like *Yāthā* etc., *(sāmyabodhaka)* are not used. It is important to note that the two varieties of *Dṛṣṭānta* viz., *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* and *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* as given by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha are similar to those of the varieties available in the Nyāya works like TB of Keśavamiśra.[38]

(2) *Udāharaṇa*

Alongwith *Dṛṣṭānta, Udāharaṇa* is treated as an independent *Alaṅkāra* only by Jagannātha and Parakāla Swāmī. Jagannātha defines it as follows :

सामान्येन निरूपितस्यार्थस्य सुखप्रतिपत्तये
तदेकदेशं निरूप्य तयोरवयवावयविभाव
उच्यमान उदाहरणम्।

(P.175)

For example:

अमितगुणोऽपि पदार्थो दोषेणैकेन निन्दितो भवति।
निखिलरसायनराज्ञो गन्धेनोग्रेण लशुन इव।।

The term *Udāharaṇa* is defined in the NyS as :

साध्यसार्धम्यात्तद्धर्मभावी दृष्टान्त उदाहरणम्।

(NyS. I. 1.36)

In this *Alaṅkāra* the similarity is expressed by the words like *yathā, iva* etc., as in that of Nyāyaśāstra i.e. *parvata vahnimān dhūmavattvāt yathā mahānasaḥ.*

(3) *Viśeṣokti* (Peculiar Allegation)

This *Alaṅkāra* is introduced for the first time by Bhāmaha. Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara, and Viśvanātha follow Bhāmaha in this respect and define this *Alaṅkāra* in the same way. *Viśeṣokti* occurs when the effect is not produced in spite of the occurance of its cause. Viśvanātha defines it as :

सति हेतौ फलाभावो विशेषोक्तिः।

(SD. P.44)

He gives the following example:

धनिनोऽपि निरुन्मादा युवानोऽपि न चञ्चलाः।
प्रभवोऽप्यप्रमत्तास्ते महामहिमशालिनः।।

(SD. P.49)

The concept of this *Alaṅkāra is* related to the Nyāya theory of causality. Naiyāyikas advocate *asatkāryavāda,* according to which an effect which is *anitya* gets produced from its cause which is *nitya.* For example, *anitya ghaṭa* is produced from *nitya paramāṇu.* According to the Naiyāyika theory, *kārya* does not exist in any form and at any place before its production. It produced when *kāraṇavyāpāra* is undertaken. Even if the clay is present, a jar is not produced

without the causal process of the jar-maker. In the same way in the *Viśeṣokti Alaṅkāra* in spite of the cause being present, the effect is not produced. In the example given above, youth, the cause of fickleness is present but it does not give rise to fickleness in the absence of the *kāranavyāpāra*.

(4) *Smṛti* (Recollection)

This *Alaṅkāra* is propounded for the first time by Rudraṭa by the name *Smaraṇa*. Narasiṁha Kavi names it as *Smṛtimat*. Śobhākara, Jayaratha, Jayadeva and Appaya call it *Smṛti*. Other rhetoricians have termed it as *Smaraṇa*. Thus all the rhetoricians are not unanimous about its name but the concept of the *Alaṅkāra* is the same. Viśvanātha defines it as:

सदृशानुभवाद्वस्तुस्मृतिः स्मरणमुच्यते ।

(SD. P.22)

A recollection of an object arising from the perception of something similar is termed as *Smaraṇa*. For example :

अरविन्दमिदं वीक्ष्य खेलत्खञ्जनमञ्जुलम् ।
स्मरामि वदनं तस्याश्चारु चञ्चललोचनम् ।।

(SD. P.22)

In this example the perception of the lotus on which *khañjana* bird was playing stirs up the impression which causes the remembrance of the face of the beautiful lady with tremulous eyes. There is similarity between the face and the lotus.

According to the Naiyāyikas the knowledge *(Jñāna)* is of two types : *Smṛti* and *Anubhava*. *Smṛti* is that knowledge which is produced by impression called *bhāvanā* which is of two kinds : *yathārtha* (true) and *ayathārtha* (false). Both types of knowledge arise in one's waking state. In dream all kinds of remembrance is false.

In case of the *Smṛti* of Naiyāyikas the object which is once experienced by a person at some particular time, leaves some kind of impression on the mind of the person and when he again observes a similar object it strikes the hidden impressions which give rise to the knowledge of the object experienced before.

Similar is the nature of the *Alaṅkāra* called *Smṛti*. In the example given above, the *sādṛśya* (similarity) existing between the lotus with the bee hovering over it and the face with tremulous eyes is an instrumental cause giving rise to the memory of the beautiful face by arousing the *bhāvanā saṁskāra* of the face-experience. But the difference in the *Nyāya-smṛti* is that in poetics it must deal with some aesthetic object.

In the TB *sādṛśya, cintā, adṛṣṭa* are mentioned as the causes of impressions which give rise to *Smṛti*.[39] Among poeticians Bhoja considers these causes as the base of this *Alaṅkāra*.[40]

(5) *Samāsokti* (Speech of Brevity)

In case of *Samāsokti Alaṅkāra* it is interesting to note that the authors like Ruyyaka, Brahmatantra Parakālaswāmī and Narendraprabhasūri admit the Nyāya element as *aprastuta*. In Ruyyaka, however, we see for the first time instead of worldly objects occuring as *aprastuta* the elements of *Nyāya* and other śāstras are occuring as the elements of *aprastuta*. Ruyyaka in his AS gives the following example and shows the superimposition of Nyāya objects on wordly objects :

स्वपक्षलीलाललितैरूपोढ़हेतौ स्मरे दर्शयतो विशेषम्।
मानं निराकर्तुमशेषयुनां पिकस्य पाण्डित्यमखण्डमासीत्।।

(AS. P. 327)

Śrīkṛṣṇa-Brahmatantra Parakālaswāmī in *Alaṅkāramaṇihāra* shows how in the treatment of the subject

pertaining to Vedāntaśāstra the subject of Nyāyaśāstra is superimposed.

व्याप्त्या प्रथितमबाधं निस्प्रतिपक्षं च साधुपक्षस्थम्।
सद्धेतुमीश जगतां त्वां प्राप्येष्टानि साधयन्ति बुधाः।।

(P. 457)

Here, it is shown that as the persons congnised fire on the basis of its *sādhana* i.e. *dhūma* which is free from fallacies like *Bādha* and *Pratipakṣa,* similarly, the wise persons attempt to obtain the Lord who is all pervasive. Here in the treatment of a topic relating with the philosophy of Vedānta superimposition of technical Nyāya concept has occured.

यत्र त्वं तत्र श्रीरिति युवयोस्साहचर्यनियमोऽस्ति।
व्याप्तिश्चैषाऽच्युत तत्साध्या सत्पक्षवर्तिनस्त्वच्छीः।।

(P. 458)

Again, here in the treatment of *Dharmaśāstrīya* subject superimposition of *Nyāyaśātrīya* topics like *vyāpti* and *pakṣavṛttitva* of *hetu* has occured.

यस्मिन्निश्चितमच्युत साध्यं निःश्रेयसं वसत्यन्तः।
तद्भक्तो न्यायविदां स सपक्षस्स्यात्फणाधरगिरीन्द्रो।।

(P. 485)

Here in the treatment of *Vedāntaśāstrīya* topic the superimposition of *Nyāyaśāstrīya* objects such as *sapakṣa* has occured.

पिप्रीषयैव मऽच्युत कनकमुखर्या मखैर्जयति हि त्वाम्।
बुधततिरेषा कथमिह न स्यान्सल्लक्षणा जहत्स्वार्था।।

(P. 485)

Here, in the treatment of a topic related to *Bhagavadgītā* and *Bhāgavata* the superimposition of *Nyāyaśāstrīya* objects has taken place.

हृद्गतमुक्तावलिकरिशितिकण्ठीयाति वेलरुचिसुभगः।
प्रौढशिरोमणिदीधितिपरिचयपर भगवान् हरिर्जयति।।

(p.486)

In this example, the treatment of a *laukikavastu, śrīnivāsādivigraha* the superimposition of the *Nyāyaśāstrīya* topic has taken place. Through *Samāsokti* he refers to NSM of Viśvanātha, Śiromaṇi and to his *Dīdhiti,* a commentary on TC of Gaṅgeśa.[41]

Vidyānātha in his *Pratāparudrīya* similarly shows superimposition of the *Tarkaśāstrīya* objects on worldly objects.

गुरुप्रमाणेन निजेन सद्यस्तिरस्कृतोद्यत्प्रतिपक्षहेतौ।
प्रतापरुद्रस्य समित्युदग्रे खड्ग महत्खण्डनपण्डितत्वम्।।

(p.187)

Here in the treatment of a *laukika* object, *Khaḍga,* there is imposition of Nyāya object such as *pratipakṣa* and *hetu.*

Narendraprabhasūri in his *Alaṅkāramahodadhi* similarly shows the superimposition of the objects of Nyāyaśāstra on worldly objects. The example :

सीमानं न जगाम यन्नयनयोर्नान्येन यत् सङ्गतं
न स्पृष्टं वचसा कदाचिदपि यद् दृष्टोपमानं न यत्।
अर्थादापतितं न यन्न च यत् तत् किञ्चिदेणीदृशो
लावण्यं जयति प्रमाणरहितं चेतश्चमत्कारकृत्।

(P. 282)

In this above example upon the treatment of *lāvaṇya* the superimposition of *pramāṇas* has taken place.

(6) *Tulyayogītā* (Equal Pairing)

Dealing with the *Tulyayogitā Alaṅkāra,* Viśveśvara Paṇḍita in his *Alaṅkārapradīpa* first gives its definitions on the generally well-known line as:

प्रकृतानामप्रकृतानामेव वा एकधर्मान्वयस्तुल्ययोगिता।

Then he defines another type of *Tulyayogitā* as:

सपक्षविपक्षयोर्वृत्ति सामान्यमन्यातुल्ययोगिता।

(P. 32)

Obviously this second *Alaṅkāra* of the same name is entirely based on the Nyāya concept and defined by the Nyāya terminology. It is clear that this second *Alaṅkāra* is not to be treated as sub-variety of the first one. By the term *Anyā* given in the definition he perhaps means a kind of *Tulyayogitā* different from the commonly known *Alaṅkāra* of this name. This is further proved by the definition of *Tulyayogitā* given previously. Viśveśvara does not mention *Anyā Tulyayogitā* as a kind of *Tulyayogitā Alaṅkāra.* The terms used by him i.e. *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are defined by the Naiyāyikas as *niścitasādhyavān* and *niścitasādhyābhāvavān* respectively. As per the Nyāya *Anumāna* theory a *hetu* cannot be present in both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa.* But, according to Viśveśvara, it can remain present in the sphere of poetry. He gives the following example :

ज्योत्स्नारसानुभूति प्रोल्लसदङ्गाररुचिभाजः।
हिमदीधितिनाविहिताः सुतनु! चकोराश्च चक्रवाकाश्च।।

(P.32)

(7) *Virodhābhāsa* :

Viśvanāthadeva in his SSS, while dealing with *Virodhābhāsa Alaṅkāra* gives the following example which interestingly reflects an influence of Nyāya:

न पक्षवृत्तिर्न सपक्षवृत्तिः
विपक्षवृत्तिः करवालधूमः।
तथापि ते विक्रम भूमिपाल
प्रतापवह्नेः प्रमितिं करोति।।

(SSS. P.223)

This shows how even Nyāya terminology and concepts can be employed with a reversal to poetic ends. Here the presence of *karavāladhūma,* the hetu which is neither present in *pakṣa* nor in *sapakṣa* and yet its presence in *vipakṣa* becomes means of inference of the fire of the valour of the king praised in the verse. The author here refers to the terms and concepts of Nyāya with the help of paranomistic words. The same example is also given by the author as that of *Apratītadoṣa.*

IV. 7. *Alaṅkāradhvani* based on Tarkaśāstra

Narendraprabhasūri in his *Nañrājayaṣobhuṣaṇa* explains *Alaṅkāradhvani (Śabdaśaktimūlā)* based on the object of Tarkaśāstra. The example :

अनियतसहचरवृत्तिप्रथितविरोधैकहेतवः कुभृतः।
अन्तः प्रकोपवह्निं व्यक्तं गमयन्ति वीर विभुसूनोः।

(P. 26)

Here *Vibhāvanā Alaṅkāra* is suggested as *vahnyānumiti* has been shown without a valid *vyāpti* in spite of the fallacious nature of the *hetu.*

We have seen above how various concepts of Nyāya are imbibed into the structure of the poetic figures of speech also. As a result we find the *Alaṅkāras* like *Anumāna, Kāvyaliṅga, Dṛṣṭānta, Udāharaṇa, Smṛti* etc. In the matter of the types of

Anumāna Alaṅkāra and *Hetvābhāsas* as *Alaṅkāras* the influence of Nyāya is very clear. The section of *Pramāṇālaṅkāras* also clearly reveals the impact of Nyāya. The principle of *Āśrayāśrayibhāva* and *Anvayavyatirekibhāva* are found to have some relation with the Nyāya concepts. In the *Alaṅkāras* like *Anyā-Tulyalogitā* we see the poetics going a step further over the Nyāya concepts where the author says that the *hetu* is present in *vipakṣa* also. Viśvanāthadeva even shows poetic examples where the Naiyāyika process is reversed or contradicted. The author like Parakālaswāmī would even blur the distinctions of *prastuta* and *aprastuta* by putting various śāstric concepts including Naiyāyika ones in both the categories. Thus individual Nyāya concepts included into the Ālaṅkārika fold attain the poetic charm and they are recognised as individual poetic figurative structures called *Alaṅkāras* and at a times even bypassed or surpassed as we just saw above. This is not difficult to explain since the primary concern of the Nyāyaśātra is the validity of thought and thought process and poetry organises various semantic structures. Logical validity or invalidity are therefore bound to enter thought structure or poetic figures and when we recognise them as such that is when we see a Nyāya structure appearing in an expression they will naturally be recognised as such. The strikingness (*camatkṛti*) makes it a poem, the thought structure reveals the Nyāya concept which makes the rhetoricians recongnise them as Nyāya-based *Alaṅkāras*.

REFERENCES

1. शब्दार्थयोरलंकारौ द्वावलंकुरुते समम्।
एकत्र निहितो हारः स्थानं ग्रीवामिव स्त्रियः।।
AP.Ch. IX 1. p. 173

2. काव्ये दोषगुणालकाराणां च शब्दार्थगततयाऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विभागः क्रियते। KASS. Ch. IV. p. 40.

3. BŚP., P. 382.

4. योऽलंकारो यदाश्रितः स तदलंकार इत्यपि कल्पनायां अन्वयव्यतिरेकावेव समाश्रयितव्यौ। तदाश्रयमन्तरेण विशिष्टस्याश्रयिभावस्था–भावादित्यलंकाराणां यथोक्तनिमित्त एव परस्परव्यतिरेको ज्यायान्। KP. Ch. X p. 417

5. द्रव्ययोरेव संयोग इति नियमादिति भावः। *Dinakarī*, P. 87

6. इहेदमिति यतः कार्यकारणयोः स समवायः। *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, 7.2.26

7. TB. P. 16.

8. अत्र पर्वतस्याग्निमत्वं साध्यं धूमवत्वं हेतुः।
स चान्वयव्यतिरेकी अन्वयेन व्यतिरेकेण च व्याप्तिमत्वात्।
TB, P. 32

9. AS. P. 538-612.

10. Shukla, Chitra P., *Treatment of Alaṅkāras in Rasagangādhara,* P. 197.

11. KA. Ch. V. 30.

12. RG. Ch. II, P. 700.

13. TS. P. 25.

14. तस्यश्च करणं व्याप्तिप्रकारकलिङ्गनिश्चय इत्येके। व्याप्यत्वेन निश्चीयमानं लिङ्गमित्यपरे। RG. Ch. II, P. 701.

NSM., P. 286.

इदं च साधरणमनुमानं। अत्र च कविप्रतिभोल्लिखितत्वेन चमत्कारित्वे काव्यालंकारता। RG. Ch. II, P. 701.

साध्यसाधनयोः पौर्वापर्यविकल्पे न किञ्चिदवैचित्र्यमिति न तथा दर्शितम्। KP. Ch. X. P. 427

अथ तत्पूर्वकं त्रिविधमनुमानं पूर्ववत् शेषवत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च।

NyS., I. 1.5.

TB. P. 24.

Ibid

Ibid

AS, P. SS2.

पक्षधर्मत्वान्वयव्यतिरेकानुसरणगर्भतया यथा तार्किकप्रसिद्धा हेतवो लोकप्रसिद्धवस्तुविषयत्वेनोपनिबद्यमाना वैरस्य भावमावहन्ति न तथा काव्यहेतुः अतिशयेन सर्वेषां जनानां योऽसौ हृदयसंवादी सरसः पदार्थ तन्निष्ठतया उपनिबध्यमानत्वात्।

Pratihārendurāja, KASS *Ṭikā*

पक्षधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकित्वेन त्रिरूपो हेतुः साधनम्।

KP. Ch. X, P. 426.

TB. P. 106

Śṛ P. Vol. II, P. 33.

ASaṁ, P.58.

Ibid.

Ibid

TS., P. 34.

NyS. I. 1.6.

अभावश्चतुर्विधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावोऽत्यन्ताभावोऽन्योन्याभावश्चेति।

ſS. p.43

TS, P. 45.

34. *Alaṁkārapradīpa* ,P. 49.
35. *Ibid*
36. TS. P. 22.
37. *Ibid*. P.33.
38. TB. P. 99.
39. सादृश्यदुष्टचिन्तायाः स्मृतिः बीजस्य बोधकाः।

TB. P.212.

40. सदृशादृष्टचिन्तादेरनुभूतपदार्थज्ञानोत्पत्तिः स्मरणम्।

Śṛ.P., Ch. X. P. 403.

41. पक्षे शितिकण्ठीयमिति न्यायग्रन्थविशेषः। तस्मिन्नतिवेला रुचिः आस्था तया सुभगा। प्रौढ़ः शिरोमणिः चूडारत्नं तस्य दीधितेः प्रभायाः पक्षे शिरोमणिदीधितिः न्यायग्रन्थविशेषः तस्य परिचयतः संपर्कात् व्यासङ्ग परमा गुणोत्कर्षवान्। परभागो गुणोत्कर्ष इति कोशः। अत्र लौकिके श्रीनिवासदिव्यविग्रहव्यवहार न्यायशास्त्रीय व्यवहारारोपः।

Alaṅkāramanihāra, P. 527-8.

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CHAPTER V

THEORY OF ANUMĀNA IN SANSKRIT POETICS

The Nyāya theory of *Anumāna* (inference) exerts its profound influence on the *Rasa* and *Dhvani* theory of Sanskrit poetics. A great classic like VV of Mahimabhaṭṭa is based on the *Anumāna* theory. Almost all the eminent poeticians have more or less dealt with *Anumāna* in their works. Therefore, an analytical exposition of the theory of *Anumāna* with its relation to some poetic theories is attempted in this chapter.

V.1 *Anumāna* as a *Pramāṇa*

Anumāna is an important means of valid knowledge. Except the materialistic Cārvāka almost all the Indian philosophical systems accept *Anumāna* as a source of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa)* for the cognition of those objects which are not cognised by means of *Pratyakṣa* (perception). But, unlike other schools of philosophy, the Nyāya school accepts four *pramāṇas*[1] and gives highest emphasis on *Anumāna* and distinguishes it from other *pramāṇas* in its detailed treatment which has not been so thoroughly and systematically dealt with by any other school. The treatment of *Anumāna* forms the most important topic in the Nyāya, especially Navya-Nyāya system of logic.

Anumāna as its etymological sense (also literally) indicates is 'after-proof'. It is after-proof in the sense that it uses the knowledge derived from perception (*pratyakṣa*) or verbal testimony (*śabda*) and helps the mind to march on further and add to its knowledge. Since *Anumāna* consists in making an assertion about an object on the strength of the knowledge of the *hetu* which is invariably connected with *sādhya,* the word *Anumāna* literally means the cognition which follows from other knowledge. Here the prefix *anu* means 'after' and *māna* means the means of knowledge. From this literal meaning it follows that the perceptual knowledge of the *hetu* gives rise to the inferential knowledge. One can infer the existence of fire, for example, after perceiving the smoke which has got an uninterupted connection with the surface of the mountain. The knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti)* is the key to have inferential knowledge. This knowledge of *vyāpti* is not possible without the help of direct perception. *Vyāpti* is a relation of invariable concomitance between *hetu* and *sādhya*. The knowledge of the *sādhya* as related to the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) depends on the previous knowledge of the *hetu* as related to the subject and at the same time as invariably related to the *sādhya*. One can infer fire on the mountain by virtue of the fact that one perceives smoke on it and has observed it as invariably accompanied by fire. In both the cases the necessity of perception cannot be denied.

Anumāna, according to the Naiyāyikas, is the most important cause of *anumiti* (inferred knowledge), or cognition or judgement[2]. It represents the process by which this cognition is obtained. In the instance of inferred knowledge, the mountain is fiery because of smoke (*parvato vahnimān dhūmavattvāt),* the conclusion that the mountain is fiery is the *anumiti*[3] and the process by which it is produced consisting of *paksadharmatā* (existence of probans in subject) and

vyāpti (invariable concomitance) is *anumāna* i.e. *parvato vahimān dhūmavattvāt. Anumiti* differs from *pratyakṣa* in giving the valid knowledge of a thing that it is not in direct contact with the senses. In the instance of fire on the mountain, senses of a person do not come in contact with the fire at all, as they do in direct perception. In the whole process of inference, one sees only the smoke on the mountain and to that extent his senses come in contact with that object. Inferred knowledge (*anumiti*) depends upon two things-*pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti*.[4] Firstly, one must see the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called *pakṣ adharmatā*.[5] Secondly, it is necessary that one must have the knowledge of the relation of fire and smoke (i.e, wherever there is smoke there is fire) from the past experience. This is technically called *vyāpti*.[6] In the process of *Anumāna,* one brings the past experience to bear upon the present case of the smoke on the mountain. This is technically called *parāmarśa*.[7]

Anumāna is of two kinds : *svārtha* (inference for oneself) and *parārtha* (inference for others).[8] *Svārthānumāna* causes one's own inferential experience. *Parārthānumāna* is the syllogistic expression which consists of five members and which a person employs after inferring for himself fire from smoke, with a view to enabling other person to have the same kind of inferential cognition.[9] *Parārthānumāna* is syllogism termed Nyāya. The five members are as follows :

1. *Pratijñā : parvato vahnimān*
2. *Hetu : dhūmavattvāt*
3. *Udāharaṇa : yo yo dhūmavān sa sa vahnimāna yathā mahānasaḥ.*
4. *Upanaya : tathā cāyam.*
5. *Nigamanam : tasmāt tathā.*

The validity of an inference depends on the validity of its constituent proposition. If any of the constituent propositions is fallacious, the whole inference will be vitiated.

This is in essence, the Nyāya theory of *Anumāna*. With this outline of the *Anumāna* theory in view an attempt is made here to explore how Sanskrit poeticians have employed this *Anumāna* theory in the analysis of poetic theory of *Rasa* and *Dhvani*.

V.2 Theory of *Rasa* and *Anumāna*

The theory of *Rasa* constitutes one of the most important features of Sanskrit poetics. According to Bharata the main object of a drama is *Rasa*. Ālaṅkārikas believe Bharata to be the earliest exponent of *Rasa* theory and so they try to find his support for their views on *Rasa*.

The theory of *Rasa* realisation is based on the *Rasasūtra* of Bharata i.e. *vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogāt rasaniṣpattiḥ.*[10] This *sūtra* has been differently interpreted by different scholars-commentators on the basis of different interpretations. Important questions pertaining to *Rasa* that were posed and answered in different ways were about the locus of *Rasa,* the nature of *Rasa,* the process of its realisation and kinds of *Rasa*. This gave rise to different theories viz., *Utpattivāda* of Lollaṭa, *Anumitivāda* of Śaṅkuka, *Bhuktivāda* of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and *Abhivyaktivāda* of Abhinavagupta as available in his ABh.The knowledge of these theories is gained only through the ABh. of Abhinavagupta and some later writers like Mammaṭa and Hemacandra.

In the history of Sanskrit poetics Śaṅkuka as a prominent exponent of Bharata's *Rasa* theory occupies an important place. He, under the influence of Nyāya philosophy, makes a novel and unique attempt to interpret the *Sūtra* on the basis of the Naiyāyikas' theory of *Anumāna*. He distinguishes

himself from other rhetoricians by his *Anumitivāda*.After Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka took up the problem of *Rasa* and criticised Lollaṭa's view. His own original work is lost. But it has been possible to reconstruct his view on the basis of the brief quotations in the work of Abhinavagupta, which is more or less abridged and copied by Mammaṭa and Hemacandra. Since Śaṅkuka makes an attempt to refute the *Rasa* theory of Lollaṭa and then propounds his *Anumitivāda;* it is necessary here to present Lollaṭa's view also in order to understand Śaṅkuka's stand, his counter arguments and to make a critical appraisal of his view point.

V.3 Lollaṭa's Theory of *Rasa*

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa appears to be the first writer to attempt a psychological analysis of *Rasa*. According to Abhinavagupta he interprets the *Rasasūtra* of Bharata as follows.[11] The birth of *Rasa* takes place out of the combination of the permanent mental state- implicit in the *sūtra*- with the determinants etc. More precisely, the determinants are the cause of the birth of the feeling, which constitutes the permanent state of the mind. The consequents intended by Bharata are not, obviously, those which arise from the *rasas* -but the consequents of the states of mind only. Even if the transitory states of mind, in so far as they are feelings, cannot accompany simultaneously the permanent mental state, still, according to Bharata, this is not absent, but remains in a state of latent impression. In the example too, some flavourings appear in a latent state, like the permanent state, and others in a emergent state, like the transitory states. *Rasa,* therefore, is simply a permanent state, intensified by the determinants, the consequents, etc.; but, had it not been intensified, it is only a permanent state. This state is present both in the person reproduced and in the

reproducing actor, by virtue of the power of realisation (*anusaṁdhāna*).

V.4 Śaṅkuka's Refutation

Śaṅkuka gives the following arguments against the view of Lollaṭa[12]:

1. *Sthāyibhāva* (permanent mental state) cannot be *Rasa* because without *vibhāvas* it cannot be known. *Vibhāvādi* are *liṅgas* (logical reasons) by means of which the knowledge of *sthāyibhāva* is acquired.

2. If it is accepted that without *vibhāvas, sthāyibhāva* can be known by means of *Śabda* (verbal testimony), then, *Rasa* cannot be *pratyakṣa*. For, *śabdajñāna* is only a *parokṣ-ajñāna.*

3. Bharata, therefore, has not expounded the *sthāyibhāva* first and *Rasa* afterwards. If the permanent mental states exist before the *Rasa* why does Bharata explain *Rasa* first and thereafter the *sthāyibhāvas*.

4. If *Rasa is* nothing more than an intensified permanent mental state then Bharata need not have defined the determinants twice: once in connection with the non-intensified state (NS, VII) and once again in connection with it in its intensified sate (NS. VI). It is illogical to explain the causes of the same thing twice.

5. If *Rasa* happens to be an intensified feeling, the problem of gradation will arise. An intensity admits of many degrees, similarly, there ought to be numberless grades in the realisation of *Rasa*.

6. If it is argued that only when the utmost intensity is reached, *Rasa* is realised, then, there would not be six varieties of *hāsyarasa*.

7. Bharata explains the ten stages of *Śṛṅgārarasa*. If each of them would have different grades as per their intensity there would be an infinite number of mental states and of *rasas*.

8. We see that what happens is just the contrary, in the sense that sorrow (*śoka*) is at first intense, and is seen to grow weaker with time and that in the feelings of anger *(krodha)*, heroism *(utsāha)* and delight *(rati)* a diminution is met with when indignation (*amarṣa*), firmness (*sthairya)* and sexual enjoyment *(sevā)*[13] are absent.

Śaṅkuka then explains the *rasasūtra* in the following way:[14]

The actor *(naṭa)* with his long training and constant practice represents the causes, the effects and the associating causes, (which are technically called *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* respectively) so skillfully that they, though artificial, are considered by the spectators as the real ones. The *liṅga* i.e. *vibhāvas* etc., lead the spectators to infer the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati* etc., existing in the *naṭa*. But as a matter of fact they are not present in the *naṭa*, because he is imitating the original *sthāyibhāvas* of the real characters like Rāma. As this is the imitation of the original *sthāyibhāvas,* this is given a different name *rasa.* The realisation of the spectators is of a very distinct kind. The spectators take the *naṭa* as Rāma, the original character on the analogy of the knowledge of a *citraturaga* (the painted horse). It cannot be called *yathārthajñāna* (valid knowledge), because *naṭa* is different from the character, say, Rāma. It is not *mithyājñāna* because there is no another *jñāna* to negate it like 'this is not Rāma'. It is not *saṁśayajñāna* because there are no two alternatives *(koṭis)* in the cognition such as 'is this Rāma or not'. In the absence of the similar *jñāna* as 'he is like Rāma' it cannot be called *sādṛśyajñāna* also. Therefore, this *jñāna*

about *naṭa* as 'this is Rāma' is quite peculiar, and different from all the other forms of *jñāna* like *pramā, mithyā, saṁśaya* and *sādṛśya*. This kind of *jñāna* is the result of the *naṭa*'s skill in the four kinds of *abhinaya*.

It may be argued that the knowledge of *Rasa* is not valid as it is negated by the subsequent knowledge. According to the rule invalid knowledge is defined as *tadabhāvavati tat prakārako'nubhavo'yathārtha* (to percieve a thing which does not exist is *bhrama*). In the present case *Rāmatva* which is not in the *naṭa* is ascribed to him; and in such a case how can a *bhrama* produce the real effect? This question is answered by Śaṅkuka by saying that even a *bhrama* can produce an effect. He quotes the *kārikā* of Dharmakīrti's PV. "Seeing a gem and a light from a distance a man misunderstands both of them as *maṇis*"[15]. Thus, his *jñana* is only a *bhrama*. But when he approaches, then, he is able to get *maṇi*. Therefore even a *bhrama* can produce a real effect. This *jñāna* is further proved to be *bhrama* also because in *Nāṭya* only the artificial imitation of *kāraṇas, kāryas* and *sahakārins* are brought into use and these are given new names *vibhāva, anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*. *Ālaṁbanavibhāva* and *Uddipanavibhāva* can be presented by reciting appropriate verses. The *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* also can be presented by the *naṭa* with the help of the trainings etc. But a *sthāyibhāva* can never be presented because it cannot be expressed by merely using such words like *rati, hāsa* etc. The imitation by *naṭa* helps the spectators to infer the *sthāyibhāva* in *naṭa*. Only the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati*, which are imitated are called by the rhetoricians with the names like *śṛṅgārarasa*. In other words, *rasa* is the inferential knowledge of the imitation of *sthāyibhāva* like *Rati*. But, unlike other inferences, this *anumiti* is the source of pleasure, because in this, the things inferred are beautiful. In this respect it is quite unique. Since the spectators infer *Rasa*, it is to be understood

as resting in *naṭa*. Though the *sthāyins* are not in the *naṭa*, the *sāmājikas* have the inference of them as there is no *bādhakajñāna*. This is in fact not the inference of actual but only the so called *sthāyibhāva* which is the imitation of the original one. Therefore, ultimately the imitation of the *sthāyibhāva* is understood as the *Rasa*.

The above analysis gives rise to the following points: The process of the *vahnyanumāna* as described by the Naiyāyikas is different from the *Rasānumāna* because of the following reasons:

1. *Rasa* , the object of inference is unique in nature and is different from the other worldly objects of inference.

2. In the other cases of *Anumāna,* both the *sādhya* and the *sādhana* which become the object of perception and of which relation is perceived, become the object of inference. For example : in the case of the *vahnyanumāna, sādhya* i.e. *vahni* and *hetu* i.e. *dhūma* are perceived in a kitchen and the person who has frequently observed their invariable relation in a kitchen or in many places is able to infer the presence of fire by looking at the smoke. But in the case of *Rasa,* it can never become the object of perception. Hence the relation existing between *kāraṇarūpa-vibhāvādi* and *kāryarūpa-rasa* is never perceived.

3. *Vibhāvādi* are *kāraṇas* for the intensification of the *sthāyibhāva* (in Ramā). But for the spectators they are *liṅgas*.

4. The realisation of *Rasa* which is the fruit of *Anumāna* is unique and cannot be compared with any other *anumiti,* the knowledge obtained by inference.

Searching for the root of Śaṅkuka's theory of the *Rasānumāna* one realises that for Śaṅkuka *Rasa* is a kind of

knowledge *(jñāna)*. Since *Rasa* is a *jñāna*, a *sādhana* to obtain the knowledge of *Rasa* is called for (technically called *pramāṇa*). The *pramāṇa* such as *Pratyakṣa, Upamāna, Śabda* and others are not capable of producing the knowledge of *Rasa*. Therefore *Anumāna* is the only means which helps one in obtaining the knowledge of *Rasa*. The knowledge of *Rasa* is not possible by *Pratyakṣa* as there is no direct connection between respective *indriya* and *Rasa*. *Pratyakṣa* is defined as *indriyārtha sannikarṣajanya jñāna*. *Upamāna* is also not capable of giving the knowledge of *Rasa* because the *sādṛśyajñāna* is essential for *Upamāna* as *go sadṛśo gavayaḥ*. Since there is no object similar to *Rasa*, *Upamāna* does not obtain. *Rasajñāna* cannot be obtained by *Śabda pramāṇa* also because the knowledge of *Rasa* cannot be obtained by the statements of a trustworthy person *(āptavākyam śabdaḥ)*. No other *pramāṇas* such as *Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi, Saṁbhava, Aitihya* produce the knowledge of *Rasa*. Ultimately it is the *Anumāna pramāṇa* which only can account for the knowledge of *Rasa*. So *Rasānubhūti* is one type of *anumiti*. It seems that Śaṅkuka follows the well-known Nyāya method of *pariśeṣa*[16] as given in the NBh on the strength of which he develops his theory of *Anumāna*.

Śaṅkuka is well aware of the fact that the *Rasānumiti* is not like the *vahnyanumiti*. That is why he says *Rasajñāna* is different from the four types of *jñānas* and explains it by the illustration of *citraturaga*. He also points out that even if the *rasānumiti* is different from the *vahnyanumiti* it still leads to *arthakriyā*. He quotes a verse from Dharmakīrti's PV to that effect. All these go to prove that Śaṅkuka had a deep knowledge of the Nyāyaśāstra and the influence of which perhaps motivated him to develop the theory of *Rasānumāna*.

V.5 Bhaṭṭa Tauta's Criticism

Bhaṭṭa Tauta (10th century A.D.), teacher of Abhinavagupta criticises the *Anumitivāda* of Śaṅkuka.[17] He poses the question: does Śaṅkuka's *anumitivāda* propound *Rasa* as an imitation of *Sthāyibhāva* based on (1) the experience of the spectators or (2) that of the actors or (3) the nature of *Rasa* or (4) the strength of the statement of Bharata himself.

(1) Śaṅkuka's *anumitivāda* cannot be based on the experience of the spectators. Imitation *(anukaraṇa)* is possible only of the things which are already perceived by means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). For example, in case of a person drinking milk and saying 'Thus did so-and-so, drink the wine', the action of milk-drinking reproduces action of wine-drinking. But it will be realised as an imitation only when the spectator has himself directly observed the imitated person drinking wine. But nothing is found in the *naṭa,* which may be said to be the imitation of something else. His body, his artificial face, horripilation, faltering voice and the movement of limbs etc., cannot be the imitation of *sthāyibhāva* like *rati*. The *anubhāvas* appearing outwardly cannot be identical with the *sthāyibhāva,* which is beyond the perception of others. They, being insentient, being perceived by different organs of sense and having different substrata cannot be called imitation. Moreover, consciousness of imitation presupposes perception of both the original and of its imitation (made by the actor). But nobody (either the spectator or the actor) has ever perceived the *rati* of Rāma (character). Hence, the possibility that the actor is imitating Rāma is excluded.

It is the feeling of the actor which is realised as the imitation of the *rati* of Rāma which as perceived by the spectator is considered as *Śṛṅgāra Rasa;* still one has to consider in what form and in what manner it is cognised. If

the cognition *(pratīti)* of the feeling of the *naṭa* is similar to that of the ordinary feeling, which consists of causes, such as women etc., when the feeling, which consists of the actor would be perceived in the form of *rati*. Therefore, the idea of the imitation of *rati* is not sound.

Further, the determinants etc., are real in the character but in the actors they are unreal. If that is the case, are they perceived as artificial by the spectators? And if they are perceived as artificial the cognition of *rati* is not possible. If one says that for this reason what is cognised is not *rati* but the imitation of *rati,* then it would be possible only for a man of dull wits.

When the cognition of the *liṅga* (logical reason) e.g. smoke, is erroneous, the inference based upon it will be invalid. Though the vapour appears as smoke, if it is cognised as smoke, the inference of fire from it will not be valid.

Even if the actor himself is not enraged, still he is seen as such, the resemblance is due to contraction of eyebrows etc. Hence, he is like someone who is enraged. But the spectators willingly suspend their awareness of this resemblance between the actor and the character. As a result of which they are immersed in a certain state of consciousness of the actor. Therefore, the idea that what appears on the stage is an imitation of something, is not valid.

Further, the knowledge of the spectator i.e. 'This is Rāma' is not correct. For, this perception is devoid of every doubt, and it is not stultified later by some subsequent cognition which would invalidate it *(bādhaka)*. Then, why should one not consider it as true cognition? And, if it is stultified, why it is not a false cognition? In fact though the invalidating cognition does not appear, it will always be a false cognition. Thus Śaṅkuka's contention, that this is "an

experience wherein, it being devoid of any contradictory idea, one cannot distinguish any error", is untrue. Furthermore, in other actor also, the spectators have the perception 'This is Rāma'. Hence the cognition of Rāma is only in its most universal aspect.

The statement that ' the determinants can be recognised through the power of poetry' is also not true. For, the actor does not have the perception 'This Sītā is the woman I love'. If it is argued that, this is how the determinants are made perceptible to the spectators then in this way the permanent state will be made perceptible in a better way. Since it is predominant, spectators experience it as 'That man (is) in this (feeling)'.

Therefore it is wrong to say that from the point of view of spectators, *Rasa* is an imitation of the permanent mental state.

(2) From the point of view of actor it is not valid, for, the actor while performing the drama does not have the notion, 'I am imitating Rāma or his feelings'. The word *anukaraṇa* can be explained in two ways, the production of actions similar to those of someone and temporally after-product. If we take the first meaning, then *naṭa* has never seen Rāma. Hence it is not possible. If the second meaning is taken, then such imitation would extend to all the activities even of the ordinary life.

If it is said that the actor does not imitate a particular being *(niyata)* and has only this notion, 'I am imitating the sorrow *(śoka)* of some noble person (*uttamaprakṛti*): then the question arises : by what he is imitating? Certainly it cannot be done by sorrow, since it is absent in the actor. It also cannot be done by the tears etc., because tears are insentient, while sorrow, being mental state, is sentient.

If it is argued that *naṭa* is imitating the consequent (*anubhāvas*) of the person, who also wept in the manner he does, then *naṭa* also intervenes in his act of imitation and the relation of *anukārya-anukartā* no longer exists. Besides, the actor does not have the awareness that he is imitating.

The actor's performance takes place only through three causes : his skill in art, his memory of his own determinants, and the consent of his art aroused by the state of generality of the mental states and in this virtue, he displays the consequents (*anubhāvas*) and reads the dramatic text with suitable intonations (*kāku*). He is conscious of this only and not of imitation.

(3) Nor can it be said that there is an imitation from the point of view of the nature of things (*vastuvṛtta*), for it is impossible that a thing of which one is not conscious has a real nature.

(4) Even Bharata has never said that *Rasa* is the imitation of a permanent mental state. Such a statement was never made by him even indirectly or by a means of an indication. On the contrary the various sub-divisions of women's dance, various music and the *dhruva* songs described by Bharata indicate exactly the opposite. The expression of Bharata i.e. 'Drama is an imitation of all the forms of explanations in the seven islands can have also other explanations. And if it were an imitation, then there would be no difference between it and the imitation of the attire, walk etc., of the beloved one.

V.6 Mahimabhaṭṭa's View

Mahimabhaṭṭa has a rightful place in the context of *Anumitivāda* among the various theories of *rasaniṣpatti*. According to him, *Rasa* is *Anumeya*.[18] The permanent mental states of love, sorrow etc., belonging to the characters

delineated in a *kāvya* are inferred through the cognition of the *vibhāvas, anubhāvas* and the *vyabhicāribhāvas* described in the *kāvya*. It is the inexplicable magic of poetry that the inferred *sthāyibhāva* leads to the exquisite pleasure of rumination whereas in ordinary life the inferred *sthāyibhāvas* as belonging to others do not lead to any such pleasure. Thus, the instances cited by Ānandavardhana for *Rasadhvani* like the description of Pārvatī's entrance with floral decoration of the spring season and the reactions caused by that in Śiva, described in the canto III of *Kumārasaṁbhava* can be included in *Anumāna*.

V.7 Viśvanātha's Refutation

Viśvanātha points out a defect in Mahimabhaṭṭa's stance, that is, *Rasa* is *Anumeya*. He poses the question as what exactly *Rasa* is in the *Anumāna* theorist's concept. Is it the congition of love etc., as existing in the characters like Rāma inferred from the cognised *vibhāvādi* depicted in poetry? Or is it the self-manifesting bliss enjoyed by the aesthete on aesthetically contemplating the dramatic performance? If former is accepted then it is different from that of *dhvani* theorist. If the second alternative is accepted, then it is evidently clear that the proposed *hetu* is fallacious on account of the lack of the knowledge of invariable concomitance between *Rasa* and the *vibhāvādi*.[19] Hence there cannot be any inference.

Moreover, the mere knowledge derived through the reasoning "wherever there is the expressed statement or dramatic presentation of such and such *vibhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*, there is the origin of the *rasas* like *Śṛṅgāra*", is also not taken as *rasa* by the *dhvani* theorists. Thus the *hetus* which are adduced by Mahimabhaṭṭa for the realisation of *rasa* cause the inference of something else viz.,

the mere cognition of the presence of a particular mental state in the dramatic character. But they cannot explain the aesthetic bliss, that is *rasa*. Hence it is actually *hetvābhāsa* in so far as it establishes something other than what is sought to be established.

V.8 Theory of *Dhvani* and *Anumāna*

Ānandavardhana in his Dh.A[20] refers to the question as known from the *Locana,* whether *Dhvani* can be included in *Anumāna.* He presents the *Anumāna* theory as a *pūrvapakṣa* view perhaps keeping in mind the Naiyāyikas. The argument is that the suggested meaning being the speaker's purport can be understood through inference. Hence, *vyaṅgya-vyañjakabhāva* is *liṅgaliṅgibhāva*. The so called suggestiveness of sound is none other than a *liṅga*. This *pūrvapakṣa* argument is refuted by saying that the suggested meaning cannot be inferred. The knowledge which arises on hearing an uttered sound has two aspects-1. the intention of the speaker (*tātparya*) and 2. the actual meaning (*vācyārtha*). The former consists in the desire to reveal the form of the sound and to convey some special idea through the sound. These two desires can be inferred from the utterance of the sound. But the expressed and the non-expressed ideas of a sentence fall within the purview of the meaning to be described. These meanings are not inferred. Secondly, there may be differences of opinion regarding the nature of the suggested meaning among the listeners. But no such difference is possible in the case of the inferential meaning which as a definite form of cognition arrived at from a given *hetu*.

If one argues that since the validity of the suggested meaning is ascertained through inference it can be treated as inferred, this is unsound, since, for the same reason the expressed meaning, when varified through inferential

methods, should have to be regarded as inferred, which, however, is not the case. It is regarded as the expressed meaning itself, being originally cognised through the denotative power of the word.[21]

Thus, Ānandavardhana makes passing reference to the Naiyāyika theory of *Anumāna*. He makes a definite attempt to refute the view of Naiyāyikas who attempt to reject the suggested meaning. This becomes clear from the rejoinder of Jayantabhaṭṭa, a Naiyāyika of great repute.

V.9 Jayantabhaṭṭa's Criticism

It was not at all necessary for Jayantabhaṭṭa to refer to and refute a theory of literary criticism, but Ānandavardhana's action seems to have inspired a reaction in Jayantabhaṭṭa, who is drawn to refute the *dhvaṇi* theory in his Nyāya text only because Ānandavardhana has discussed and refuted the Naiyāyika theory of *Anumāna*.

Jayantabhaṭṭa examines the *dhvani* theory in his NM while discussing the problem whether *Arthāpatti* is an independent *pramāṇa*. He thinks that the newly preached theory of *dhvani* does not deserve any serious notice at all.[22] He laughs at the very idea that poets propose to solve the satisfactory solution at the hands of the most learned logicians.[23] He redicules Ānandavardhana as a *paṇḍitammanya,* man who makes a pretence of scholarship which he does not possess.[24]

He notes the first two instances of *vastudhvani* cited by Ānandavardhana, and remarks that the fact can be explained more satisfactorily by regarding the so-called suggested meaning as being conveyed by the primary function of words with the assistance of other *pramāṇas,* particulary *anumāna*. Jayanta's criticism has been hedged in between his refutations of the views of Mīmāṁsakas on *Arthāpatti* and

Abhāva. According to him *dhvani* occupies almost the same place as that of *Arthāpatti* and therefore the criticism levelled against the latter will, in his opinion, apply *mutatis mutandis* in regard to *dhvani* too. Just as *Arthāpatti* is nothing more than a kind of inference, *dhvani* also is another kind of inference only. He kills two birds with one stone by positing those words with their well-known functions, which are enough to explain all meanings, and arrived at through some *pramāṇa* or another. The variety in meaning is due, in other words, to the variety of the *pramāṇas* that assist in the grasping of the meaning and not due to the variety of functions (*vyāpāra*) of a word.

V.10 Mahimabhaṭṭa's Criticism

Mahimabhaṭṭa's VV stands foremost among the works criticising the *Dhvani* theory. He attempted to demonstrate elaborately how all varieties of *Dhvani* can be included in *Anumāna*. In the third chapter of the VV he cites about thirty examples quoted in the Dh.A and shows how they can be explained away by *Anumāna*. Some of them are analysed as follows :

1. *Vastumātradhvani*

भ्रम धार्मिक विश्वस्तः स शुनकोऽद्य मारितस्तेन।
गोदानदीकच्छलताकुञ्जवासिना दृप्तसिंहेन॥

These words are spoken by the heroine to a mendicant who wanders in the forest to gather flowers. She explicitly bids him to wander as he pleases. The meaning actually intended here is the prohibition of wandering. This meaning according to Ānandavardhana, is conveyed through suggestion; while Mahimabhaṭṭa shows that it is inferred.[25] It can be explained as :

गोदावरीतीर भीरूभ्रमणयोग्यम्, दृप्तसिंहवत्वात्,
यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा प्रमदोद्यानम्।

2. *Arthāntarasaṁkramitavācya*

तदा जायन्ते गुणाः यदा ते सहृदयैर्गृह्यन्ते।
रविकिरणानुगृहीतानि भवन्ति कमलानि कमलानि।।

Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that the word *kamalāni* (lotuses) is used twice in two different senses. The first word refers to the lotuses in their general capacity and the second to the particular aspect characterised by qualities like excessive charm and perfume caused by the contact with the rays of the Sun. These particular qualities are inferred as existing in the lotuses because of the identification of the general with the particular.[26] It cannot be objected that the identification between the same objects is illogical, because there the identification is between the same things characterised by different aspects.

3. *Atyantatiraskṛtavācyadhvani*

रविसंक्रान्तसौभाग्यस्तुषारा वृतमण्डलः।
निःश्वासान्ध इवादर्शश्चन्द्रमा न प्रकाशते।।

Here the explicit statement that the mirror is blind, being actually incompatible causes the inference of the dimness of the mirror. Blindness can be the characterstic of only a living being; hence we infer that all that is intended is the mirror which is just like the eye covered by the vapour of exhalation.[27]

4. *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*

अत्रान्तरे कुसुमसमययुगमुपसंहरन्नुदजृम्भत ग्रीष्माभिधानः
फुल्लमल्लिकाधवलाट्टहासो महाकालः.......

Here, apart from the contextual meaning referring to the advent of the summer season, we congnise a non-contextual meaning referring to Śiva. Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that it is because the figure *Samāsokti* originating due to the greater suitability of the epithets to the *Mahākāla* (Śiva) serves as the cause for the second meaning of that word.[28] As a result it is able to denote the non-contextual meaning i.e. Śiva in addition to the contextual meaning , the great season (*Mahākālaḥ*). The word *Mahākāla* by itself cannot give both the contextual and the non-contextual meanings alike by *Abhidhā* and it is the association of roaring laughter *(aṭṭ ahāsa)* and the destruction of *yuga* with *mahākāla* that is responsible for the cognition of a non-contextual meaning. Thus we congnise this meaning also." In the meanwhile yawned terrible Lord Śiva with a boisterous laughter white like full-blown jasmines", apart from the contextual meaning: "By that time, the great season called summer concluding the twin months of flowering season burst forth whiteness of full-blown flowers rendering the turrets beautiful". Its *Anumānavākya* can be possible in the following two ways:

(a) प्रकृतं महाकालपदं महाकालदेवताविशेषप्रतिपादनपरम्, युगसंहाराट्टहासबोधकपदसमभिव्याहृतत्वात्,

(b) महाकालो नाम देवविशेषः अत्रत्यमहाकालपदप्रतिपाद्यः युग संहाराट्टहाससम्बन्धित्वात्।

Mahimabhaṭṭa insists that some hint should be given by the poet as to the presence of the non-contextual meaning for its cognition. Accordingly he denies the presence of the additional meaning in places wherein no such hint is given.

For example :

दत्तानन्दाः प्रजानां समुचितसमयाक्लिष्टसृष्टैः पयोभिः
पूर्वा विप्रकीर्णा दिशि दिशि विरमत्यह्नि संहारभाजः।

दीप्तांशोर्दीर्घदुःखप्रभवभवभयोदन्वदुत्तारनावो
गावो वः पावनानां परमपरिमिता प्रीतिमुत्पादयन्तु॥

(VV.p 478)

Here, there is nothing to warrant the presence of the non-contextual meaning pertaining to cow and hence no cognition of that meaning is possible here. The homonymous word *gauḥ* itself cannot denote the non-contextual meaning because of it in that case, there would be no reason why it cannot denote other non-contextual meanings like *vajra* as well. It cannot be argued that due to the suitability of epithets to cow, only that main meaning is selected from among the several non-contextual meanings; there is nothing to show that a second meaning other than the contextual is intended by these epithets. If we take the word *gauḥ* to be the determining factor of their non-contextual meaning, it will involve the defect of mutual reliance (*anyonyāśraya).*[29] The cognition of the non-contextual meaning of the epithets will itself have to be caused by means of the word *gauḥ*. It cannot be argued that both the homonymous *viśeṣaṇas* and *viśeṣya* operating jointly cause the cognition of the non-contextual meaning; they have no capacaity to produce meaning independently without the involvement of the reader's cognitive power. Moreover, if the word were the cause of the cognition of the contextual and the non-contextual meanings alike, it could do so automatically and simultaneously. In that case there would be no sequence in their cognition. Thus Mahima shows that the homonymous words themselves are not capable of giving forth the non-contextual meaning without some hint. In the absence of any such hint there can be no cognition of the non-contextual meaning.

5. *Arthaśaktimūladhvani*

Mahimabhaṭṭa explains that in case of *Arthaśaktimūladhvani* the cognition of the suggested meaning from the expressed meaning is like their invariable concomitance. Thus in the verse:

एवं वादिनि देवर्षौ पार्श्वे पितुरधोमुखी।
लीलाकमलपत्राणि गणयामास पार्वती॥

The expressed meaning consisting of Pārvatī's counting the petals of the lotus causes the inference of the bashfulness of Pārvatī because of the mutual connection between them.[30]

V.11 The Suggestive Elements in Mahimabhaṭṭa's Perspective

Ānandavardhana regards all elements of poetry, beginning from mere letters *(varṇas)* to the whole composition *(prabandha)* as capable of suggestion *(vyañjaka)*. Mahimabhaṭṭa examines this view from his own standpoint. According to him, *varṇas* and *saṁghaṭanā* do not have the natural power to evoke *Rasa* directly. They are related to the *Rasa* only through the expressed meaning.[31] Mahima maintains that the *Rasas* shine forth more vividly when they are inferred from the expressed meaning given forth by sound adorned with the appropriate *varṇas* and *saṁghaṭanā*. The *varṇas* and *saṁghaṭanā* are actually the attributes of sound which gives forth the expressed meaning, which in its turn is the cause of *Rasa* just as dry leaves cause fire which is the cause of smoke. The relation of *varṇa* and *saṁghaṭanā* with the concerned *Rasa* is grasped through experience. It is our ordinary experience that people use style and sound devoid of huge compounds when affected by emotions like love and grief. When angry or excited, they employ harsh sounds and

complex style. This experience serves the basis of the inference of the appòrpriate *Rasa* from *varṇas* and *saṁghaṭanā.*[32]

As to the suggestiveness of words and sentences, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that they are directly responsible for the cognition of the expressed meaning from which *Rasa* is inferred. They become the cause of the cognition of another meaning because of either metaphorical usage (*upacāra*) or factors like the context (*prakaraṇasāmagrī).*[33] The word *rāmeṇa* in रामेण प्रियजीवितेन तु कृतं प्रेम्णः प्रियेणोचितम्। is the example where a word becomes responsible for the inference of Rāma's qualities like bravery etc., otherwise the use of *mayā* in place of *Rāmeṇa* could have served the purpose.

Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes VV with the observation that the gist of his arguments is that all the elements considered to be responsible for *Abhivyakti* by the *Dhvani* theorists are accepted by him as the causes responsible for inference.[34]

V.12 *Anumāna* and Mahimabhaṭṭa's Theory of Language

Mahimabhaṭṭa critically examines the problem of meaning and analyses the concepts like *Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā, Vyañjanā* and *Tātparyaśakti* as well as *Pramāṇas* like *Upamāna* and *Arthāpatti*.

The most intersting feature of this theory of language is that he considers all linguistic expressions as the forms of inference. One resorts to language to bring forth some desired effect in the hearer. This effect may be either some positive action or abstention from action. It is the result of *yathārthajñāna* and *ayathārthajñāna*. In Mahima's view language by its very nature is pragmatic, having definite aims in its operation. It is through creative conviction of the validity of the communicated fact that a hearer can be persuaded to act in accordance with the speaker's wishes. In

other words, linguistic usage always involves the establishment of some fact logically and convnicingly leading the hearer to the comprehension of the validity of that fact. The hearer can be convinced of the validity of a proposition only when he understands the logic in it and this demonstration of logic is done through language.

Mahimabhaṭṭa distinguishes between descriptive sentences which do not establish anything new and substantive sentences establishing new facts. In other cases the meaning of the sentence becomes descriptive as in the case of the statement:

अस्त्युत्तरस्यां दिशि देवतात्मा हिमालयो नाम नगाधिराजः।

'There is a mountain called Himālaya in the north'. Substantiation of new facts involves the presentation of the fact to be established (*sādhya*) as the means of establishing that fact (*sādhana*). The *sādhya* and *sādhana* portions of a sentence are constituted respectively by the subjective and predicative elements of the sentence. In other words, the known facts become *sādhana* in establishing the *sādhya* of unknown facts. The process involved in the comprehension of the theme of an argument is inference undergoing in the mind of the hearer when he cognises a verbal statement.

Ordinary inference is possible only when there is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*vyāptijñāna*) of the *sādhya* and *sādhana*. In the inference of fire on the hill, on seeing smoke, one is prompted by the knowledge of the invariable concomitance between the fire and the smoke grasped by the inferer from his frequent observations in the places like kitchen. The same procedure is followed in the understanding of the arguments couched in ordinary language, which can be grasped from three sources of valid knowledge. They are 1. *Loka* 2. *Veda* and 3. *Ādhyātma*. Among the

three, the first two constitute verbal knowledge and the last one is perception. First of all Bharata has referred to these three *pramāṇas*. Abhinavagupta explains the term *Lokapramāṇa* means *Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Āgama* etc. Whereas, as Ruyyaka points out, this list significantly omits *Anumāna*. The omission, Ruyyaka explains, is due to the fact that *Anumāna* is the end served by these *pramāṇas*.[35]

Mahimabhaṭṭa deals with *sādhyasādhanabhāva* of a language at two different levels. (1) The substantiation of one fact by another at expressed level. (2) the substantiation of a fact by means of the expressed facts, at the unexpressed level. It is the second type that comprises *Anumāna* wherein Mahima includes all varieties of *Dhvani*. Though both types of substantiation involve *sādhyasādhanabhāva*, the former is essentially different from the latter in one important respect. The first type, comprising explicit *sādhyasādhanabhāva*, causes the cognition of no new idea save the logical relationship between directly stated *sādhya* and *sādhana*. On the other hand, the second type caused the cognition of the unexpressed *sādhya* from the expressed *sādhana*. Ruyyaka cites the parallel to *kāvyahetu* and *Arthāntaranyāsa* of Udbhaṭa to illustrate the point.[36] *Anumāna* is like *kāvyahetu* where something unexpressed is cognised. The explicit *sādhyasādhnabhāva* is like *Arthāntaranyāsa* where one expressed idea is substantiated by means of another expressed ideas.[37] All instances of Dhvani, in Mahima's view, consist of *sādhyasādhanabhāva* between the expressed and the unexpressed meanings, i.e. of the second type.

Mahima divides the whole meaning-complex of language into *vācya* and *anumeya*.[38] He is of the view that the relationship between word and meaning is conventional. Sound can denote a meaning only when there is a convention assigning that specific meaning to it. Hence, he rejects the conventional relation with it.

V.13 Critics of *Anumāna* Theory

1. Mammaṭa

Mammaṭa in his KP makes an attempt to show the defects in Mahimabhaṭṭa's theory of *Anumāna*.[39] He presents the *pūrvapakṣa* view as follows :

The suggested meaning without having any relation with the expressed meaning cannot be cognised. If it happens, anything could be suggested by any word without any restriction. So one has to accept that the suggested meaning has some relation with the expressed meaning. Since relation exists between the two there can be no suggestiveness in the absence of that relation existing between the suggested and the suggestor. The relation is such that the suggestor is never concomitant with the contrary of suggested. The suggestor also subsists in the suggested meaning. Thus the suggestor fulfils three essential conditions of *hetu* required in *Anumāna viz., pakṣasattva, sapakṣasattva* and *vipakṣāsattva*. The knowledge of the suggested meaning becomes inferential in nature. For example in *bhrama dhārmika* etc., the traveller is advised to move in the wilderness because of the death of the dog. But it leads to the inference that *godāvarītīra* is not a safe place because of the presence of the lion. The nature of inference is :

गोदावरीतीरं भीरूभ्रमणयोग्यम्, दृप्तसिंहवत्त्वात्, यन्नेवं तन्नेवं यथा प्रमोदोद्यानम्।

Thus presenting the *pūrvapakṣa* view Mammaṭa shows the three defects of *Anaikāntikatva, Viruddhatva* and *Asiddhatva* of *hetu* in the given example.

The first defect is that the *hetu* is *Anaikāntika* which is explained as *savyabhicāra* in the Nyāyaśāstra. It is so named because it does not possess only one end or it tends to prove

not only one thing but also its opposite. Thus *Anaikāntika* means inconclusive. Mammaṭa says that the mere apprehension of something frightening is not an adequate reason for abstaining from wandering since people are seen wandering through dangerous places when they are obeying the command of their elders or are impelled by love. Thus the *hetu* is *Anaikāntika* by nature.

Secondly, the *hetu* suffers from *Viruddhatva* which is defined in the Nyāyaśāstra as that which is invariably comcomitant with the absence of the *sādhya*. In the given example the mendicant's aversion to the dog may not be due to his fear but because of its impure nature. Hence it does not prove that he would be afraid of the lion. If he is a hero, the presence of the lion may prove just the contrary.

Thirdly, the defect of *Asiddha* also occurs in the given example as it does not establish the *sādhya* correctly. The presence of lion on Godavarī's bank itself is not a documented fact. It is conveyed through the verbal statement of a woman in love. Thus the validity of the *hetu* itself being not established, the whole process of inference built upon it loses certainty required in a normal process of an inference.

Mammaṭa again demonstrates the same thing with the help of another verse *niḥśeṣacyutacandanam'* etc. In this verse *Anumāna* theorists cannot explain the cognition of the suggested meaning from the expressed meaning. The signs seen on the messanger's body cannot conclusively prove that she has returned after enjoying dalliance. The very same signs can warrant the conclusion that she has taken bath. Nor can the term *adhama* establish the bad conduct of the hero since the weakness of hero is not a fact established through valid means. Thus, Mammaṭa establishes that the indefiniteness of the suggested meaning proves the difference between *Anumāna* and *Vyañjanā*.

2. Vidyādhara

Following Ruyyaka, Vidyādhara (1985-1325) in his *Ekāvali* rejects the *Anumāna* theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa.[40] He repeats the arguments of Ruyyaka but adds *Anupalabdhi* as *Vyāptiprayojaka* which is not found in the treatment of Ruyyaka in his AS. *Anupalabdhi* cannot prove *dhvani* for it can prove only that *sādhya* which consists of an absence of something, as the absence of a jar can be proved from *Anupalabdhi*. The fact, that' there is no jar here' can be proved from the perception that it is not cognised here. Since, had it been here it would have been cognised. If Mahimabhaṭṭa attempts to prove *dhvanyabhāva* from *Anupalabdhi,* the *hetu* which is vitiated leads to the fallacy called *Asiddha* when the cognition of *dhvani* is evident, its non-cognition cannot be proved. Nor can *dhvanyabhāva* be proved from the non-cognition of words and their sense. The non-cognition of a jar cannot prove the absence of a pillar. Therefore, the non-cognition of words and their senses cannot prove the absence of *dhvani*. Thus *Anupalabdhi* cannot prove the absence of *dhvani*. Thus *Anupalabdhi* cannot establish the *vyāpti* between the *sādhya* and the *sādhana, dhvani* and *śabdārtha*.

3. Vidyānātha

Vidyānātha (1325 A.D.) in the *Pratāparudrīyayaśobhūṣaṇa* while dealing with Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Anumāna* theory maintains that *Arthaśaktimūladhvani* cannot be included in *Anumāna*.[41] There is no *vyāpti* between suggestive elements and the suggested meaning, because the intended meaning is cognised from words qualified by the poet's intention. Different meanings are cognised from the same words due to the difference in the implications of the poems. This is not compatible with *Anumāna* which requires the cognition of the same meaning from the same expression.

4. Viśvanātha

Viśvanātha (1383 A.D.) in his SD repeats the arguments of Mammaṭa with regard to the problem of the inclusion of *vastudhvani* and *alaṅkāradhvani* in *anumāna*. The *hetu* in the example *bhrama dhārmika* etc., is not free from the defects like *Anaikāntika* and *Asiddha*. Apart from this he further points out some other difficulties with regard to the *anumāna* theory. Referring to the verse *niśśeṣacyutacandanam* etc., he raises the question as to who is the inferer? or who does infer that the messenger made love to the hero? There would not be any problem if it is maintained that the implied meaning is inferred by the messenger herself or by other people present there. But the *Anumāna* theorists maintain that it is the *sahṛdaya* who infers this meaning. This is unsound since the same verse may give a different meaning in another context. Thus the *vyāpti* between the literal and the suggested meaning is not possible[42]. It may be argued that the literal meaning qualified by background features like the speakers mood can give rise to specific suggested meaning only. But there is no way of comprehending the *vyāpti* in such a specific form modified by contextual features. Further, Viśvanātha argues that as the subject matter presented in poetry originates from the poet's *pratibhā* it is essentialy different from logical propositions[43]. The *hetu* depicted in poetry having defecs like *sandigdhatva* and *Asiddhatva* may fail to satisfy the technical requirements of the *hetu* in a logical syllogism.

5. Kavi Karṇapura

Kavi Karṇapura (1505 A.D.) in *Alaṅkārakaustubha* (IInd *kiraṇa*) in connection with the discussion of *vyañjanā* deals with the *Anumāna* theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa and rejects it[44]. *Vyañjanā* cannot be identical with inference. For, the relation between the suggestor and the suggested is not the same as that of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* in the case of *Anumāna* of fire from smoke. The relation existing between the suggester and the suggested is of the nature of manifestor and manifested like the lamp and the jar. While in the case of *vahnyanumāna* the relation existing between *dhūma* and *vahni* is *sāhacarya*. Secondly, in the *vahnyanumāna* of Naiyāyikas the knowledge of *hetu* produces *arthakriyā* (a sense of action). On the basis of *arthakriyā*, *anumāna* is known to be valid one. Thirdly, there should be presence of the *hetu* in *pakṣa* otherwise the *anumāna* is not possible. All these conditions are not there in case of *vyañjanā*. So the *anumiti* of the suggested meaning is not possible. *Vyañjanā* also does not depend on any kind of *vyāpti* and therefore it can convey the suggested meaning in all circumstances.

Anumāna is a major topic of Nyāya philosophy and it deals with very fundamental aspect of epistemology. Experience of *rasa* or realisation of *dhvani* is also an important type of cognition and as such it also moves on the frings of the epistemological problem. Thus, the chain of *Anumāna* to substitute the *vyañjanā* (and *dhvani*) is a very serious one, and has constituted a major theory in Indian aesthetics, a major opposition to the *Rasa-Dhvani* theories, and an important exposition in the VV of Mahima. Aesthetic experience as a kind of cognition has claimed an important

portion in the earlier poeticians like Bhāmaha etc, a major theory of *rasānumiti* propounded by Śaṅkuka, and a major perhaps the most serious criticism of the Dhvani theory. The graveness of this particular objection to *Rasa* and *Dhvani* has been recognised by all the major and minor poeticians beginning from Abhinava and upto Appaya and Jagannatha and even after who, while adhered to the *Rasa* and *Dhvani* views of Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, Mammaṭa, could not afford to neglect it and always mentioned it and strove to answer it out. Each successive writer was trying to add an argument or two of his own. This shows that this important part of Nyāyaśāstra, the *anumānavicāra* has not only constituted a major source of fear to the poetic theories but also has influenced the poetical thought and sharpened the wits of the Indian literary thinkers. It has proved to be a very important aspect of the Naiyāyika influence on Sanskrit poetics.

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1. प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि। NyS., I.1.3.
2. अनुमितिकरणं अनुमानम्। TS., p.25
3. तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमान् इति ज्ञानमनुमितिः। *Ibid*
4. अनुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिः पक्षधर्मता च। TB, p.33
5. व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता। TS, p.25
6. यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः। *Ibid*
7. व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः। *Ibid*
8. तच्चानुमानं द्विविधम्। स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति। TB, p.25
9. यत्तु कश्चित् स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं बोधयितुं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत् परार्थानुमानम्। TB, p.26
10. NS., Ch. VI, p. 226.
11. Gnoli, R., *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*, PP. 25-26.
12. ABh., PP. 266-7.
13. As Translated by Gnoli, *op.cit*, P. 29
14. ABh., PP. 266-7.
15. PV. II. 56
16. विशेषाभावसहकृतसामान्यहेतुकानुमानम्; प्रसक्तस्य प्रतिषेधेन्यत्रा– प्रसङ्गात्परिशिष्यमाणे संप्रत्ययः। *Nyāyakośa*, p.484
17. ABh. p. 233
18. यापि विभावादिभ्यो रसादीनां प्रतीतिः सानुमान एवान्तर्भावमर्हतीति। विभावानुभावव्यभिचारि प्रतीतिर्हि रसादिप्रतीतेः साधनमिष्यते। ते हि रत्यादीनां भावानां कारणकार्यसहकारिभूतास्तानमुमापयन्त एव रसादीन्

निष्पादयन्ति। त एव हि प्रतीयमाना आस्वादपदवीं गताः सन्तो रसा इत्युच्यन्ते। इत्यवश्यम्भावो तत्प्रतीतिक्रमः। VV. p. 477

19. तत्र प्रष्टव्यम् किं शब्दाभिनयसमर्पितविभावादिप्रत्ययानु–मितरामादिगतरागादिज्ञानमेव रसत्वेनाभिमतं भवतः, तद्भावनया भावुकैर्भाव्यमानः स्वप्रकाशानन्दो वा? आद्ये न विवादः। किन्तु रामादिगतरागादिज्ञानं रससंज्ञया नोच्यतेऽस्माभिः इत्येव विशेषः। द्वितीयस्तु व्याप्तिग्रहणाभावाद्धेतोराभासतयाऽसिद्ध एव। SD.p.163

20. व्यंजकत्वं शब्दानां गमकत्वं तच्च लिङ्गत्वमतश्च्चव्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिलिङ्गि प्रतीतिरेवेति लिङ्गलिङ्गिभाव एव तेषां व्यङ्गयव्यञ्जक भावो नापरः कश्चित्। DhA., III. 33., p. 216

21. *Locana*, p.254.

22. अथवा नेदृशी चर्चा कविभिः सह शोभते।

विद्वांसोऽपि विमुह्यन्ति वाक्यार्थगहनेऽध्वनि।। NM.p.45

23. तदलमनया गोष्ठ्या विद्वजनोचितया चिरं।

परमगहनस्तर्कज्ञानामभूमिरयं नयः।। *Ibid*

24. एतेन शब्दसामर्थ्यमहिम्ना सोऽपि वारितः।

यमन्यः पण्डितम्मन्यः प्रपेदे कश्चन ध्वनिम्।।

विधेर्निषेधावगतिर्विधिबुद्धिर्निषेधतः।

भम धम्मिअ वीसत्थो मास्म पान्थ गृहं विश।। *Ibid*

25. तेनानुमेय एव भ्रमणस्य निषेधो न व्यङ्ग्य इत्यवसेयं यथा नात्र शीत–स्पर्शोऽग्नेरित्यतः शीतस्पर्शस्य। VV.p. 465

26. एवञ्चास्याप्यनुमानान्तर्भाव एवावगन्तव्यः। *Ibid*. p. 476

27. तस्य चानुमानान्तर्भावः समर्थित एव प्राक्। *Ibid*

28. इत्यत्र त्वनन्तरोक्तः प्रकारो न सम्भवतीति कुतोऽर्थान्तरप्रतीतिः।

VV.p.476

29. *Ibid*. p. 479

30. *Ibid*. p. 489

31. *Ibid*. p. 499

32. *Ibid*.

33. *Ibid*. p. 501

34. तदेवं ध्वनेरनुमानान्तर्भावाभ्युपगमः श्रेयानिति। *Ibid*. p.510

35. Ruyyaka, Com. on VV. प्रमाणं च त्रिधा लोकवेदाध्यात्म–रुपत्वेन..............अनुमानमत्र न गणितं तस्योपकार्यत्वेन प्रसिद्धत्वात्। p.501

36. ततश्चोद्भटकाव्यहेतुन्यायेनानुमानं व्यवस्थितम्, अर्थान्तरन्यासन्यायेन तूपपादनम्। *Ibid*. p. 49

37. VV, p. 57-8

38. अर्थोऽपि द्विविधो वाच्योऽनुमेयश्च। *Ibid*. p.47

39. KP, p. 255

40. यत् पुनरनुमानतो नातिरिच्यते ध्वनिरित्याचष्टमहिमभट्टस्तदपि पलालायमानम् .... प्रकृते ध्वनिः साध्यसामान्यं शब्दार्थो च साधनसामान्यं तत्र च ध्वनेरनुपलब्धिर्वा शब्दार्थयोस्तादात्म्यं वा तदुत्पत्तिर्वा साधिका। *Ekāvali*, p.32

41. *Pratāparudriyam*, p. 33.

42. ननु वकाद्यवस्थासहकृतत्वेन विशेष्यो हेतुरिति न वाच्यम् एवं विधव्याप्त्यनुसंधानस्याभावात्। SD, p. 168

43. *Ibid*.

44. *Alaṁkārakaustubha*, p. 27.

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CHAPTER VI

NYĀYA METHODOLOGY AND SANSKRIT POETICS

The present chapter makes an attempt to show how the poeticians have employed the Nyāya methods, style and language in their works.

VI.1 Nyāyaśāstra as a Vādaśāstra.

Nyāyaśāstra is mainly a Vādaśāstra. It is specially a science of methods. The *Nyāyaśūtras* of Gautama (c.100 A.D) are devoted to the methods of argumentation, disputation and dialectics. Out of the sixteen *padārthas*[1] enumerated by Gautama all, except the *prameya* (object of valid knowledge), are directly related to the method of disputation.

In the NyS Gautama uses the term *kathā* for debate. He says *kathā* is of three types: *Vāda, Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*[2].

Vāda consists in the putting forward of statements by two parties, *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*, in which there is the procedure of establishing and confuting by means of *pramāṇas* (proofs) and *tarka* (hypothetical reasoning), neither of which is quite opposed to the main thesis *(siddhānta)* and both of which are conducted in accordance with the method of reasoning.[3] *Vāda* basically meant for the discernment of truth or the real nature of the thing under investigation and

imparting the truth to the other party. Hence, in *Vāda* there is no consideration of victory or defeat.

Jalpa possesses the above characteristics of *Vāda*. Moreover, it establishes or confuts the statement by means of *Chala* (quibble), *Jāti* (futile rejoinder) and *Nigrahasthānas* (grounds of defeat).[4] In *Jalpa*, the procedure is similar to that of *Vāda*, but the aim is to establish one's own position by defeating the opponent.

Vitaṇḍā (wrangling) is a kind of disputation when there is no establishing of the counter-view.[5] The Vaitāṇḍika does not care to establish his point, but keeps on criticising and condemning the proofs employed by the other party. Vaitāṇḍika confines himself to merely criticising the opponent's view. The Vārttika defines *Vitaṇḍā* as criticism only *(dūṣaṇamātram vitaṇḍā)*.

Gautama emphasises the role of *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* in theoretical discussions. Some people transgress all bounds of reasoning through excessive partiality for their own theories. In that case one should be practical and employ *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* for the purpose of protecting one's own determination regarding the real nature of things, just as the hedge of throns is put up for the protection of sporuting seeds.[6]

In *Jalpa*, the person aims at *parapakṣadūṣaṇa* as well as *svapakṣasādhana*; in *Vitaṇḍā*, the person is merely concerned with *parapakṣadūṣaṇa* and does not care for *svapakṣasādhana*. Vāda is carried on with the person who is willing to learn or to impart knowledge, while *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā* are carried on with persons who are perverse in their ignorance and too proud to learn. Thus, whereas *Vāda* aims at the ascertainment of truth, *Jalpa* aims at the establishing of counter-thesis, and in *Vitaṇḍā* even this is absent.

VI.2 Devices of Debate

Chala, Jāti and *Nigrahasthānas* are auxiliaries to *Vāda*, *Jalpa* and *Vitaṇḍā*. These devices can never themselves be the direct means in supporting of establishing a thesis but only in condemning they can independently serve as such. Gautama defines *Chala* as वचनविघातोऽर्थविकिल्पोपपत्त्या छलम् (NySI.6.10). It consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than the intended one. It is of three kinds: *vāk-chala* (verbal quibble), *sāmānyachala* (generalising quibble) and *upacāra-chala* (figurative quibble).

Jāti is defined by Gautama as :

साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः

(NyS.I.2.18)

It is a kind of futile objection. It is of twenty four kinds such as *utkarṣasama, apakarṣama* etc.

Apart from this Gautama has also enumerated the methods of debate like *Tarka* etc., which are useful in the process of disputation. The successors of Gautama like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra etc., developed these methods further. Prominent Buddhist dialecticians like Dharmakīrti, Diṅnāga etc., also made significant contribution in their development. This methodology reached its climax in the period of Navya-Nyāya. Prof. Solomon rightly remarks[7]:

> Navya-Nyāya evolved a new method and gave
>
> a different turn to the growth of dialectics.

Originally these methods developed as dialectics or oral debates. But then they were also employed in written works. Thus, the style of a Sanskrit polemical work has often assumed the tone of an oral or verbal debate. The scholars have structured their arguments even in their written works just as one would be involved in a practical debate and argue

with his opponents, refute the opponents' proposition and establish his own thesis. This has resulted into the arguments developing as the discussion of *pūrvapakṣa* and *uttarapakṣa* or *siddhāntapakṣa*. This methodology was so appealing that all the Śāstras in Sanskrit have almost spontaneously adopted it and shaped their own thoughts in a dialectical form instead of descriptive or commentatorial presentation.

The Nyāya influence in their style is a foregone conclusion. Naiyāyikas wrote their works into a dialectical one. Navya-Naiyāyikas wrote their works entirely in this new methodology of dialectics. Hence the works like *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa, works of Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa, Gadādhara and many others are very rich in dialectical wealth. In fact, they are known as vāda-granthas only. While studying all those Nyāya works one gets confused in deciding the *pūrvapakṣa* and the *siddhāntapakṣa*. But they are identified in some cases by direct mention of the names of the persons or by terms like *kecit, eke, apare, nanu........iti, cet, na ca... vācyam, nāpi......*and so on and so forth. These expressions to indicate *pūrvapakṣa* have also overflowed into works of other śāstras. We shall see some illustrations from works on Poetics below.

१. परस्परप्रतिक्षेपकविकल्पार्थेन वा कारेण हि या परस्परप्रतियो–गिकत्वविशिष्टोपमा तद्विषयवृत्यन्तरनिरपेक्षव्यक्तिबोध्या तद्विषयव्यक्ति–निरपेक्षवृत्यबोध्या वा भवति सोपमेयपमेति पर्यवस्यति।

(Appaya Dīkṣita, *Citramīmāṁsā*, p.179-180)

२. तत्रोपमानोपमेययोः प्रमेयत्वेनैक्येऽपि प्रान्तरे तिस्विकासाधरण–धर्मावच्छेदेन भेदसत्त्वादिति चेत् न। केवलान्वयिधर्मा तिरिक्तद्रव्यत्वादिनापि तत्रोभयोरैक्यसंभवेन तद्दोषतादवस्थ्यात्। ननु यद्धर्मावच्छेदेनोपमेयत्वं यस्योपनिबध्यते तद्धर्मावच्छेदेन तस्योपमेयत्वमनन्वय इति लक्षणमिति चेन्मैवम्। 'रामो राघव इवे' त्याद्यनन्वये अव्याप्तिः।

(*Alaṅkārarāghava*, p.46)

३. अनुमानसिद्धा च घ्राणरसनत्वादिघ्राणरसनादि पदानाम्, आनन्त्यात् व्यभिचाराच्च व्यक्तिनामभिधेयताया अकल्पनात् । न च ज्ञातगोत्वादिरूपया गोत्वादिज्ञानरूपया वा प्रत्यासत्या प्रत्यक्षेण परिकलितासु सकलतदीय व्यक्तिष्वभिधायाः कल्पने नास्ति दोष इति वाच्यम् । सामान्यप्रत्या– सत्तेनिराकरणात् । गौरवदोषस्यानुद्धाराच्च ।

४. अमी सामाजिका रसानुभववन्तः, ये ये विवक्षितचेष्टाविशिष्टास्ते ते रसानुभवन्तः । यथा तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारानुभवितारस्तथा चेमे चेष्टाविशिष्टाः । तस्माद्रसानुभववन्त एवेति ।

(Taking up the *Anumāna* in its variety *sāmānyato dṛṣṭ a* (based on analogy) Viśvesvara in his *Camtakāracandrikā* proves *Rasa* syllogistically.)

The poeticians like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana mainly devote their works to formulate the poetic theories of *Alaṅkāra, Guṇa, Doṣa* and *Rīti*. Their works are mostly free from dialectical arguments. It is Ānandavaradhana who for the first time in Sanskrit poetics employes the dialectical method in his great work Dh.A. In the first Uddyota, he presents three views as *pūrvapakṣa* and deals with them logically and even employes terms like *avyāpti*, *artivyāpti* and *asaṁbhava* etc. Dh.A. may be considered as a good model of dialectical work and his successors have adopted this model. After Ānandavardhana, came Mahimabhṭṭa who in the beginning of his VV declares his aim of refuting *hvani* theory, and devotes his entire work for it. Ruyyaka wrote a commentary on VV to show the validity of the *dhvani* theory. This dialectical argumentations for and against the *dhvani* theory have continued upto Jagannātha and to some extent even thereafter. The method of dialectics fascinated the post-Ānandavardhana theorists like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Vidyādhara, Appaya, Jagannātha, Devaśaṅkara, Viśveśvara,

Yajñeśvara etc., who attempt to attack the loop-holes in the opponent's viewpoints and then established their own theory. This tendency somehow seems to have increased in the period of Jagannātha and thereafter. It is found that the works written by the poeticians in the period of Navya-Nyāya (12th century onwards) are very rich in dialectics.


VI. 3. Three fold Objectives of the Nyāyaśāstra

Vātsyāyana in his NBh considered three elements to be the main concern of Nyāyaśāstra. They are: *uddeśa* (enumeration of the concept), *lakṣaṇa* (definition) and *parīkṣā* (examination).[8] *Uddeśa* is the mention by name of what is to be enumerated.[9] *Lakṣaṇa* is the statement of the distinctive quality which belongs only to thing defined and to none else.[10] According to Uddyotakara definition is made for demarcating or particularising the objects from others.[11] Tarkadīpikākāra rightly says; व्यावृत्तिर्व्यवहारो वा लक्षणस्य प्रयोजनम् । (TB.p.18). It is usually translated as 'definition'. In fact a *lakṣaṇa* points out not the thing to be defined but the defferntia or the particular characteristics possessed by the thing defined alone and which is not common to others. The technique of definition, however, in which the Navya-Naiyāyikas evince such a deep interest, was not clearly developed in the early school. Vātsyāyana states the purpose of definition is to differentiate an entity from those which do not possess the nature or essence *(tattva)* of that entity. Thus in so far as the term 'nature' or 'essence' remains vague in meaning, the notion of *lakṣaṇa* also remains vague. The new school attempts to avoid the vagueness by specifically mentioning that the purpose of definition is to distinguish the *lakṣya* from all entities that are different from it *(itaravyāvartakatvam)*. Thus, the *lakṣaṇavākya* of the


Naiyāyikas shall usually consist of two parts: *lakṣya* and *lakṣaṇa*.

It is not an easy task to formulate a logical definition, as per the strict rule of the Nyāyaśāstra. A definition, according to Nyāyaśāstra, should be free from the three defects viz., *avyāpti* (being too narrow), *ativyāpti* (being too wide) and *asaṁbhava* (impossible).[12] An illustration would make this clear.

If a cow is defined as *kapilatvam gotvam*, the definition suffers from the defect of *avyāpti*, as all cows that are not *kapila* (tawny) would be thereby excluded[13] and only a few number of cows having tawny colour will become too narrow *(avyāpta)*.



Now, if *paśutvam gotvam* is proposed as a definition of a cow, it also will not be correct as the cow undoubtedly possesses *paśutva*, but *paśutva* is also found in other animals like horses, buffaloes etc., which are, not cows.[14] Thus this *lakṣaṇa* will be too wide, possessing the doṣa of *ativyāpti*.



ativyāpti (wide)

Ativyāpti implies that the *lakṣaṇa* covers the *lakṣya* completely and in addition extends to other objects.

Again, if *ekaśafatvam gotvam* is proposed as a definition of a cow it will suffer from the defect of *asaṁbhava*, as no cow possesses *ekaśafatva* (having one hoof or undivided hoof).[15] Thus it will lead to the fault of *asaṁbhava*.

गौः एकशफवत्त्वम् *asaṁbhava* (impossible)

So *sāsnādimattvam* (having dew-lap), according to Naiyāyika, is the correct definition of cow as *sāsnā* is possessed by cows only.

Apart from these three defects, there are other defects like 1. *ātmāśraya* 2. *anyonyāśraya* (*etaretarāśraya* or *parasparāśraya*) 3. *cakraka* 4. *aprasiddha* which are to be avoided in a definition.

1. *Ātmāśraya* (self-dependence) is a logical defect and a type of circularity. It takes place whenever we explain a concept by using the same concept in some way or other in our explanation. Nyāya defines it as : स्वज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञान विषयत्वमात्माश्रयः।

For example :- गोभिन्नवृत्तित्वे सति गोमात्रवृत्तिजातिमत्त्वं गोर्लक्षणम्।

Prof. Matilal explains it nicely using modern symbols:[16]

X is self-dependent if *x* is explained as an object of some cognition which is dependent upon a cognition of X *(sva-graha-sāpekṣa-graha-viṣayatvam ātmāśrayatvam)*.

2. *Anyonyāśraya* is one of the logical defects from which the definition must be free. It is defined as :

स्वज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानविषयत्वमन्योन्याश्रयः।

or

परस्परज्ञानसापेक्षज्ञानाश्रयः अन्योन्याश्रयः।

(TB. p.18)

Where the object to be defined depends on the other which also depends on the first object. For example :

महिषभिन्नत्वं गोत्वं गोभिन्नत्वं च महिषत्वम्।

The knowledge of *gotva* depends on *mahiṣatva* and vice versa. Prof. Matilal explains it as: [17]

X and Y are naturally dependent if X is explained as an object of cognition which is dependent upon a cognition of Y and Y in its turn is explained as an object of cognition which is dependent on cognition of X *(sva-graha-sāpekṣa-graha-sāpekṣa-graha-viṣayatvam anyonyāśrayatvam)*.

3. *Cakraka* is sometimes related to another defect i.e. *anavasthā (regressus ad infinitum)*. But *anavasthā*, in certain cases, is like the question whether the chicken comes first or the egg has to be tolerated. But it is to be avoided in the logical definition.

Apart from this, another important feature of Nyāya methodology is the excessive stress on *lāghava* (simplicity or parsimony) and *Gaurava* (prolixity), which are to be taken into consideration while formulating a definition. So many definitions and explanations fulfiling all the logical requirements and conditions are found to be rejected in Nyāya works because of either *Lāghava* or *Gaurava*. Like Grammarians who are famous for bravity (cf. अर्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते) the Naiyāyikas also emphasise these two conditions the most.

Parīkṣā is the examination of the validity of a definition. Nyāya defines it as :

लक्षितस्य लक्षणमुपपद्यते न वेति विचारः परीक्षा।

(NBh.p.17)

In *parīkṣā* with the help of *pramāṇas* and *tarka* the ascertainment is made whether the defined object *(lakṣita)* confirms, in fact to the definition as given. After formulating a definition, one proceeds to show why and how his definition adequately meets the acceptable standards or the necessary requirements of a definition and how the defined

object is appropriately characterised by the definition. This eventually leads him to a discussion, and a criticism of the rival theories showing inadequacy of the rival definitions of the same concept. This constitutes an important feature of Nyāya methodology.

Looking from such a perspective in Alaṅkāraśāstra the tradition of defining is started from Bharata and Bhāmaha. Other rhetoricians coming after them also define the objects in a similar vein. But one thing to be noted is that their definitions are not definitions in the strictly Naiyāyika sense of the term. They do not fulfil the logical conditions which are necessary for a definition. That is why the later poeticians find scope to find fault with them while examining their definitions as per the rules of the Nyāyaśāsta. Jagannātha and Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita etc., aim at making a cirtical review of the previous definitions of poetic objects before formulating a definition of their own. Side by side their criticism also speaks how their definitions are logically correct and fulfills the conditions. Since the task of defining the object is the hardest of tasks, only a few have succeeded in their undertaking. Another important factor which motivated these Navya-Ālaṅkārikas, was that the Navya-Naiyāyikas were also engaged in a similar task. Thus the Naiyāyika's influence and inspiration gave rise to a new trend in the treatment of the śāstric topics of poetics and gradually becomes its distinct characteristic. It became a sacrosanct tradition as it were, all the scholars who followed Jagannātha fell in the stream of this tradition almost *gaḍḍalikāpravāhanyāyena*.

The rhetoricians of the last phase of Navya-Nyāya logic have taken a leading role in this respect and thereby they have made Alaṅkāraśāstra so complicated that the *Alaṅkāra* works of the last phase are hard nuts to crack. Minds boggle in getting at the implications and essence of their definitions. No doubt they have exhibited their deep scholarship of

Nyāyaśāstra and distinguishes themselves from their predecessors, but it has also contributed to the loss of its originality and *saukumārya*. Some of the examples are given here :

(a) यन्निष्टकारणतानिरूपितकार्यताश्रयत्वेन यद् बुद्धिस्थं तेन विना तस्यास्तित्वमात्रोपनिबद्धो विभावनालंकारः। p.153.

(b) स उपमेयतावच्छेदकप्रकारकशून्यत्वे सति उपमानतावच्छेदक–प्रकारकोपमेयप्रतीतिः। (SSS, p. 445)

(c) अलङ्कारत्वं च रसादिभिन्नव्यङ्ग्यभिन्नत्वे सति शब्दार्थान्यतरनिष्ठा या विषयितासम्बन्धावच्छिन्ना चमत्कृतिजनकता–वच्छेदकता तदवच्छेदकमत्वात्। अनुप्रासादिविशिष्टशब्दज्ञानादुपमादि–विशिष्टार्थज्ञानाच्च चमत्कारोदयात्तेषु लक्षणसमन्वयः। शब्दार्थयोर्ज्ञाननिष्ट–चमत्कृतिजनकताया विषयितयावच्छेदकत्वेन तद्विशेषणीभूतानुप्रासोपमादे–स्तन्निष्ठावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकत्वात्। रसवदाद्यलङ्कारसंग्रहाय व्यङ्ग्यो–पमार्दिवारणाय च भेदद्वयगर्भं सत्यतोपादानम्। (Vaidyanātha, *Alaṁkāracandrikā,* p.2.)

VI.4. *Padakṛtya* Method

Padakṛtya is a method used by the Naiyāyikas for examining the correctness and logical relevance of each and every word costituting the definition *(dalaprayojana)*. This is known as a commentatorial or expository method. As per this method an attempt is made to show how each and every word in that definition is relevant and how it contributes to the total intended sense convincingly and adequately and that it is indespensible and valid. If the definition is found faulty it is remodelled either by modifying words or by adding more words until it becomes perfect and flawless. This method is also called *dalavyāvṛtti*. Candrasiṁha Paṇḍita, a Naiyāyika has named his entire gloss on TS as *Padakṛtya*.

Navya-Naiyāyikas of Gaṅgeśa and post-Gaṅgeśa period (12th century onwards) use this method profusely and by means of it accept or reject the definitions of proponents and

opponents. This trend has influenced the Ālaṅkārikas also. The prominent figures who arrest our attention for adopting this technique are Viśvanātha, Appaya, Śobhākara, Viśvanāthadeva, Viśveśara Paṇḍita, Jagannātha, Devaśaṅkara etc. Because of such tendency we do not find originality in their theoretical discussions but rather dialectical war-fares. Alaṅkāraśāstra of this period is quite different in its nature and objective from that in its earlier period. It now becomes a veritable dialectical discipline like Navya-Nyāya and Navya-Vyākaraṇa. Hence Ālaṅkārikas of this period need to be distinguished from their predecessors and be designated as Navya-Ālaṅkārikas.

Some of the examples which show how the poeticians have employed the *Padakṛtya* method, are given below :

Viśvanātha in the first chapter of his SD uses the Nyāya method of *Padakṛtya* to examine the definition of *kāvya* given by Mammaṭa and shows how it contains the faults like *avyāpti* and *ativyāpti* as follows :

Mammaṭa's definition of *kāvya* :

तददोषौ शब्दार्थौ सगुणावनलंकृती पुनः क्वापि।

(KP, p.13)

Padakṛtya

1. *(tat) adoṣau* - First of all Viśvanātha examines the word *adoṣau* and shows the fault of *avyāpti* in the definition. He argues if *kāvya* is defined as a piece free from fault then the verse, *nyakkāro* etc., would not be a poem as it has the fault *vidheyāvimarśa*. But it has been admitted to be a specimen of the highest type of poetry as it contains suggestion. Therefore the definition is *avyāpta* (too narrow) as it excludes the poetic verse in question which is universally acknowledged to be the best type of poetry from the province of poetry.

2. *saguṇau* - This term is inappropriate, says Viśvanātha. Mammaṭa himself has declared that the qualities such as *mādhurya* are the properties of *rasa* alone and not of anything else. But the definition, *saguṇau* is shown as the adjective of *śabdārthau* and *guṇas* are said to be the properties of word and sense. This leads to inconsistency and does not logically define the object.

3. *analaṅkṛti* - Following the words of Vātaysyana, *atattvavyavacchedako dharmaḥ*, Viśvanātha says that the term *analaṅkṛti* in the definition is irrelevant. Figures of *śabda* and *artha* even when they are present serve merely to highten a *kāvya*. They are not the essence of the poetry.

Jagannātha in his RG profusely uses the method of *padakṛtya* while explaining and examining the logical validity of the definitions of *alaṅkāras* given by predecessors. After rejecting the definitions of *alaṅkāras* which do not appear to him logical, he completely formulates new ones. The following one is example which shows that all the terms in his definition are significant and fulfil the logical need. Jagannātha's method of defining objects, therefore, provides the best examples of *padakṛtya*.

Definition of *Sasaṅdeha* :

सादृश्यमूला भासमानविरोधका समबला नानाकोट्यवगाहिनी धी-रमणीया ससंदेहालंकृतिः।

(RG. p.340)

Padakṛtya

1. *sādṛśyamūlā* - This adjective is used to remove the fault of *ativyāpti*. If it is not given there would not be any difference between *sasaṅdeha alaṅkāra* and common *saṅdeha* (doubt). To clarify it Jagannātha gives the following example:

अधिरोप्य हरस्य हन्त चापं
परितापं पशमक्षय बान्धवानाम्।

परिणेष्यति वा न वा युवायं
निरपायं मिथिलाधिनाथपुत्रीम्।।

(RG. p.340)

This is an example of *sandeha*, and not of *sasandeha alankāra,* for in this statement of the people of Mithilā there is only doubt. To differentiate the *sasandeha alankāra* from the common *sandeha*, the term *sādṛśyamūlā* is used. It means that the cognition of doubt should be as the result of the knowledge of similarity. Any doubt cannot constitute this *alankāra.*

2. *bhāsamānavirodhakā (dhiḥ)* - 'having only apparent contradiction'. This term differentiates *sasandeha alankāra* from the *Mālārūpaka alankāra* which has more than one *aprastuta* expressed in poetical superimposition, while in *Sasandeha* the superimposition is suspended. If this term is absent in the definition, it will lead to *ativyāpti,* for, the definition will be applicable to the *Mālārūpaka.*

3. *samabalā* - To differentiate *Utprekṣā alankāra* from *Sasandeha* this term is used. The alternative which is predicated is more powerful in *Utprekṣā,* while in *Sasandeha* all the alternatives are equally powerful *(samabalā).*

4. *nānākoṭyavagāhinī* - Though the adjectives *bhāsamāna-virodhakā* and *samabalā* imply that the alternatives should be many, this term is used to make this point more clear.

5. *ramaṇīyā* - This adjective excludes ordinary doubts which arise in the wordly life in the form of *sthāṇurvā puruṣo vā.*

At last Jagannātha says that in the absence of the three terms i.e. *nānākoṭyavagāhinī*, *ramaṇīyā* and *sādṛśyamūlā* the definition will define only doubt and not *Sasandeha alankāra* which is different from an ordinary doubt.

VI.5. Poeticians of Navya-Nyāya Period

The poeticians who flourished during the period of Navya-Nyāya (after Gaṅgeśa) reveal the influence of Nyāyaśāstra in a gradually increasing degree in regard to their language, method, style, technical terms and principles of Navya-Nyāya. From among those poeticians only those who have earned illustrious name by making valuable contribution to Sanskrit poetics are introduced here. Some of these poeticians are masters of both poetics and the Nyāya and have composed works in both the fields. Some of them who have written only on Alaṅkāraśāstra through their works clearly prove deep knowledge of Nyāyaśāstra.

1. Śobhākara

Sobhākara (1500 A.D.), the author of the *Alaṅkāraratnākara* derives inspiration from the Nyāya system and uses some of the important techniques of Navya-Nyāya in his work. G. Parthasaradhy Rao who has made a critical study of his work, remarks :[18]

It has to be noted here that Śobhākara lived at a time when 'Navyanyāya' (Modern Logic) was making its initial progress taking the scholars of the day under its sway and as a consequence there developed a tendency in the scholars to view any matter critically setting aside the views and conventions of the earlier writers. This is the period when the great logician Gaṅgeśopādhyāya, the author of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* flourished. Śobhākara sufficiently imbibed in the characteristics of this new age and so his writings in the *Alaṅkāraratnākara* have colouring of modern logic. His references to the aphorisms of Gautama, the *Vṛtti* he composed under the definition of the figure *Sandeha,* the definition of *samāsokti* where he brought into a new term *avacchedaka,* the arguments he presented while establishing', the view that common characteristic *(Sādhāraṇadharma)* in *upamā* can be

of twenty four kinds, the stress he gave that qualities *(guṇas)* can be twentyfour only as enumerated by the logicians and finally the arguments he presented while extending the scope of different figures, splitting them wherever necessary and introducing several new figuers with narrow differences, amply bear testimony to the fact that he was influenced by the thoughts of modern logic.

We have quoted Dr. Parthasaradhy Rao *in extenso* only to show how and in how many different ways does Śobhākara reveal the Nyāya influence so deeply imbibed in the entire fabric of his work on Poetics.

2. Viśvanāthadeva

Viśvanāthadeva (552A. D) is the author of three works on poetics viz., *Citramīmāṁsā, Mṛgāṅkalehā* and *Sāhitya-sudhāsindhu*. Among these works only SSS is published. Dr. Ram Pratap, the editor of SSS says[19] that following the Nyāya method of defining the objects, Viśvanātha formulates the definitions of *doṣa* in the 5th chapter and of *alaṅkāras* in the 8th chapter with a deliberate attempt to make them entirely free from all logical faults. Further, because of his adopting the style of Navya-Nyāya, Dr. Ram Pratap remarks, some of the portions of his texts are not clear.

3. Appaya Dīkṣita

Appaya Dīkṣita is a great name in the history of Sanskrit literature. A versatile scholar and a prolific writer, he has to his credit the authorship of over one hundred works, including at least three on literary criticism. His *Citramīmāṁsā* is a scholarly work on Alaṅkāraśāstra, dealing with the definitions of *arthālaṅkāras* given by predecessors and their discussions in the light of his own definitions. *Vṛttivārttika* is a short treatise on semantics, and *Kuvalayānanda* is a work on Sanskrit poetics dealing with *arthālaṅkāras* only.

All these works exhibit his deep scholarship of Navya-Nyāya. While reading them, readers must face a lot of probabilities offered by Appaya, which are presented in a language that strictly follows the track of the Nyāya philosophy. Satyanaryana Chakraborty remarks:[20]

The very approach of Appaya Dīkṣita in discussing the figures of speech betrays the style of Nyāya philosophy.

Though his *Citramīmāṁsā* and *Vṛttivārttika* are written in a lucid style, yet in quite a number of cases, the mode of argumentation is that of a mature Naiyāyika. Examples of such Naiyāyika technicalities will be discussed later at the proper place. Here we may simply point out that Appaya, a scholar of great genius, flourished in an age of Navya-Nyāya and should not but adopt the Navya-Nyāya methods, style and language.

4. Yajñeśvara Dīkṣita

Yijñeśvara Dīkṣita (1600 A.D.) has written three *Alaṅkāra* works viz., *Alaṅkārarāghava, Alaṅkārasūryodaya* and a commentary on KP. Besides being a poetician he is also a great Naiyāyika. He has written two Nyāya works, *Śāstracūḍamaṇi* and *Vivaraṇojjīvinī*. His deep study of Nyāya method of defining the objects is revealed from his treatment of the *Alaṅkāra* in his work, *Alaṅkārarāghava* from which an example is already given in this chapter.

5. Jagannātha

Jagannātha was a great scholar of Navya-Nyāya. His *magnum opus* the RG exhibits his deep erudition in the Nyāyaśāstra. He himself holds a rare epithet : *padavākya-pramāṇapārāvāriṇa* which is found in a colophon of the printed text of his *Manoramākucamardinī*[21], the epithet appropriately praises his scholarly attainment in the three great śāstras-Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya. In the

beginning of RG he declares that he had received the knowledge of the Nyāyaśāstra from his father, Perubhaṭṭa whom he refers to in glowing terms.[22] The whole scholastic atmosphere in and around the age of Jagannātha was surcharged with the Navya-Nyāya. In his age Navya-Nyāya was on the peak of its development both in the Navadvīpa of Bengal and Mithilā in Bihar with the great Naiyāyikas like Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana, Rājacuḍāmaṇi Dīkṣita and Veṅkaṭadhvarin and many others flourishing in that period. Jagannātha could not avoid their influence even while composing his work on poetics and he reveals it in his Navya-Nyāya language and style.

6. Viśveśvara Paṇḍita

Viśveśvara Paṇḍita (18th Century A.D.) also known as Parvatīya Viśveśvara Pāṇḍeya has earned geat reputation both as a Naiyāyika as well as an Ālaṅkārika. He has wielded his pen with ease in both the areas and composed many works like *Tarkakutūhalam* and *Dīdhitipraveśa* in Nyāya and *Alaṅkāramuktāvali, Alaṅkārapradīpa* and *Alaṅkarakaustubha* in Alaṅkāraśāstra. The editor of the *Tarkakutūhalam* rightly remarks that Viśveśvara's *Alaṅkārakaustubha* is written in the style of Navya-Nyāya. In refuting the views of other Ālaṅkārikas and in establishing his own position he mainly follows the method of Navya-Naiyāyikas. His other rhetoric works also exhibit his liking for the logical precision and techincal expression so peculiar to the Navya-Nyāya style.

7. Devaśaṅkara Purohita

Devaśaṅkara Purohita, the author of *Alaṅkāramañjuṣā* (18th century A.D) was also well-versed in Nyāyaśāstra. The learned editor S.M. Katre rightly remarks:[23]

It seems our author was primarily a logician and only secondarily a poet (sic)

His constant use of Navya-Nyāya style of highly technical expression speaks of him more as logician than a poetician. It is interesting to note that Devaśaṅkara in his work refers twice to Akṣapāda Gautama, the promulgator of the Nyāya system and once to the Naiyāyikas in general.

Extracts from the works of the above authors are presented below to show the language, technical terms, style and method which reveal the clear influence of Nyāya.

VI.6. Use of Navya-Nyāya language

One will be definitely surprised while looking at the rhetorical works written in the garb of the Navya-Nyāya language. The authors and the commentators of such works of the Navya-Nyāya period adopt the Navya-Nyāya language in such a fashion that the works of poetics seem to be the works of Navya-Nyāya, rich in technical terms, logical techniques, long compounds and dialectical style. Because of this peculiarity all these works become quite technical in nature and difficult to understant.

It is well-known that the language of the Navya-Nyāya is one of the distinctive features of Indian logic. It gives an unique status to Navya-Nyāya and also distinguishes it from other śāstras in Sanskrit. It is altogether different from the commonly known Sanskrit language. Even the language of Prācīna Nyāya system has got no similarity with that of Navya-Nyāya. Some of the passages from the rhetoric texts are produced here as specimen :

(a) समवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नचमत्कृतिनिष्ठकार्यतानिरूपितसमवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नजनकतानिरूपितविषयितासम्बन्धावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकतावच्छेदकमनुप्रासादिविशिष्टतत्तच्छब्दगतानुपूर्व्यपमादिविशिष्टतत्तदर्थगताधर्माः। तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणाय तादृशकार्यतानिरूपितसमवायसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाकारणातानिरूपितविषयतासम्बन्धावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकतानिरूपितावच्छेदकत्वमप्यलङ्करीयत्वस्वरूपसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नं वाच्यम्।

(AM. p.242)

(b) तथा अरविन्दमिव सुन्दरमित्यत्रेवार्थे सादृश्येऽरविन्दस्य निरूपितत्वसंसर्गेणान्वयः। तस्य च प्रयोजकतासंसर्गेण सौन्दर्ये। एवं चारविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नमिति। अरविन्दमिवेत्यत्र त्वरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यवदिति निपातजन्योपस्थितिप्रयोज्य-प्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतानिपातजन्योपस्थितिप्रयोज्यविशेष्यतान्यत-रभिन्नविशेष्यतसंसर्गेण नामार्थप्रकारकबोध एव विशेष्यतया विभक्तिजन्योपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वादिवार्थस्य नञर्थस्येव भेदसंसर्गेण नामार्थ-विशेषणत्वे विशेष्यत्वे च न दोषः।

(RG. p.247)

(c) ननु कथमत्र दूषकता। सत्यनुशासनसिद्धत्वे शाब्दसामग्र्थाः परिपूर्णत्वेन तदविलम्बे मानाभवात्, कविसम्प्रदायप्रयुक्तत्वज्ञानस्या-हेतुत्वात् च। न शाब्दबोधे तदव्यपक्षणीयं गौरवान्मानाभावाद्। व्यभिचाराच्चेति चेत्, उच्यते।

प्रकृतप्रतीतिरस्थगनमत्र दूषकताबीजम्। तथाहि-यथायं पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात्। यत्र धूमः तत्र वह्निः। वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं तस्माद् वह्निमानयमिति साम्प्रदायिकपञ्चावयवप्रयोगः। तत्र पर्वते वह्निः धूमो यतः वह्निव्याप्तिर्धूमे धूमेन च पर्वते भवितव्यं पर्वताधेयो वह्निरित्येतादृशप्रयोगकारी निगृह्यत इति सर्वसिद्धम्।

(SSS. p.199-201)

VI.7. Navya-Nyāya Technical Terms

With the use of Navya-Nyāya language poeticians also use the technical Nyāya terms in their works.Mainly the poeticians of later period who flourished in and after the development of Navya-Nyāya logic employed Naiyāyika terms while explaining their poetic concepts. Among them are Jagannātha, Yajñeśvara, Devaśaṅkara, Viśvanāthadeva, Viśveśvara Paṇḍita and Śobhākara Mitra whose works are well-known and are available to us in a published form. Because of the incorporation of the Nyāya terms which have particular significance and connotation these works have not attracted as many scholars as they otherwise should. Some of the technical terms are illustrated and explained below :

1. *Avyāpyavṛttitvam*

In RG, Jagannātha, while discussing the adjective *adoṣau* of Mammaṭa's definition of poetry, remarks as follows:

न च संयोगाभाववान्वृक्षः संयोगीतिवदंशभेदेन। दोषरहितं दुष्टमिति व्यवहारे बाधकं नास्तीति वाच्यम्। 'मूले महीरुहो विहंगमसंयोगी, न शाखायाम्' इति प्रतीतेरेवेदं पद्यं पूर्वार्धे काव्यमुत्तरार्धे तु न काव्यमिति स्वरसवाहिनो विश्वजनीनानुभवस्य विरहादव्याप्यवृत्तिताया अपि तस्यायोगात्। (RG. p.8)

Here the term of our special interest is *Avyāpyavṛttitva*. The author of *Tarkadīpikā* defines *Avyāpyavṛttiva* as *svātyntābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇatvam* (simultaneous presence of *saṁyoga* in one locus of the referent of *sva-pada* and its absence in other loci).

In the Nyāyaśāstra relations are broadly divided into two categories, *Vṛttiniyāmaka* (occurance-exacting) and *Vṛtyaniyāmaka* (non-occurance-exacting). *Saṁyoga* is a *vṛttiniyāmakasaṁbandha*. This relation is known as a relation of incomplete occurance *(avyāpyavṛtti)*.[24] Because when a contact takes place between two substances, it occurs only in a part of them. When Jagannātha discusses the term *adoṣau (iṣadarthe nañ)* he gives an example of this *Avyāpyavṛtti* nature of *saṁyoga*. He uses this technical term and his words remind one of the definitions of this type as given by a famous Nyāya work, *Siddhāntalakṣaṇa* of Gaṅgeśopādhyāya. The term is as follows :

अयं कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यादिसंग्रहायऽसमानाधिकरणान्तम्।

(p.90)

अयं कपिसंयोगी एतद्वृक्षत्वादित्यत्र हेत्वधिकरणिभूतैतद्वृक्षे मूलावच्छेदेन कपिसंयोगाभावस्य विद्यमानत्वात्।

When a monkey is sitting on a branch of a tree, both the presence and the absence of *kapisaṁyoga* are present in the tree. Presence of monkey on the particular branch and the absence of it in other parts of the tree, like its root etc.

Therefore, *saṁyoga* of the monkey and the tree is of an *avyāpyavṛtti* nature. Similarly, persons who argue the *adoṣau* means having absence of defect in one part of the poetry and presence of it in another, define it as *duṣṭam kāvyam* but this is not correct, says Jagannātha, because in the case of poetry the experience that some part contains defect and some does not is not universally accepted. Hence, *doṣa* in the definition of poetry is not of the nature of *avyāpyavṛttitva*.

2. *Avacchedaka*

The conception of *avacchedaka* in Navya-Nyāya is of utmost importance from the point of view of subtle analysis of ideas and their accurate expression. Though the term *Avacchedaka* in Navya-Nyāya is generally used in highly technical sense, yet instances are not rare in which the term has been used only in the sense of an adjective. Thus, if we want to make someone to understand each and every case of fire or all the cases of fire as distinguished from the pot or any other object, then, according to the Navya-Nyāya technique, we would say *vahnitvāvacchinna*.

वह्नित्वावच्छिन्नस्य सर्वस्यैव धूमादिमन्निष्ठाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभुततद् तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नत्वात्।

(*Siddhāntalakṣaṇa Jāgadīśi,* p.209)

In this expression *vahnitva* or fireness is understood to be the *avacchedaka* (limitor) of *vahni*. Here *vahnitva* is an adjective of *vahni* in as much as it differentiates *vahni* from other objects. In this general sense *avacchedaka* may be defined as that property which itself being one of the primary meanings of a term, differentiates the primary meaning of that term from other objects. *Avacchedaka* also means a determining attribute.

Viśvanātha uses the term *avacchedaka* to clarify the difference between *Rūpaka* and *Pariṇāma*. He says :

अत एव रूपके आरोप्यस्यावच्छेदकत्वमात्रेणान्वयः।
अत्र तु तादात्म्येन। (SD. X. p.26)

When we say *mukham candraḥ* what the word *candra* effects is simply to tell us that the face is one which possesses most of the qualities of the moon and it is similar to it. It serves to distinguish the particular face from other faces which do not possess any similarity of the moon. Hence in *Rūpaka* what is superimposed *(upamāna)* is construed simply as characterising or distingushing the subject; but in *Pariṇāma,* the thing superimposed *(āropya)* is construed as being completely identical.

Viśveśvara Paṇḍita also uses the term while discussing *Rūpaka alaṅkāra* :

उपमानतावच्छेदकस्योपमेयतावच्छेदकसामानाधिकरण्यप्रतीतेरेव विवक्षितत्वात्। (*Alaṅkāramuktāvali*, p.14)

Viśvanāthadeva uses the term as follows :

उपमेयतावच्छेदकनिषेधविषयिका उपमेये उपमानतावच्छेदकधर्म प्रतीतिः। (SSS, p.433)

3. Siddhasādhana

Vidyādhara in his *Ekāvali* refutes the views of the opponents of the *dhvani* theory on the basis of two logical faults called *Siddhasādhana* and *vyāghāta* which are generally mentioned by the Naiyāyikas. The *Nyāyakoṣa* defines *Siddhasādhana* as :

सिषाधयिषाया असत्त्वे प्रमाणान्तरेणावगतार्थसाधनम् अनुमानम्। यथा पर्वते वह्निनिश्चयानन्तरमपि पुनस्तत्साधनाय विहितं पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमात् इत्यनुमानम्। (p. 1019)

Abhāvavādins deny *dhvani* on the strength of the argument that it is not found in some places. This argument, says Vidyādhara, is opened to the fault of *siddhasādhana* for proving what is already proved. It is admitted that *dhvani* does not exist in *Citrakāvya*. If *dhvani* is considered as

apprehended and further denied because it is not found anywhere, it leads to the fault *Vyāghāta.*[25]

4. *Vinigamanā*

Vinigamanā is a Nyāya technical term. The *Nyāyakoṣa* defines it as *anyatarapakṣapātinī yukti.*

Jagannātha uses this term repeatedly in his RG.

We may consider one example below :

रचनावर्णानां तु पदवाक्यान्तर्गतत्वेन व्यञ्जकतावच्छेदककोटिप्रविष्टत्वमेव न तु व्यञ्जकत्वमिति यद्यपि सुवचम्, तथापि पदवाक्यविशिष्टरचनात्वेन, रचनाविशिष्टपदवाक्यत्वेन वा व्यञ्जकत्वमिति विनिगमनाविरहेण घटादौ दण्डचक्रादेः कारणत्वस्यैव प्रत्येकमेव व्यञ्जकतायाः सिद्धिरिति प्राञ्चः। (RG. p. 113)

While deciding the factors which are the suggestors of *dhvani* Jagannātha refers to the view of the old ones and says that there is no *Vinigamanā*, the argument definitely proving any one side whether *vyañjaktva* resides in *padavākya* characterised by *racanā* and *varṇas* or in *racanā* and *varṇa,* characterised by *pada* and *vākya*. Therefore, just as *daṇḍa, cakra* etc., elements are considered to be the cause of *ghaṭa,* similarly all the elements like *pada, vākya, racanā* etc., should be considered as the suggestors.

VI.8. Navya-Nyāya Methods

1. *Śābdabodha*

Śābdabodha means the verbal knowledge of a sentence. The term is explained as -*śabdajanyam śābdam, śābdaścāsau bodhaśca śābdabodhaḥ* i.e. the knowledge which is generated by the causal factor i.e. *śabda* is called *śābdabodha.* It is the apprehension of sentence-meaning *(vākyārthabodha).* A *vākya* is a collection of *padas.* The meaning of a *vākya* is understood by remembering the meanings of the individual words constituting that *vākya.* But the relation existing among those individual meanings is not understood when

they are individually remembered. Hence, the understanding of the relation is a new product when the *vākya* is understood. So *śābdabodha* means the comprehension of the relation of the meanings of *padas (anvayābodha)*.

The Navya-Naiyāyikas have propounded independent theory of *Śābdabodha*. According to them, only a determinate cognition *(savikalpakajñāna)* is embodied in, and conveyed by a sentence. Every sentence comprises of at least a subject *(uddeśya)* and a predicate *(vidheya)*. In *Śābdabodha* arising in hearer's mind from a sentence, the meaning of the chief substantive or qualificand in the nominative case plays the role of the leading concept *(mukhyaviśeṣya)* and all other concepts are directly or indirectly subordinate to it. The cognition arising from a sentence is always non-perceptual and the additional elements conveyed by a sentence, over and above the seperate concepts conveyed by separate words is the intended relation of the concept *(padārthasaṁsarga)*. This additional element which is the distinctive feature of *Śābdabodha* is conveyed through the particular juxtaposition of words *(saṁsargamaryādā)* and not through the denotative or indicative power of words. For example, the *Śābdabodha* of a simple sentence like; *caitraḥ grāmam gacchati* will be as follows :

एकत्वावच्छिन्नग्रामनिष्ठसंयोगानुकूलव्यापारानुकूलकृतिमान् चैत्रः।

In this sentence Caitra is the chief qualificand *(mukhyaviśeṣya)* and other meanings are qualifiers. Caitra is the agent and is the substratum of the agentness *(kartṛtva)* which is the meaning of *tiñ*, the verbal suffix *(ākhyātapratyaya)*. *Kartṛtva* is related to Caitra by the relation of *samavāya*. The meaning of the root *gam* 'go' is the activity *(vyāpāra)* conducive to the contact *(saṁyoga)* of the agent with the destination. The *phala* viz., the contact of the agent with the destination and *vyāpāra* are the meanings of the *dhātu*. *Vyāpāra* is related to the *kartṛtva* by the relation called *anukūlatā*. *Saṁyoga* is related to *vyāpāra* by the

relation *janyatā* or *anukūlatā*. The meaning of the substantive, *grāma* is the village and the meaning of *'am'* the accusative case endings is *karmatva* and *ekatvasaṁkhyā*. The *saṁkhyā* is related to *grāma* by the relation of *paryāpti*. The import of village is related to *karmatva* by the relation of *ādheyatā*. The *karmatva* is related to *saṁyoga* by the relation of *āśraya*. Thus finally we get the *śābdabodha* as stated above.

With this background let us now examine how Jagannātha employes the method of *Śābdabodha* in his RG.

While treating the prominent figures of speech like *Upamā, Rūpaka* etc., Jagannātha gives *Śābdabodhas* of the *alaṅkāras* and thereby attempts to bring out subtle distinctions between the figurative statements. In this task he follows mainly the Naiyāyikas though he also shows the *Śābdabodha prakāras* accepted by the Vaiyākarṇas and the Mīmāṁsakas. As an example of the *Śābdadodha, Upamā alaṅkāra* is given below:

अरविन्दनिरूपितसादृश्यप्रयोजकाभिन्नसोन्दर्यवदभिन्नमिति मुखम्।

(RG. p. 246)

Here, the expression अरविन्दसुन्दरं मुखं or अरविन्दमिव मुखं सुन्दरम् may apparently brings out *sādṛśya* in the same manner but there is some subtle difference underlying these expressions. Jagannātha gives the *Śābdabodha* according to the prācīna as well as the Navya-Naiyāyaikas. The Navya Naiyāyikas believe that *sādṛśya* is something different from the common property. The ancient ones, however, think that *sādṛśa* is identical with the common property. For example, in मुखं चन्द्र इव, *sādṛśya* is nothing but the common property of *saundarya* existing between the moon and the face and therefore this *sādṛśya* is not an independent *padārtha*.

Jagannātha first elucidates the example of *samāsagatopamā* i.e. *aravinda sundaram*. In the proposition according to the well-known rule निपातातिरिक्तनामार्थयोरभेदान्वयः, *abhedānyaya* is to be accepted between *aravinda* and *sundara*

which would result in the *Śābdabodha* अरविन्दाभिन्नसुन्दरम्। But such a *Śābdabodha* is prevented because in that case the word *sundara* being an adjective should have *pūrvanipāta* according to the rule विशेषणं विशेष्येण बहुलम् and उपसर्जनं पूर्वम्[26] and so the *samāsa* would have been *sundarāravindam*. Jagannātha contends that the part *aravinda* in the compound conveys by *Abhidhā* lotus only. Since the word *iva* in the *vigrahavākya,* is elided the word *aravinda* itself conveys the sense i.e. *prayojaka* is related to the part of the sense *sundara* i.e. *sundaratva* through *tādātmyasaṁbandha*. The whole sense of the proposition is : अरविन्दनिरुपितसादृश्यप्रयोजका- भिन्नसौन्दर्यवदभिन्नं (मुखम्)।

Thus following the Naiyāyikas Jagannātha gives *prathamāntamukhyaviśeṣyaka śābdabodha* of *Upamā alaṅkāra*.

This attempt of Jagannātha is remarkable. It appears from the study of his work that the *Śābdabodha* method for him is not an exhibition of his technical erudition of śāstras as it may appear to a casual reader of first sight. Ramaswamy Shastri rightly remarks:[27]

The distinction between one figures of speech and another as explained by their definitions can be easily known from the forms of *Śābdabodha* that are arrived at from the statement containing this figures.

Jagannātha has been successful in handeling the method of *Śābdabodha* for exploring the special traits of the figurative statements. Strangely, however, P.Sri Ramachandrudu remarks :[28]

"This śāstra (i.e. Alaṅkāraśāstra) has gained nothing by the introduction of this *prakriyā.*"

But this does not seem to be correct. *Śābdabodha* being a śāstric method had indeed helped in making logical analysis of the figurative statements more sharp and accurate and

adding a greater clarity to the understanding of the essential characteristics of the figures of speech.

2. ***Anugama***

Anugama is also a method of Navya-Nyāya logic. The term *Anugama* means comprehension of objects in common form *(anugatarupeṇa sarvasaṅgraha)*. *Anugama* is defined by Bhīmācārya as a common connotation, for example, all the *ghaṭas* have got the common connotation in the form of the generic character like *ghaṭatva*[29]. Mathurānātha Trakavāgiśa defines *Anugama* as a common statement. But it is used as a method by the Navya-Naiyāyikas to make the definition free from all kinds of possible ambiguities and to make it easily comprehensible. It is applied for making a single statement including diverse objects of the same category as well as of the different category. There are two types of *Anugama* i.e. *saṁsargamudrayānugama* and *Prakāramudrayānugama*. In the first type of *Anugama* a component part of a relation is qualified by another relation, the component part of that relation is again qualified by another relation and thereby a common statement through the process of relation is made. It is done for the sake of avoiding possible defect of the statement and also for making the statement universal. The second type of *Anugama* is through the process of mentioning the *prakāra* with a view to eliminating the undesirable objects for making the statement free from doubts.

This method is useful for making clarification of object and giving it a general form without leaving any scope for ambiguity. In this connection Guha says :[30]

This method of *Anugama* had subsequently become very popular with the Sanskrit scholars in other fields of Sanskrit study also. The new school of grammarians in particular and almost all the scholars in other subjects of

Sanskrit in general, were so fond of this technique of *Anugama* that even a casual reader of the new school of Sanskrit study in any branch would undoubtedly be convinced of the situation.

Jagannātha gives the definitions of *kāvya* as रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः। (RG. p.93) In this if the meaning of the word *ramaṇīya* is to be understood in the general sense the defect *ativyāpti* arises because the statements like 'you are blessed with a son' etc., are sources of pleasure. Hence they will be *kāvya*. To avoid this he explains the *ramaṇīyatā* as लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकज्ञानगोचरता। The pleasure that is derived from the above statement is only *Laukika* in as much as it is directly caused by a particular man's worldly prosperity and so it is quite personal. Again Jagannātha makes *lokottaratva* as synonym to *camatkāra-kāritva* and accepts it to be a *jātiviśeṣa* to avoid the lack of *Anugama*. This *camatkāratva* should be realised only through one's experience and cannot be described in words. This kind of *lokottarāhlāda* is the result of *Bhāvanā* which is no other than the constant contemplation. Here by substituting the word *Bhāvanā* for *jñana* Jagannātha slightly modifies his previous statement :

चमत्कारजनकभावनाविषयार्थप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वम्।

(RG. p.5)

And this has been necessitated by the following reason. There may be some *samūhālambanajñāna* comprising of two co-ordinate thought of which one may be of *ramaṇīyārtha* and the other of *aramaṇiyārtha*. This kind of *samūhālambana jñāna* also will have to be taken as *camatkārajanaka jñāna*. Such cases are excluded by replacing *jñāna* by *Bhāvanā*. *Bhāvanā* being chain of cognitions, it can be connected only with *ramaṇīyārthas*, under special circumstances. In other words one may be thinking of a particular object again and again for a long time only if it is beautiful as only beautiful objects can be the *viṣaya* of *Bhāvanā*. Thus by substituting

the word *jñāna* by *Bhāvanā* Jagannātha modifies his definition as shown above.

Jagannātha gives two more amplified forms of the definition as follows :

1. यत्प्रतिपादितार्थविषयकभावनात्वं चमत्कारजनकतावच्छेदकं तत्त्वम्। (RG. p.5.)
2. स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतासंसर्गेण चमत्कारत्ववत्त्वम्।

The second definition is made in *Anugama* style. Not content with first Jagannātha gives second amplification in *Anugama* style. He feels that the first one is much cumbersome because it contains *yacchabda* and *tacchabda,* which being the words of uncertain meanings, hinder the *Anugama.* Therefore, he gives the second modified *lakṣaṇa* which is comparatively simple according to the tradition of Naiyāyikas as there will be no need of bringing many things into *Śābdabodha* as in the case of the first form of *Lakṣaṇa.* Thus the final *Lakṣaṇa* is :

स्वविशिष्टजनकतावच्छेदकार्थप्रतिपादकतासंसर्गेण चमत्कारत्ववत्त्वम्।

(RG. p.5.)

Thus, after defining *kāvya* as चमत्कारत्ववत्त्व Jagannātha specifies further and narrows down the meaning of *ramaṇīyatā* to characterise the poetic delight exactly by thrice resorting to the *Anugama* technique of the Naiyāyikas.

We can adduce many more examples from Jagannātha and other poeticians of this later period but that is not necessary. Our aim in this chapter was to illustrate how the Nyāya methodology, style, terminology and concepts have pervaded the warps and woofs of the fabrics of the Nyāya terms and concepts and illustrating them from the works of poetics in the foregoing pages, we hope, we have succeeded in our aim.

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   NBh. on NyS I. 2.1.
3. प्रमाणतर्कसाधनोपालम्भः सिद्धान्ताविरुद्धः पञ्चावयवोपपन्नः पक्षप्रतिपक्षपरिग्रहो वादः। NyS. I. 2.1.
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   NyS. I. 2.2.
5. स प्रतिपक्षस्थापनाहिनो वितण्डा। NyS. I. 2.3.
6. NBh. on NyS I. 2.2.
7. Solomon E, *Indian Dialectics,* Vol. I.p.36.
8. त्रिविधा चास्य शास्त्रस्य प्रवृत्तिः उद्देशो लक्षणं परीक्षा चेति।
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CHAPTER VII

BUDDHIST LOGIC AND SANSKRIT POETICS

In the preceding chapters some aspects of the influence of Nyāya philosophy have been analysed in general. In some cases we have tried to particularise the influence of particular Naiyāyikas or their works on the basis of the quotations or some similarity wherever the fact is very clear. When we are not clear we have discussed them in general under the influence of Nyāyaśāstra. Here, in this chapter we particularly make an attempt to trace the influence of Buddhist logic on Sanskrit Poetics.

While considering the influence of Buddhist logic on Sanskrit Poetics the first question arises: who among the poeticians are actually Buddhists. There are no concrete historical evidences on the basis of which poeticians can be determined as Buddhists. Therefore different scholars have come forward with differing claims and conjuctures. If some say that famous poeticians like Bhāmaha and Diṅnāga etc., are Buddhists and belong to the tradition of Buddhist poeticians, there are other scholars who do not accept this view. However, one has to admit the fact that there is definitely some, at least partial influence of Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist logic on many of the Sanskrit

poeticians. In the development of Sanskrit poetics not only the Hindus but Buddhists have also made inportant contribution. So in Sanskrit poetics we find different traditions or systems such as Buddhist tradition of Sanskrit poetics. The Brahminic tradition of Sanskrit poetics is well-known and makers of this system are mainly Brahmins, the followers of Hindu religion and philosophy. They are, to mention a few, Bharata, Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka and many others. Similarly, the poeticians like Bhāmaha, Śilameghavarma, Saṅgharakṣita etc., are said to be the poeticians of Buddhist tradition.[1] But it is unfortunate that the works of most of these poeticians are not available; they are completely lost to the posterity. Except the first one they are known only from the references made to them by other poeticians. It is not possible to make proper study of these writers in the absence of their works. We shall have, therefore, to sastisfy ourselves only with a broad survey-study of some important Buddhist poetic concepts woven in the fabrics of the general system of Sanskrit poetics.

VII.1 Bhāmaha

Bhāmaha, the author of KA is one of such authors. As the oldest extant poeticians after Bharata, he occupies a place of prominence in the history of Sanskrit poetics. He first laid down normative rules of *Alaṅkāras* and started the *Alaṅkāra* school. He is not only a poetician but a great philosopher theorist also. He is said to be influenced by the Buddhist logic as set out by Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga. Of all the poeticians, Bhāmaha seems to be the foremost to accept the viewpoints set forth in the Buddhist logic. K. Krishnamoorthy[2] makes some arguments in support of this supposition. We summarise them here as follows:

1. Bhāmaha begins KA with a salutation to one who is given exclusive epithet *sārva* and *sarvajña*[3]. Later we see him

deriving both the words, *sārva* and *sarvajña* from *sārva* in the sense of doing good to others by adding the affix *saṁ* as mentioned by Kātyāyana in his *Vārttika.*[4] Though according to *Amarakośa, sārva* can denote both Śiva and Buddha equally,[5] the compassionate quality of working for the weal of the entire world is Buddha's exclusive epithet. Prajñākaragupta's salutation to Buddha in his *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* makes it clear as :

प्रमाणभूताय जगद्धितैषिणे प्रणम्य शास्त्रे सुगताय तायिने।

It is further proved by the following verse of Maṅgala in praise of Buddha cited by Śrīdharadāsa in his *Saduktikaraṇāmṛta*[6] :

यदाख्यानासङ्गादुषसि पुनते वाचमृषयो
यदीयः सङ्कल्पो हृदि सुकृतिनामेव रमते।
स सार्वः सर्वज्ञः पथिनिरपवादे कृतपदो
जिनो जन्तूनुच्चैर्दमयतु भवावर्तपतितान्।।

Here both the epithets in question are exclusively applied to Buddha in close succession. Taking into consideration this view we can say that Bhāmaha pays homage to Buddha as he was a Buddhist poetician.

2. Bhāmaha devotes almost the whole of the fifth chapter of the KA to a detailed discussion of the rules of *pramāṇas* viz., *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. The whole account is modelled after the Buddhist logic of Diṅnāga. It is generally admitted that the acceptance of only two *pramāṇas* is an innovation first introduced only by Diṅnāga. There are only two *pramāṇas* accepted in Sauntrantic thought initiated by Diṅnāga and extended further by the followers such as Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. Bhāmaha cites them from Diṅnāga himself almost verbatim.

सत्त्वादयः प्रमाणाभ्यां प्रत्यक्षमनुमा च ते।
असाधारणसामान्यविषयत्वं तयोः किल।।

(KA. V. 5)

Diṅnāga and his successors admit only two *pramāṇas,* viz, *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa.* The former is the subject of only bare sensation or perception and the latter which involves names and forms having universal application is experienced only because of inference. This is also another point proving Bhāmaha's greater affinity for the views of Buddhist logic.

3. Diṅnāga's definition of perception as *kalpanāpoḍham* is also cited verbatim by Bhāmaha in the same place of his work i.e. V. 6a. Immediately on the heels of it he follows the view of Vasubandhu indicated by the first two words of his definition viz. *tato'rthāt* the other words left out being *rūpādestata eveti nānyataḥ.* Vasubandhu was out and out a Vijñānavādin holding reality only subjective in *samjñā* (sense). *Pratyakṣa,* according to this view, becomes the real subjective experience, arising from the internal sensation of external things. Again, Bhāmaha explains the idea of *kalpanā* in Diṅnāga's own words viz., *nāmajātyādi* etc.

कल्पनां नामजात्यादियोजनां प्रतिजानते।

(KA. V. 6b)

4. Bhāmaha illustrates *hetuvirodhinī pratijñā* with two statements, one from Vedānta and other from Sāṁkhya.[7] *Ātman* exists *(asti ātmā)* is the position of Vedānta, and *prakṛti* exists *(asti prakṛtiḥ)* is the position of Sāṁkhya. Bhāmaha says that in both the above statements subject *(dharmi)* of the proposition is unestablished and as such what is predicated of an unestablished subject also becomes unestablished. This makes it likely that Bhāmaha is following possibly the *anātmavādīn* Buddhist logical tradition.

5. Bhāmaha is seen rejecting the Buddhist doctrine of *Apoha* as constituting the essence of all word-meanings.[8] It should be noted that *apohavāda* is a distinctive feature of Diṅnāga's logic. In earlier Buddhist texts we do not find any reference to it. Bhāmaha redicules this doctrine by stating that if the *gauḥ* were mean no positive cow but only exclusive of all others than cow *(agotvapratiṣedha)* it would became incumbent on the listener to seek out another word to be aware positively of the cow as such. One and the same word cannot denote both positive and negative entities simultaneously. According to Bhāmaha it is natural to think that the positive meaning should precede the negative exclusion. This refutation indirectly proves Bhāmaha's deep knowledge of Buddhist logic and reveals independence of his mind.

6. Bhāmaha's incidental remarks as a literary theorist evoked a detailed notice and rebutal at the hands of professional philosophers like Śāntarakṣita who were adherents of Diṅnga's logic developed by Dharmakīrti. In the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Bhāmaha is expressely named and his criticism of *apohavāda* are answered at considerable length by Śāntarakṣita[9]. This shows that though Bhāmaha was a poetician his views were considered seriously in the Buddhist philosophical tradition. This could not have been the case, if Bhāmaha were considered as belonging to a non-Buddhist poetic tradition.

7. The Buddhist philosophers do not accept soul as an independent entity and therefore they are known as *anātmavādins*. Bhāmaha, like Buddhists, does not accept poetic elements. Bhāmaha seems therefore to be revealing a strong influence of the Buddhist tradition of logic which advocated the theory of *anātmavāda*.

8. Bhāmaha himself admits in his work that his father's name was Rukrila Gomin.[10] This name sounds much nearer to other Buddhistic names like Rahula, Somila, Potrila etc.

Apart from this, Gomin is one of the prominent disciples of Lord Buddha. Therefore, this particular name also indicates the possibility of Bhāmaha being a Buddhist. Secondly, the name of Bhāmaha's son, according to M.Krishnamacarya, is probably Maskari[11]. This name also confirms his being a Buddhist.

As far as our study goes Krishnamoorthy is absolutely right in viewing Bhāmaha as a Buddhist Logician.

VII.2 Śaṅkuka

As far as the influence of Buddhist Logic is concerned we cannot neglect Śaṅkuka, a figure of great prominence. There is no doubt that the Rasa-theory of Śaṅkuka has been developed upon the background of the Nyāya theory of *Anumāna*. But the question arises : what is that logical system under the influence of which he has postulated his *Rasānumitivāda*. Since Śaṅkuka does not leave for us any direct clue and since Śaṅkuka flourishes during a period of transition when prācīna Nyāya was at its peak, Buddhist logic was in full swing and the back-ground for Navya-Nyāya was beginning to be prepared, it is difficult to get a correct answer. However, there are some indications in Abhinava's presentation of his views that points to a possibility of his learning towards the Buddhist system of logic.

1. According to Śaṅkuka *Rasa* is the latent emotion *(Sthāyibhāva)* imitated by the actor. *Rasa* originally does not reside in the actor. But the spectators consider him as Rāma. In fact there is no real presence of *Rasa* in the actor but the spectator thinks him as Rāma by means of *citraturaganyāya*. He, therefore, gets involved with it and thinks Naṭa's happiness, miseries etc., as those of the character (Rāma).[12] According to the spectators this knowledge is different from all the four types of knowledge viz., *samyakjñāna, mithyājñāna, saṁśayajñāna* and *sādṛśyajñāna*.

Śaṅkuka admits this fact and therefore the question occurs to him how is it that the spectators experience happiness on the basis of false knowledge. To put it into technical language how false knowledge leads to *arthakriyā* (practical behaviour). To serve this problem, Śaṅkuka follows Dharmakīrti and quotes the following kārikā from his PV :

मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः ।

मिथ्याज्ञानाविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ।।

(II.57)

2. The *citraturaganyāya* employed by Śaṅkuka to explain his theory is the special feature of Buddhist logic. As *rajjusarpanyāya* has been used by the Vedāntins to illustrate their theory of superimposition so also Buddhist logicians apply *citraturaganyāya* to ellucidate their theory of illusion. Unlike Hindu Naiyāyikas Buddhist do not admit *sāmānya* as a special category. But they consider it as a non-existence *(abhāvarūpa)*. According to Naiyāyikas, *sāmānya* is *ekākārapratīti*, cognition of oneness of form in various individuals e.g. the realisation of potness in various pots. According to them, *sāmānya* is independent and internal category but Buddhists do not admit this *sāmānya* as a separate category. It is only of the nature of *sāmānya*. The non-difference which is experienced among the different *ghaṭas* is due to the function of the spectator's sight. The truth-seeker finds difference among them. The Buddhists give an example of *citradarśana* (picture scene) to show how a person finds identity between two different objects. The observer of a picture finds identity between two different objects viz., the original *ghaṭa* and the painted *ghaṭa*. Buddhist Vijñānavādins are of the view that anything either *gauḥ* or *ghaṭaḥ* or *turaga* in a picture is an *upādhi* (adjunct) of *vijñāna*. Since the lines, colour etc., of a painted pot seem

to be non-difference from a real pot, one is not able to differentiate it. But, to a wise person the difference is clrearly visible. Dharmakīrti has illustrated the nature of this *nyāya* in his PV.

नीलादिश्चित्रविज्ञाने ज्ञानोपाधिरनन्यभाक्।
अशक्यदर्शनस्तं हि पतत्यर्थे विवेचनम्।।

3. While Bhaṭṭa Tauta, the teacher of Abhinavagupta refutes the Rasa-theory of Śaṅkuka, he seems to consider him as a Buddhist. A number of evidences are available in the ABh. Bhaṭṭa Tauta gives four alternatives for the refutation of the theory of imitation *(Anukaraṇavāda)*. Among them one is of *vyākhyātṛviśeṣa*. By saying : व्याख्यातारः खल्वेवं विवेचयन्ति, he is quoting Dharmakīrti. The text of Dharmakīrti runs thus:

ननु बाह्या विवेकिनः, न च तेषु विकल्पप्रवृत्तिः, कथं तेषु भवतीति? व्याख्यातारः खल्वेवं विवेचयन्ति, न तु व्यवहर्तारः। ते तु स्वावलम्बनमेव अर्थक्रियायोग्यं मन्यमानाः विकल्प्यार्थाविकीकृत्य प्रवर्तन्ते। तदभिप्रायवशादेवमुच्यते। तथा तत्कारितयाऽतत्कारिभ्यो भिन्नान् शब्देन प्रतिपादयन्तीत्युच्यते। तत्त्वचिन्तकास्तु प्रतिभासाभेदादिभ्यो नाभेदमनुसधत्ते। *Pramāṇavārttika-vṛtti*., p.170-1

While discussing the *sāmānya*, Dharmakīrti considers it from two points of view, one *vyavahartā puruṣa* and other *vyākhyātā*. In the same way Bhaṭṭa Tauta refutes from four points of view viz., *sāmājika, naṭa, vyākhyātā* and Bharata. Tauta's statement implies that even if Śaṅkuka follows the *sidhānta* of Buddhist phitosopher Dharmakīrti, *Rasa* cannot be proved as *anukaraṇarūpa*.

5. In the refutation of Śaṅkuka's view one line seems to be significant : नर्तकान्तरेऽपि च रामोऽयमिति प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति। ततश्च रामत्वं सामान्यरुपमित्यायातम्। (ABh.p. 269).

Bhaṭṭa Tauta argues here that if Śaṅkuka's argument is accepted then different actors on different stages will have to be considered as *rāmoyam* and therefore the *rāmatva* in the from of a universal *(sāmāṅya)* will have to be unavoidably admitted. The implication of the words *rāmatvam sāmānyarūpamityāyātam* is that Śaṅkuka does not and cannot admit *sāmānya* which is the position of the Buddhist logician. Tauta thus indirectly indicates to Śaṅkuka being a Buddhist thinker.

6. Lollaṭa accepts *rasa* to be the *upacitasthāyi* existing in the poetic character. Thus he admits two conditions viz., the *upacita* (accumulated) and *anupacita* (unaccumulated) of sthāyi (permanent emotion). While refuting this Śaṅkuka holds that the *anupacita* condition cannot be apprehended because in that condition there is no conjuction of *vibhāvādi* with *sthāyi*. When the conjunction takes place, that condition turns into the state of *upacita*. *Vibhāvādi* happen to be the liṅgas indicating the state of *bhāva*. In the *anupacita* state when there are no *vibhāvādi*, the knowledge of *sthāyi* cannot arise in the absence of the liṅgas.[13]

This argument of Śaṅkuka seems to be having relation with the Buddhist doctrine. Buddhist philosophers admit only two *pramāṇas* - *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. The *anupacita* state which Lollaṭa admits as *sthāyi* cannot be perceived as it is internal *bhāvātmaka* and there cannot be any inference of it without *vibhāvādi* which act as *lingas*. There is no other *pramāṇa* to prove this state. Thus the argument of Śaṅkuka gives an indication of his Buddhist background.

7. The Vijñānavādin Buddhist philosophers do not admit the existence of any other object except *buddhi* or *jñāna*. Dharmakrti says that there is no difference between blue colour and the knowledge of the blue colour. The external objects which appear to be different from knowledge

is an illusion and just an appearance of *jñāna* itself. The *nīlātmaka* knowledge itself takes place as the external blue object which appear to be existing. According to Dharmakīrti *arthasārūpya* is the means of knowledge. The existence of *nīla* is inferred on the basis if *nīlasārūpya* or *arthasārāpya.*[14] Similarly the person who admits the existence of external objects admit *bhāva* or *artha* as the producer of *jñāna*[15]. So according to them *jñāna* precedes *bhāva* and according to Vijnānavādins, *bhāva* precedes *jñāna.*[16] Thus there are two types of *vijñāna*, *vyavahārabuddhi* and *tāttvikabuddhi*. As per the *vyavahārabuddhi*, bhāva precedes *jñāna* and according to the *tāttvikabuddhi*, *jñāna* precedes *bhāva*. Now, while Bharata in the sixth chapter of NS raises a question whether *bhāva* arises from *rasa* or *rasa* arises from *bhāva*, he gives the following answer keeping its critics in view :

किं रसेभ्यो भावानामभिवृत्तिरुताहो भावेभ्यो रसानामिति। केषाचिन्मतं परस्परसम्बन्धादेषामभिनिवृतिरिति। तन्न। कस्मात्। दृश्यते हि भावेभ्यो रसानामभिनिवृतिर्न तु रसेभ्य भावानामभिनिवृत्तिरिति।

ABh. P.286

In this connection the criticism of Śaṅkuka seems to be based on the Buddhist ideas. He admits the production of *bhāvas* from *rasa* as is clear from the following text:

श्रीशङ्कुकस्ताह-अनुकर्त्तरि रसानास्वादयन्तोऽनुकार्ये भावप्रतीतिः प्रयोगे। लोके प्रकृतिःरसं निष्पादयतीति। द्वितीयपक्षो नाट्यचार्या----------

ABh.p.283

Śaṅkuka admits that first of all the *sāmājika* experiences the *anukriyamāṇa rasa* in *anukartā* and after that the knowledge of *bhāva* in relation with *anukārya*. Therefore, from the point of view of *sāmājika, bhāva* arises from *rasa,* while from the *vyavahāra* or *laukika* point of view it is said that *rasa* arises out of perception of *bhāva* (which is called *prakṛti* in the above statement).

Here, two points appear to be similar with the Buddhist thoughts. One is the discussion of the relation of *rasa* and *bhāva* from the *vyāvahārika* and *laukika* point of view as well as from that of *vyākhyāṭā* and *ālocaka* and other is the acceptance of *rasa* in the form of knowledge as the producer of *bhāvas*. Further, Śaṅkuka's thesis of *janya-janaka* is nothing but *vyavasthāpya-vyavasthāpaka* nature as it is known from the statement of Dharmottarācārya :

न चात्र जन्यजनकभावनिबन्धनः, साध्यसाधनभावः, अपितु व्यवस्थाप्यव्यवस्थापकभावेन।

(Darmottara on *Hetubindu,* p.276.)

8. While refuting the *anukaraṇavāda* of Śaṅkuka from the point of view of *vastuvṛtta, vivecaka* and *vyākhyātā* Bhaṭṭa Tauta has definitely kept in view the Buddhist thoughts. In the experience of *sāmānya* while *vyavahartā* observes identity *vivecaka* observes difference. Similar is the case with the perception of a picture. *Sāmājika* does not make any difference between *naṭa* and *Rāma,* it is the *vivecaka* who finds a difference there. Keeping this in view Tauta says :

नापि वस्तुवृत्तानुसारेण तदनुकारत्वम्, अनुसंवेद्यमानस्य वृत्तत्वानुपपत्तेः।

(ABh. 276)

Sāmājika cannot concentrate on the *vastutattva* because of his deep involvement with the realisation of *rasa.* Here Bhaṭṭa Tauta presents his view of *vastutattva* in the light of the ideas of Dharmakīrti.

9. The terms and language used by Śaṅkuka also give an indication of the influence of Buddhist logic. The terms like *samyakjñāna* which is used by the philosophers like Dharmakīrti with a specific meaning in the palce of *yathārthajñāna* in the age when Śaṅkuka flourished and Buddhist logic was in its full swing definitely bear some significance. All these arguments prove that Śaṅkuka's *rasa* theory has deep relation with the philosophy of Dharmakīrti.

VII.3. Ānandavardhana

1. Ānandavardhana in his Dh.A shows evidences of his close acquaintance with the works of Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician. His following stanza :

मुख्यां वृत्तिं परित्यज्य गुणवृत्त्यार्थदर्शनम्।
यदुद्दिश्य फलं तत्र शब्दो नैव स्खलद्गतिः।। I.17

has close connection with the following stanza :

यत्रा रूढ़या सदर्थोऽपि जनैः शब्दो निवेशितः।
स मुख्यस्तत्र तत्साम्याद् गौणोऽन्यत्र स्खलद्गतिः।।

(PV.II.37)

2. Ānandavardhana refers to the *kṛtrimasaṁbandhavādinaḥ* (scholars who accept a conventional relation between words and their senses). Here, the Buddhist logicians must have been meant along with other Naiyāyikas. Abhinava in his *Locana*[17] also refers to PV.III.91, which may be taken as an evidence. He quotes the *kārikā* in full in a separate context.[18] Abhinava in his *Locana* refers to another verse attributed to Dharmakīrti[19] by Ānandavardhana himself. They are as follows :

लावण्यद्रविणव्ययो न गणितः क्लेशो महान् स्वीकृतः
स्वच्छन्दस्य सुखं जनस्य वसतः चिन्तानलो दीपितः।
एषापि स्वयमेव तुल्यरमणाभावाद्वराकी हता
कोऽर्थश्चेतसि वेधसा विनिहतस्तन्व्यास्तनुं तन्वता।।

(Dh.A, p. 240)

अनध्यवसितावगाहानमनल्पधीशक्तिना-
प्यदृष्टपरमार्थतत्वमधिकाभियोगैरपि।
मतं मम जगत्यलब्धसदृशप्रतिग्राहकं
प्रयास्यति पयोनिधेः पय इव स्वदेहे जराम्। (DhA. p.242)

The former verse is said to belong to the concluding portion of *Nyāyaviniścayavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti.[20]

3. Ānandavardhana employs the terms like *nāntariyaka* which are familiar in the Buddhist parlance.[21]

4. He is reported to have written a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti also.[22]

VII.4. Mahimabhaṭṭa

Buddhist logic seems to have exercised a profound influence on Mahimabhaṭṭa. The following points make it clear :

1. Mahimabhaṭṭa has cited following four verses from the PV of Dharmakīrti :

तदुक्तम्–
तद्भावहेतुभावौ हि दृष्टान्ते तदवेदिनः।
ख्याप्येते विदुषां वाच्यो हेतुरेव च केवलः।।

(VV. p.69: PV. III.26)

तदुक्तम्–
भ्रान्तिरपि सम्बन्धतः प्रमा इति।
मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतः।
मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषेऽपि विशेषोऽर्थक्रियां प्रति।।

(VV.p.76: PV, II.57)

तदुक्तम्–
स्वज्ञानेनान्यधीहेतुः सिद्धर्थे व्यञ्जको मतः।
यथा दीपोऽन्यथाभावे को विशेषस्य कारकात्।।

(VV.p.80: PV.III.262)

यदाहुः–
नासिद्धो भावधर्मोऽस्ति व्यभिचार्युभयाश्रया।
धर्मो विरूद्धो भावस्य सा सत्ता साध्यते कथम्।।

(VV.p.469: PV.III.p.190)

2. Ruyyaka, the commentator indentifies the following quotation of Mahimabhaṭṭa :

यदुक्तं–तच्च न शब्दपुनरुक्तं पृथग्वाच्यम् अर्थपुनरुक्तेनैव गतार्थत्वाद्। न ह्यर्थभेदे शब्दसाम्येऽपि कश्चिद्दोषः। यथा–

हसति हसति स्वामिन्युच्चैरूदत्यपि रोदिति।

द्रविणकणिकाक्रीतं यन्त्रं प्रनृत्यति नृत्यति। (VV.p.334)

with a passage in the *Vādanyāya* of Dharmakīrti by saying *yaduktam vādanyāye.*[23]

2. Bhaṭṭagopāla, the author of *Sāhityacuḍāmaṇi,* a commentary on KP describes Mahimabhaṭṭa as an *anumāna* theorist following Buddhist tradition.[24]

4. His concept of *vyāpti* as involving the relation of either *tādātmya* or *tadutpatti* between *hetu* and *sādhya* is evidently derived from Buddhist logic since it conceives of this dual relationship in *vyāpti.*

5. Ruyyaka in his commentary on VV often tries to clarify Mahimabhaṭṭa's position on the basis of Buddhist principles. Commenting on Mahimabhaṭṭa's inclusion of *Lakṣaṇā* in *anumāna*, Ruyyaka ponts out that though Buddhists accept *lakṣaṇā* as *arthavyāpāra* it should actually be considered *Anumāna.*[25] He thereby suggests that Mahimabhaṭṭa subscribed to Buddhist standpoint in such matters. Similarly on Mahimabhaṭṭa's comment that pain is a specific form of experience, Ruyyaka observes that this has been stated by Mahimabhaṭṭa as per Buddhistic principles.[25]

6. When Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that from the line *mohantu harervihaṅgamo hantu* we cognise a particular type of bird characterised by the class characteristic *Garuḍatva.* The commentary explains the point that *Garuḍatva* is reckoned as a class characteristic as per Buddhistic principles according to which *Garuḍas* are many.[26]

7. Mahimabhaṭṭa cites an anonymous passage[27] which accepts only two *pramāṇas* viz., *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Apparently this is a quotation from some Buddhistic work, since Buddhist logic accepts only two *pramāṇas*. It is true that Vaiśeṣika philosophers also accept only two *pramāṇas* but in view of many other references to Buddhisim in VV, the above passage is also probably from some Buddhist source.

VII.5. *Trairūpyahetuvāda*

(Theory advocating the three characteristics of a valid reason)

In Indian logic *trairūpyahetuvāda* is an important theory. Logicians, from the very beginning, have tried to define the characteristic of a valid reason or a *sadhetu* and to show how many characteristics exactly a *sadhetu* should have. In this connection, *trairūpyavāda* and *pañcarūpyavāda* have been developed. According to Buddhists, a *sadhetu* is that which possesses all the three characteristics viz., pervasive presence of the *hetu* in the *pakṣa (pakṣasattva)*, the necessary presence of the *hetu* in some similar instances *(sapakṣasattva)* and the absence of the *hetu* from dissimilar instances *(vipakṣāsattva)*.

These are the basic tenets for the Buddhists[28] concerning the test of validity or invalidity of a *hetu* in the absence of the three characteristics outlined above the *hetu* will suffer from the fallacies like *asiddha, anaikāntika* and *viruddha* respectively.

A lot of controversy has been created with regard to the *trairūpyavāda* of *hetu*. In the history of Indian Logic we find two interpretations of the concept of *trairūpya*, one in Praśastapāda and the other in Diṅnāga. Praśastapāda points out that 1. What is conjoined with *sādhya*, and 2. has been found in what possesses it, and 3. is always absent in the

absence of *sādhya*, is *liṅga* which brings about inference. What differs from this is one or two aspects lacking of the mark, being either contradictory, untrue or inconclusive. This view is very close to that of Diṅnāga. In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* he defines *trairūpya* as *'anumeye'tha tat-tulye sadbhāvo nāstitasati*. This means the *sapakṣa* like *mahānasa* and its absence in *vipakṣa* like *jalahrada* is later modified in the *Nyāyabindu* by Dharmakīrti as follows :

त्रैरूप्यम् पुनर्लिङ्गस्यानुमेये सत्त्वमेव, सपक्षे एव सत्त्वम् असपक्षे चासत्वमेव निश्चितम् । (Nyāyabindu, II.5)

Stcherbastsky remarks:[29]

The relation of the logical Reason to the substratum of the inference, on the one side, and to the similar and dissimilar cases, on the other side, is expressed in the three rules of Vasubandhu, which have been endorsed by Diṅnāga (sic) and Dharmakīrti. They constitute the celebrated three aspects of the logical reason as taguht by the Buddhists and rejected by all other schools of Indian logicians except the reformed Vaiśeṣikas.

It needs to be specially mentioned here that this *trairūpyavāda* of *hetu* is a special theory of Buddhist logic. On the other hand, Hindu Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers add two more characteristics for distinguishing a *sadhetu* from an *asadhetu* i.e. *asatpratipakṣatva* and *abādhitatva*. Thus they advocate *pañcarūpyavāda* of *hetu*. By enumerating the five-fold *hetvābhāsas* Gautama indicates that a real *hetu* must possess five characteristics *(pañcarūpa)* in default of any of which it becomes a *hetvābhāsa*.

With this background while studying Sanskrit poetics we observe that some of the poeticians who have entered upon some kind of discussion relating to the theory of *anumāna* have almost always referred to *trairūpya* of *hetu*.

They have also pointed out that the invalidity of a *hetu* arises from the absence of any of these three characteristics resulting in the *hetvābhāsas* like *anaikāntika* etc.

Obviously, the *trairūpya hetu* was sufficient for establishing the validity of a *hetu*. The remaining two of the *pañcarūpa* tradition of prācīna Naiyāyikas were redundant. This was soon realised by the Brahminical logicians also who were flexible enough to modify their views on this point. As Udayanācārya shows doubt about the *pañcarūpatva* of a valid hetu, it was obvious that neo-logician would adopt *trirūpatva* only.

Bhāmaha was the earliet poetician and the first to accept the *trirūpa hetu* under the influence of Buddhist philosophers. Later poeticians have only to follow the appropriate example of their staunch ancestor, as it can be seen from the following verses :

1. त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतो ज्ञानमनुमानं च केचन।
   तद्विदो नान्तरीयार्थदर्शनं चापरे विदुः। KA.V.11.
2. त्रिरूपलिङ्गाख्यानं परार्थानुमानमिति---------- VV.p.67.
3. यदुक्तं----------त्रिरूपलिङ्गाद्यनुमेयज्ञानं------ *Ibid*.p.81
4. पक्षधर्मान्वयव्यतिरेकित्वेन त्रिरूपो हेतुः साधनम्।
   KP. p.182
5. तथाहि-अनुमानं नाम पक्षसत्त्वसपक्षसत्त्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तत्व-विशिष्टलिङ्गो ज्ञानम्। SD., p.165

Thus, ultimately it was the Buddhist principle of the *trairūpya* of *hetu* that proved more efficient and was accepted both in poetical and logical tradition.

Thus Buddhist Logic, "a system of logic and epistemology created in India in VI-VII century A.D. by the

two great lustres of Buddhist science, the master Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti[30] has left remarkable influence on Sanskrit poetics. In the broad field of Indian Logic Buddhist Logic constitutes an intermediate state and was developed in a spirit of a decisive opposition to the logic of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It lasted for about three centruies and constituted an intermezzo after which Indian Logic continued its historical life in India in the absence of any Buddhist opposition. After the disappearance of Buddhist Logic new school of Nyāya concentrated all their attention on the problems of syllogism and was chiefly engaged in finding new and exceedingly subtle definitions of every detail of the syllogistic process.

Hence it is easy to infer that the poeticians who mainly flourished during the period when the high tide of the Buddhist Logic was continuing in India, have come under the influence of Buddhist logic. Even if many of the rehtoricians were brahmins and followers of Hindu religion, still they, when the occassion arises, unhesitatingly quoted *kārikās* from the classics of Buddhist logic in support of their contention and used definitions and terminology adopted by the Buddhist logicians. It is clear that the system of Buddhist logic was very influential, pre-dominat and the propounders of the system like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti had made great contributions and the authors of Alaṅkāraśāstra were much influenced by it. Ananalal Thakur remarks :[31]

"It (Sanskrit poetics) has many things in common with the Buddhist philosophers-the relation between the words and their import being one such important topic. Buddhist philosophers have written works like *Śabdārthacintāmaṇi*. The Buddhist definitions in almost all the cases were precise and their terminology were very rich and all-embracing. Moreover, Kashmir was the land where Akaṅkāraśāstra thrived more than anywhere else. It was Kashmir where

Buddhist Logic and philosophy also flourished a bit earlier and formed an important item in the curriculum. Hence it is but natural that the rhetoricians should take recourse to the Buddhist works whenever they were found useful. It may be added in this context that Brahminical logic for a time was overshadowed by its Buddhist counterpart to be revived subsequently by scholars like Vācaspati Miśra and others. But the Buddhistic elements made a permanent impression on the Alaṅkāraśāstra in its hay days."

During the period of development of Navya-Nyāya the poeticians were attracted towards this new system of logic with its new style and methods. The influence of various kinds, which we have observed in previous chapters on Sanskrit poeticians and their works, are purely of Navya-Nyaiyāyikas. Buddhist logic was almost non-existent then and it has nothing to influence the poeticians of this later period. It was only in the initial stages of Sanskrit poetics that we observe the clear influence of Buddhist logic on authors from Bhāmaha to Śaṅkuka, Tauta, Mahimabhaṭṭa and their contemporaries. In the later stages only those concepts of Buddhist logic (like *Trairūpya*) which were already assimilated in the main streams of Indian logic remained.

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   काव्यालङ्कार इत्येष यथाबुद्धि विधास्यते।। KA., I.1
4. हितप्रकरणे णत्र्च सर्वशब्दात्प्रयुञ्जते।
   ततश्छमिष्ट्या च यथा सार्वः सर्वीय इत्यपि। *Ibid.*VI.53
5. सर्वज्ञः सुगतो बुद्धो ------------ *Amarakośa,* I.1.13
6. *Saduktikarṇāmṛtam.* I.49.5.
7. अस्त्यात्मा प्रकृतिर्वेति ज्ञेया हेत्वपवादिनी। KA.V.15a
8. *Ibid*, VI. 17, 18, & 19
9. *Tattvasaṅgraha,* Vol.I, P. 395 .
10. ग्रथितं रक्रिलगोमिसूनुनेदम्।। KA.VI. 64a
11. Krishnamacharya, M., *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature,* Para 815, P.724
12. यः सुखी रामः असावयमिति प्रतीतिरस्तीति'। ABh.P.267.
13. विभावाद्ययोगे स्थायिनो लिङ्गाभावेनावगत्यनुपपत्तेः। *Ibid*, P.266
14. अर्थसारूप्यमस्य प्रमाणम्। *Nyāyabindu*, I.20
    यस्माद्विषयाज्ज्ञानमुदेति तद्विषयसदृशं तद् भवति।
    यथा नीलादुत्पद्यमानं नीलसदृशम् तच्च सारूप्यं सादृश्यमाकार
    इत्याभास इत्यपि व्यपदिश्यते। Com. of *Dharmottara* on I.20
15. न चात्र जन्यजनकभावनिबन्धनः साध्यसाधनभावः। *Ibid.*
16. ननु च ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तं सादृश्यम्। *Ibid*

17. *Locana*, P.542

18. शब्दाः संकेतितं प्राहुर्व्यवहाराय स स्मृतः।
तदा स्वलक्षणं नास्ति संकेतस्तेन तत्र न।। PV. III.91

19. *Ibid.* II. 263-4

20. तथा चायं विनिश्चयवृत्त्यन्ते धर्मकीर्त्याचार्यस्य श्लोक इति प्रसिद्धिः। एतदर्थसंसूचकश्चापरोऽपि हि स्फुट एव तस्य श्लोको विद्वद्भिः परिपठ्यन्ते। यथा – अनध्यवसित -------

Kāvyānuśāsanaviveka, p.363

21. Thakur, Anantalal," Influence of Buddhist Logic on Alaṁkāraśāstra," *Journal of the Oriental Institute* Baroda, Vol. VII, 1958

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid*

24. Ruyyaka, Com. on VV. P. 48

25. अनुभवविशेषात्मत्वोपगम इति सौगतप्रक्रिययैतदुक्तम्। *Ibid.* P.376

26. गरुडजात्यवच्छिन्नसौगतदृशा गरुडानां बहुत्वादिति भावः।
Ibid. 279

27. यदाहुः "न चान्य दर्शने ——— द्वे एव प्रमाणे। VV. P.81

28. *Nyāyabindu,* II. 3; III.1.

29. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic,* Vol. I.P. 243-4

30. *Ibid.* P.1

31. Thakur, Anantlal, *op.cit.* P.261.

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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing pages we have attempted a study of the influence of Nyāya philosophy on the various aspects of Sanskrit Poetics. In course of our study we have examined various Nyāya concepts in relation with the Poetic concepts. We have had an opportunity of studying the poeticians who have been influenced by the Naiyāyikas and also the conditions and time in which they composed their treatises. The evolution of the poetic concepts under the growing influence of Nyāya logic is also observed and brought to light. We come to realise that the Sanskrit Poetics manifests its deep relation with the principal tenets of Nyāyaśāstra of Gautama and his successors as well as Buddhist logicians. The important theories of Kāvyaśāstra such as *Śabdavṛtti, Rasa, Dhvani, Doṣa* and *Alaṅkāra* have been influenced to a great extent by the logical concepts of the schools of Nyāya system.

The Nyāya theory of *Śabdavṛtti* and the means of *Śaktigraha* has influenced the poeticians like Mahimabhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa, Keśavamiśra and Jagannātha etc. The Nyāya theories of *tātparya* and *anvitābhidhāna,* have influenced rhetoricians like Bhoja in treating *tātparya* (intention of the speaker) as a separate *Śabdavṛtti*. He holds the view that words convey the sentence meaning by their cumulative effect *(saṁhatyakāritā)*. In this regard he follows Jayantabha-

ṭa who in his NM advocates attributes of the cumulative effect to the *tātparyaśakti* of words.

In the same way the concept of the indicative power of the word i.e. *Lakṣaṇā* also will have to be attributed to the Naiyāyika influence on poetics. For example, Jagannātha following the Naiyāyika theory of *Lakṣaṇā-hetu* as explained by Viśvanātha Nyāyapañcānana in his NSM, accepts *tātparyānupapatti* as *lakṣaṇā-hetu*. Other poeticians are also found to discuss the concept of *Lakṣaṇā* after Naiyāyikas.

Next, the concept of *kāvyadoṣas* also seems to be influenced by Nyāya philosophy, particularly by its concept of *Nigrahasthānas* (the cause of defeat). *Nigrahasthānas* constitute one of the sixteen *padārthas* enumerted by Gautama, under the influence of which Ālaṅkārikas like Bharata, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa and many others have developed the poetic concepts of some *doṣas* such as *Bhinnārtha, Nyāyādapeta, Ekārtha* and *Arthāntara* are the cases in point. For example, *Ekārtha* (tautology) is defined by Bharata as - *aviśeṣābhidhānaṃ yat.* This fault can be compared with Gautama's *Punarukta.*

A number of Nyāya concepts have also been applied by the poeticians to formulate their important doctrines. Many of the Ālaṅkārikas reveal the conceptual influence of the Nyāya school. The *alaṅkāras* like *Ānumāna, Hetu, Udāharaṇa, Abhāva, Kāvyaliṅga, Dṛṣṭānta, Śabda, Pratyakṣ a* etc., are the examples of the conceptual influence. These *alaṅkāras* are defined and discussed after their concepts as explained by the Naiyāyikas. To give only one example, the definition of *Anumāna alaṅkāra* as given by various poeticians like Rudraṭa, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha etc. adds

nothing new to the Naiyāyikaś concept of *Anumāna*. In the same way there are other concepts of *alaṅkāras* which emerged and developed from the Nyāya influence in different periods of the evolution of the conception of *alaṅkāras* in rhetoric works.

The theory of *Rasa* is the most important and fundamental aesthetic concepts of Sanskrit poetics. From its first appearance in the NS of Bharata down to its establishment as the soul of *kāvya* in the work of Viśvanātha, there has been a steady working out of the idea of the *Rasa* as an aesthetic conception. The whole theory of *Rasa* realisation is based on the famous *sūtra* of Bharata. It is differently interpreted by different scholars on the basis of different philosophical points of view. Śaṅkuka, one of the prominent interpreters, has made under the influence of Nyāya philosophy, a unique attempt to interprete the *sūtra* of Bharata on the basis of the Naiyāyika theory of *Anumāna,* one of the four instruments of valid cognition. He considers *Rasa* to be a matter of inference. The *sthāyibhāva* of the original character *(Rāmādi)* is inferred to exist in the actor (though actually it does not exist there). Actually, it is a case of willing suspension of disbelief. The spectators willingly suspend the comprehension of the difference between the character and the actor and infers the *Rasa* to be existing in the actor.

Secondly, the Nyāya system has also influenced Mahimabhaṭṭa who has written his VV with the specific purpose of proving the inclusion of *Dhvani* in *Anumāna*. According to him the import of the literary composition is always conveyed by the expressed sense through the process of inference only and that there is no necessity to posit a new power, called *Dhvani*.

Again, all the rhetoricians have realised the applicability and usefulness of this Nyāya method of defining the objects and its examination. They have tried to employ this method in their works for better understanding of the Śāstric objects. The other reason is to make their system logical and scientific so as to make it unassailable by the opponents. Again, the impact of Nyāya methodology was so great and widespread in the sphere of śāstric activities in those centuries in India, that, if not for anything else but at least to claim for their *Śāstra* a status not inferior to that of others, the rhetoricians were of necessity oblige to adopt Nyāya methods in the enunciation of their theories and treatises.

The *Śabdābodha* method of the Navya-Naiyāyikas has influenced later rhetoricians like Jagannātha and Viśveśvara etc., who adopt it for the analytical exposition of different poetic figures of speech. Secondly, the *padakṛtya* method of Naiyāyikas, the method of examining the validity of each *pada* in the given difinitions, has been employed by some poeticians in formulating their definitions and proving the logical validity of each word of the definition. The attempt of Viśvanātha and Jagannātha to prove the validity of each word in their definition of the *kāvya* clearly reveal the Nyāya influence. Most of them also used this method in examining and refuting the definitions of *kāvya* given by other rhetoricians. Words in common parlance are invested with a technical sense by Naiyāyikas and Poeticians use them in technical rather than ordinary sense.

The illustrious poeticians of Sanskrit were influenced not only by the Hindu system of logic propounded by Akṣ-apāda Gautama and his successors but by the Buddhist system

of logic also. From a comparative perspective it can be observed that the influence of Buddhist logic is more predominant than that of the orthodox system of Hindu logic. This is rather strange because almost all the rhetoricians were brahmins and were orthodox in spirit. There is no reasonable ground also to hold that they were catholic in their outlook. One may, therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence, simply conjucture that logical and epistemological doctrines of Buddhist Naiyāyikas were so powerful and influential that Kāvyaśāstra simply could not neglect them in its stride of development. The poeticians might have thought of adopting their terms and arguments to enrich their poetic doctrines by logical principles. The rhetoricians have unhesitatingly quoted *kārikās* from the classics of the Buddhist logic in support of their contention and borrowed their definitions, terms and concepts.



APPENDICES

1. QUOTATIONS FROM THE NYĀYA WORKS
2. REFERENCES TO NYĀYA WORKS AND AUTHORS
3. INDECES

i. INDEX OF NYĀYA TECHNICAL TERMS
ii. INDEX OF ILLUSTRATIVE VERSES
iii. WORK-INDEX
IV. AUTHOR-INDEX

4. GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY